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EU Enlargement Package: Assessments must now translate into meaningful…

EU Enlargement Package: Assessments must now translate into meaningful media freedom action

The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) today welcomes the publication of the 2025 EU Enlargement Package and highlights key media freedom developments and concerns that should shape negotiations with candidate countries moving forward.

13.11.2025

Our organisations welcome the sharpening of criticism of certain countries engaging in egregious media freedom violations by the Commission in this year’s report, particularly Serbia and Georgia, and stress that assessments for all countries must now translate into effective progress on media freedom, media pluralism and freedom of expression.

 

The Enlargement Package recognises freedom of expression, media freedom, and pluralism as key pillars of a democratic society in the accession process. Although some improvements have been noted, the media sector in most candidate countries remains marked by persistent and systemic challenges, including political interference, lack of regulatory independence, and limited pluralism, as well as threats to the safety of journalists.

 

The report emphasises that the European Commission insists on the highest quality of reforms, especially regarding the rule of law, democratic institutions, and fundamental freedoms. However, some crucial media freedom issues deserve more attention in this report, which we highlight here.

 

The MFRR, which monitors national media landscapes and advocates for free media in all EU Candidate Countries as part of its mandate, seeks to spotlight the main concerns we want to be tackled in the enlargement process, as well welcome positive steps forward. 

 

Backsliding on media freedom

Georgia: The report accurately highlights severe backsliding, leading Georgia to decline to an early stage of preparation in the area of freedom of expression. This is the second consecutive year of backsliding, illustrating an escalating press freedom crisis driven by the ruling Georgian Dream party.  Since the protests were sparked by the government’s decision in November 2024 that Georgia would halt its EU membership negotiations until the end of 2028, the government’s crackdown on media and civil society intensified. Since the start of the protests in November, the MFRR’s Mapping Media Freedom (MapMF) platform documented 175 attacks affecting 288 media workers with the police and security forces as well as government officials being the major source of the attacks. Since MFRR started active monitoring of Georgia, in December 2023, MapMF has documented a total of 262 media freedom violations in the country affecting 433 media workers, which is the highest number of alerts recorded during the same period among EU candidate countries. 

 

Each day, Georgia moves closer to becoming a fully consolidated authoritarian regime, as the ruling Georgian Dream party intensifies its efforts to erode democracy and stifle dissent. Journalists have been viciously beaten, verbally assaulted, threatened, and detained. Their equipment has been confiscated and destroyed, and their work repeatedly obstructed. At the same time, government smear campaigns to discredit independent journalism have continued unabated. The Georgian Dream is adopting repressive legislation at an alarming rate, making it nearly impossible for independent media and civil society organisations to operate. As the report outlines, new legislation, including amendments to the Law on broadcasting, the Foreign Agents Registration Act and the legislative package on family values and protection of minors, all negatively affect the right to freedom of expression and the ability of the media to operate freely. Additionally, the Georgian Dream Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression, and the Organic Law on Common Courts. 

 

The country report on Georgia adequately assesses the capture of the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB), noting that it “lacks independence, has biased editorial policy and contributed to the promotion of anti-EU rhetoric.” MFRR repeatedly  raised concerns about the GBP, which has long been an instrument of the Georgian Dream government, and suppressed efforts by journalists who try to report free of political control, including firing several journalists. It further acknowledges the deterioration of journalists’ safety, including the use of arbitrary arrests, fines, and SLAPPs against journalists, and mentions the unjust imprisonment of Mzia Amaglobeli, founder and director of the online media outlet Batumelebi. The report brings into focus the severe crackdown on journalistic freedoms by the government, which make Georgia one of the key flashpoints for media freedom in Europe in need of urgent international attention. At this stage, the EU considers Georgia a “candidate country in name only” and urges authorities to reverse course. In the face of rising authoritarianism, Georgian media demonstrate exemplary resilience and refuse to be silenced. MFRR reiterates our call on the Georgian Dream to stop the crackdown on independent media and repeal repressive legislation. We also renew our call on the European Union and its member states to step up pressure on Georgia and stem the rapid descent into authoritarianism.

 

Serbia: The report is explicit in its assessment of backsliding on freedom of expression in Serbia, emphasising the current crisis and polarisation of society following the student-led anti-corruption protests initiated in November 2024. Attacks against free media continue to take place effectively unaddressed by authorities. Since November 2024, MapMF has documented 190 attacks affecting 341 media professionals, media outlets and journalists’ representatives. Of these, 82 journalists were targeted during demonstrations, with 51 media actors assaulted. The report also notes the smear campaigns and verbal attacks from government officials targeting journalists and media, denigrating critical journalists as enemies of the state. The latest example of these attacks is the orchestrated smear campaign against the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS) from the newly established journalists’ association ANS and pro-government tabloids, who falsely accused NUNS of plotting violence during demonstrations by distributing protective equipment to journalists ahead of demonstrations.   

 

Amidst a perilous environment for independent reporting, the future of independent media outlets remains uncertain. A recent investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) suggested efforts by President Vučić to “weaken” the editorial autonomy of the two remaining critical privateTV stations, N1 and Nova TV. These same broadcasters were labelled by Vučić as “doing pure terrorism”, and were removed from the SBB network as of 16 April 2025, retaining only their online platforms. Political interference is also contaminating newsrooms. The MapMF platform has documented several cases of journalists being dismissed or forced to resign in direct retaliation for defending ethical journalism and/or resisting censorship. Journalists at the public broadcaster, RTS, which was criticised for its unbalanced coverage of the protests, have not been spared pressure

 

While media freedom has been in a state of crisis for decades in Serbia, the current escalation of events over the past year represents one of the deepest downturns in press freedom  in the country’s recent history. The lack of independence of regulatory bodies is particularly concerning and it is demonstrated inter alia by the repeatedly obscure process of appointment of the members of the Commission for Electronic Media (REM). SLAPPs and other forms of intimidation continue to represent a threat for journalists in Serbia. MFRR organisations, which conducted a solidarity mission to Belgrade and Novi Sad earlier this year, have repeatedly called for a tougher stance by the EU in response to clear Serbian backsliding on media freedom and freedom of expression. While we welcome the long overdue hardening of language in the current report, we now call for the EU to exert maximum effort into ensuring sustained and concrete democratic reforms as part of Serbia’s accession process.

 

Türkiye: Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation in freedom of expression, with further backsliding observed in the overall state of democracy and media freedom, according to the 2025 report. Judicial actions against journalists and media intensified through politically motivated prosecutions and arrests, often relying on vague legal definitions and selective application of the law. The implementation of criminal laws related to national security, counterterrorism and defamation continued to hinder freedom of expression. The reporting period saw a further increase in arrests and detentions of journalists, underscoring the disproportionate use of legal measures to intimidate and silence media. For instance, Furkan Karabay, a journalist whose social media posts were deemed “insulting the president” was arrested. The 2022 Disinformation Law and the new Cybersecurity Law have also introduced vague provisions enabling censorship and surveillance.

 

Media ownership in Türkiye already remains highly concentrated among pro-government business groups. Türkiye’s broadcast regulator RTÜK maintained issuing discriminatory administrative and monetary fines against independent and opposition media outlets, further undermining media pluralism. Nearly 100 million liras in fines were imposed, along with 25 days of broadcast bans — including two full blackouts — and a government-appointed trustee took control of a TV channel. The selective allocation of public advertising and control over print distribution also damaged financial sustainability of independent and minority media outlets. Independent media outlets receiving foreign funding were frequently subjected to hostile rhetoric and smear campaigns by pro-government media. Online freedom is likewise restricted, as authorities frequently block access to critical websites, news articles, and social media accounts, and impose temporary shutdowns or throttling of platforms during protests or crises.

 

As the overall trend remains deeply concerning, marked by political interference and instrumentalisation of the judiciary, the MFRR reiterates the urgent need for Türkiye to overhaul its restrictive legislation and broadcasting frameworks. Reflecting the report’s assessment, we further echo the call for the release of detained journalists and human rights defenders, and urge the authorities to safeguard independent reporting as a cornerstone of media freedom and pluralism in Türkiye.

 

No progress on media freedom

Bosnia and Herzegovina: While the report  indicates that Bosnia and Herzegovina shows ‘some level of preparation’ in the area of freedom of expression, an ongoing political crisis at the entity level and a series of restrictive legislative changes have severely stalled paths for any meaningful improvement. The EU correctly reports ‘no progress’ achieved during the reporting period in guaranteeing freedom of expression, media freedom, and the protection of journalists. According to MFRR monitoring, the first half of 2025 instead saw a rise in attacks compared to the same period the previous year of threats including verbal attacks often perpetrated by politicians, physical assault, and interference with journalists’ work.The sudden closure of Sarajevo-based AlJazeera Balkans in July 2025, due to the cited financial issues, after 14 years of broadcasting further undermines media pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and across the region. The closure has left over 200 media professionals in Sarajevo, and other cities in the region without a job. 

 

The situation remains particularly challenging in Republika Srpska. In March 2025, the region’s National Assembly adopted a foreign-agent style law which targets independent media and civil society organisations that receive foreign funding, subjecting them to onerous reporting requirements under the risk of sanctions if they fail to comply with the new rules. In addition, criminal defamation, reintroduced into the Penal Code in 2023, forms part of a disturbing trend of expanding liability for dissenting opinions and creates a chilling effect, undermining previous progress as it was decriminalised more than 20 years ago. Our organisations consistently oppose criminal defamation laws, as they constitute a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression and are incompatible with international human rights standards. While the continuing political standoff in Republika Srpska continues, progress on media freedom looks set to face sustained hurdles without considerable democratic reform.

 

Kosovo: The country has some level of preparation but made no progress in the past year. The MFRR believes that this evaluation is well justified, considering that the government passed a heavily criticised media law, titled Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC). The Law was then annulled by the Constitutional Court demanding the prompt drafting of a new proposal. The boards of the public broadcaster and the media regulatory body remain dysfunctional due to a lack of quorum, as the parliament failed to elect new members. The public broadcaster faced turbulent times due to political interference, which culminated in the removal of six editors from its TV programs. This led the Ombudsperson to open an investigation into censorship. The situation further deteriorated in August when the staff of the public broadcaster received their salaries almost a month late – a situation that has been repeated in November.

 

Journalists continue to face difficulties in accessing information, as institutions remain largely closed to journalists and activists. The number of complaints filed with the Agency for Information and Data Protection over refusals of Freedom of Information (FOI) requests continues to rise on a yearly basis. Verbal and other forms of attacks and incidents also marked the year 2025, with government officials, including Prime Minister Albin Kurti, publicly attacking journalists and media outlets. Verbal and other forms of attacks and incidents also marked the year 2025, with government officials, including Prime Minister Albin Kurti, publicly attacking journalists and media outlets.

 

To improve the media situation, the MFRR urges the government and members of the ruling party Vetëvendosje to immediately stop their anti-journalist rhetoric. We further urge the incoming government to commit to preparing a comprehensive package of laws related to media freedom, ensuring that this package aligns with EU and Council of Europe standards and enjoys broad political support. We further call on the government to immediately release the funds owed to RTK so that salaries can be paid and the broadcaster can continue to operate, and for the Assembly of Kosovo to restore RTK’s legal governance structures and appoint the remaining board members to ensure the election of a permanent Director General without delay. Unless steps are taken to address converging crises, long term democratic media freedom reform in Kosovo risks heading into reverse.

 

Limited progress on media freedom

Albania: Although considered a frontrunner among candidate countries, when it comes to freedom of the media and freedom of expression, our organisations stress that Albania continues to suffer from numerous structural weaknesses and challenges to its still fragile media ecosystem. While the 2025 enlargement report assesses Albania as having some and a moderate level of preparation, the MFRR warns that recent legislative initiatives risk severely undermining recent tangible progress. In particular, draft amendments to the Penal Code on provisions related to defamation, insult and influencing judicial independence pose direct threats to media freedom and the fundamental right to freedom of expression. Our organisations have criticised these proposed changes and called for them to be amended. 

 

Further proposals by the parliamentary majority to significantly restrict journalists’ access to the Parliament of Albania, though not yet implemented, pose a threat to the public’s right to information. The non-execution of court decisions and the obstruction of journalistic activity at the Tirana premises of Focus Media Group also emerged as a key flashpoint for media freedom in 2025. Elsewhere, the country still faces serious challenges due to concentrated media ownership, strong ties of media owners to vested political and business interests, which undermines independence and public trust, as well as some instances involving the intimidation of journalists – all of which require sustained attention and action.

 

North Macedonia: The European Commission correctly observes a moderate level of preparation on freedom of expression in North Macedonia. The report accurately reflects the main challenges facing the media sector in the country, including the partial alignment of media legislation with European requirements, the need to strengthen the independence and capacity of the regulator (AAAMS), the ongoing reform of the public broadcaster (MRT), and the persistent risks to the safety of journalists (including physical attacks and online harassment). While the media environment in North Macedonia is generally stable, the difficult working and economic conditions faced by many journalists – especially in local and small media outlets struggling to remain viable – needs to be given more emphasis and considered as prerequisites for moving forward in the EU enlargement process. 

 

Of particular concern are also the lack of specific safeguards against abusive litigation (anti-SLAPP legislation) and the growing use of abusive lawsuits. Furthermore, the MFRR emphasises the need to undertake a comprehensive reform of the Media Law to address the evolving media landscape, particularly in the digital sphere. North Macedonia’s small and highly fragmented media market remains economically fragile, leaving media outlets exposed to political and financial pressures. State funding and advertising continue to reflect strong political influence over the media. Particularly concerning is the lack of transparency in the allocation of state budget funds for political advertising during election campaigns, a practice that distorts the market, increases media dependence on major political parties, and weakens editorial independence and media pluralism.

 

Some progress on media freedom

Ukraine: Overall, the media freedom situation in Ukraine remains positive, despite numerous and serious war-time pressures. Restrictions imposed within the scope of martial law regulations are “overall proportionate”, according to the Commission. While the most serious issues putting in danger the physical safety of journalists are caused by Russia’s war of aggression, the media also face a number of concerns created by domestic actors. Authorities typically react promptly to physical attacks, direct intimidation and harassment of journalists, by opening criminal cases to investigate the events. However, these criminal cases often fail to produce concrete results, and those responsible for the attacks are seldom identified and prosecuted.

 

Authorities must  ensure that restrictions imposed temporarily by martial law comply with key public rights and interests, such as access to information and media freedom. This is especially the case of Ukraine’s “United News” telethon: a government-funded project, the telethon pools Ukraine’s main TV channels into a common television broadcast, the content of which has been criticised domestically and abroad as unreliable and failing to meet objectivity standards. In its report, the Commission called upon Ukrainian authorities to reassess the format of the telethon “at latest by the time of the eventual suspension of martial law”. The independence of Ukraine’s national media regulator should be strengthened, and the transparency of media ownership increased, in line with the provisions of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). Efforts already made to implement the European anti-SLAPP directive are commendable, however these are only at a first stage of development. Overall, despite significant war-time pressures and challenges, the domestic situation for media freedom in Ukraine remains broadly positive, yet fragile.

 

Montenegro: Montenegro demonstrates moderate preparedness in freedom of expression, yet significant concerns persist regarding media independence and pluralism. The MFRR welcomes the overall positive trend noted by the Commission regarding Montenegro but notes a troubling increase in attacks against journalists and media outlets, with 17 recorded incidents affecting 25 individuals and organizations since January 2025, a sharp rise from six incidents in 2024. While physical assaults are rare, verbal abuse, often perpetrated by private individuals, including serious death threats, both online and offline, is particularly alarming. Furthermore, public officials and politicians have been primarily responsible for discrediting journalists’ work, underscoring a lack of understanding of the media’s democratic role. Additionally, the absence of a signed sectoral collective agreement contributes to poor working conditions and a lack of social dialogue. 

 

Public broadcasters, the Radio and Television of Montenegro and the Agency for Audiovisual Media Services (AMU) are particularly exposed to political pressure. The fact that AMU’s Council has been operating without its full composition since December 2024 due to the non-election of two members remains another serious issue. In parallel, ongoing court proceedings challenging the legality of the RTCG Director General’s appointment, and the recent conviction in first-instance proceedings against RTCG Council members for abuse of official position during the election, further raise concerns about transparency and adherence to legal procedures. However, at a time when national legislation requires further alignment with European media laws, the Ministry of Culture and Media’s newly formed working group to implement the European Media Freedom Act and the Digital Services Act into Montenegrin legislation is a positive step forward. Further action is needed to consolidate existing gains and push for further progress on media freedom and freedom of expression.

 

Good progress on media freedom

Moldova. Moldova is assessed as having between having some and a moderate level of preparation in freedom of expression and has made tangible progress, notably in adopting new legislation on access to information, implementing the law on the Media Subsidy Fund, amending the audiovisual media services code (AVMSC) and on advertising, as well as on the protection of journalists. Rules for selecting members of the public service broadcaster and the Audiovisual Council have been reviewed. While the overall climate for free and independent journalism remains relatively healthy compared to other EU candidate countries in the region, local divergences remain acute and all media face intense challenges to their financial viability.

 

In a landscape characterised by the division between pro-Western and pro-Russian politics, journalists face challenges in navigating polarised news environments and disinformation. The fragility of the media and public interest journalism due to the small advertising market is particularly concerning. While the media environment is overall healthy in most of the country, in Transnistria, a region occupied by pro-Russian military forces, no media are allowed to freely function. Issues also persist in the largely Russian-speaking regions of Gagauzia and Taraclia, where independent journalists report being regularly intimidated by local authorities and the population. The MFRR welcomes recent progress on freedom of expression and media freedom in Moldova and urges national authorities to continue on the trajectory as part of its EU aspirations.

This analysis was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Moldova: fears for press freedom in case of pro-Russian…

Moldova: fears for press freedom in case of pro-Russian victory

Journalists warn significant backsliding possible after elections on September 28.

On June 23 to 27, the International Press Institute (IPI), representing the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) consortium, conducted a press freedom mission to the Republic of Moldova, to assess the situation of press freedom in the country ahead of crucial parliamentary elections scheduled for September 28.

17.09.2025

Multiple interviews with journalists, press freedom activists and self-regulatory bodies painted a picture of a media sector concerned about the future of independent journalism in the country ahead of the closely watched election.

 

While the overall climate for free and independent journalism remains relatively healthy compared to other EU candidate countries in the region, local divergences remain acute and all media face intense challenges to their financial viability.

 

Moldova – still a safe haven for independent journalism?

IPI’s interviews with stakeholders in Moldova overall confirmed data documented on the MFRR’s Mapping Media Freedom (MapMF) platform. These alerts have shown that since regular monitoring started in June 2022, when Moldova became a candidate for entry into the European Union, the country enjoys a relatively healthy media freedom climate.

 

As of September 2025, the MapMF platform has recorded 81 press freedom violations in Moldova. The majority of these incidents were insults or harassment of journalists by politicians, either in person or online, as well as intimidation of journalists at protests.

 

Serious cases of physical violence against media workers were not recorded and the overall legal framework of Moldova ensures appropriate conditions for the exercise of independent journalism.

 

This includes media access to publicly available information, the right to freely report from protests and other events of public interest, as well as, overall, open media access to politicians and government officials.

 

Large-scale cyber attacks against media, which have become increasingly frequent in Europe, and especially in neighbouring Ukraine, have not been identified as a major risk in Moldova.

 

However, in a landscape characterised by the division between pro-Western and pro-Russian politics, journalists face challenges in navigating polarised news environments and disinformation. The fragility of the media and public interest journalism due to the small advertising market is particularly concerning.

 

These issues are deepened by acute regional differences within Moldova. While the media environment is overall healthy in most of the country, in Transnistria, a region occupied by pro-Russian military forces, no media are allowed to freely function. Issues also persist in the largely Russian-speaking regions of Gagauzia and Taraclia, where independent journalists report being regularly intimidated by local authorities and the population.

 

Attacks on the rise as geopolitical situation becomes more tense

The number of media freedom violations in Moldova has gradually increased since monitoring began in June 2022: 10 cases were recorded by the MapMF platform between April and December 2022, in comparison to 19 in 2023, 24 in 2024, and 25 in just the first eight months of 2025.

 

Journalists and press freedom organizations expressed particular concern about waves of attacks which have, over the past year, coincided with periods of high political tensions. The first months of 2025, for instance, saw a heavy backlash against journalists and media following the decision by the Trump administration to significantly cut U.S. foreign aid, including programmes which supported independent media.

 

In response, a number of actors, including pro-Russian politicians and private individuals, the latter especially in the online space, engaged in discrediting and intimidating behavior targeting media who previously received grant support from the United States.

 

While the drastic drop in U.S. funding greatly impacted Moldovan media, newsrooms have been able to adapt, with media representatives reporting that mass closures of media outlets have not been observed over the past year. Some journalists, however, expressed the fear that should the current level of support from European sources not continue, the risks of closure would become especially high for regional media.

 

Government approach to media freedom

While both MapMF data and interviews with Moldovan journalists have pointed to a relatively healthy level of media freedom in the country, concerns remain with regards to recent legal and regulatory decisions targeting media houses owned by pro-Russian oligarchs.

 

Central here is the mandate of Moldova’s strategic investment council (Council for the Examination of Investments of Importance to State Security). The government body was set up to help protect national security in the context of Russia’s invasion of neighbouring Ukraine and has over the past year made decisions on suspending the broadcasting of TV channels accused of distributing Russian propaganda.

 

While interviewees did not question in principle the legitimacy of the suspension of media outlets for the dissemination of pro-Russian propaganda, worries were expressed about a lack of sufficient due process in the adoption of these decisions, and the lack of transparency in the official justification for broadcast license suspensions. In fact, it was unclear whether there was any procedure in place at all for such situations, or what criteria were used to issue decisions on broadcast suspension.

 

Certain media representatives also expressed worries about the level of self-censorship in outlets which closely align editorially with the current government’s policies on pursuing European integration and denouncing Russia’s war in Ukraine. Some interviewees said that “a sort of symbiosis” exists between some pro-European media and the current government, which has led to negative perceptions about the editorial independence of these media which, in turn, leads to lower levels of public trust.

 

As a result, Moldovans have increasingly turned to social media in search of alternative voices or watchdog reporting. However, this has also increased exposure to pro-Russian disinformation and other forms of biased or unreliable news sources.

 

Efforts by the current government to counter these tendencies by building a national strategic communications (stratcom) office aiming to combat Russian disinformation, were assessed by many media stakeholders as largely ineffective.

 

Efforts to counter falling levels of trust in media, as well as Russian disinformation operations particularly during elections, are also undermined by low levels of media literacy in Moldova, leaving Moldova’s citizens particularly exposed.

 

All media stakeholders interviewed highlighted the serious risks created by Russian disinformation, arguing that Russian sources which attempt to discredit democratic, human rights and pro-EU values are able to mobilise significant financial resources, making the task of reaching local populations even more difficult for independent media.

 

Worries surrounding the outcome of the parliamentary election

The campaign preceding Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections in September 2025 included numerous instances in which journalists were dragged into the political contest between pro-European and pro-Russian forces, with politicians and protesters especially intimidating journalists who were carrying out reporting work.

 

Civil society organizations, self-regulatory bodies and journalists interviewed by IPI in Moldova also stressed the potential risks linked to the possible emergence of a pro-Russian government following the elections.

 

A proposal to introduce a “foreign agent” law in Moldova, similar to the one adopted in Russia, and more recently in Georgia, was even filed in parliament in April 2025, with the support of the Block of Communists and Socialists (BCS).

 

While this political group currently does not have a parliamentary majority, many journalists fear that pro-Russian parties could eventually approve such legislation and threaten the future of media which receive foreign funding.

 

Some journalists even discussed plans to relocate outside the country in the event of the victory of pro-Russian parties, noting that plans to work in exile were already explored following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

 

Other interlocutors, however, expressed doubts that a pro-Russian government would introduce restrictive “foreign agent” legislation. They pointed out that a foreign agent law would also affect many pro-Russian media, who rely on funding from Russia or other foreign sources.

 

Other fears of journalists surrounding a possible victory of pro-Russian groups include restricted access to information of public interest, limited access to press conferences for critical and independent media, as well as the possible misuse of spyware and other surveillance tools against journalists.

 

Transnistria and Gagauzia

While the media freedom situation in Moldova remains stable overall, this situation is very different in the region of Transnistria, which remains outside the control of the government in Chișinău. Inside Transnistria, independent reporting critical of the pro-Russian authorities does not exist. Journalists from other parts of Moldova cannot freely travel to the region to report. The arrest of TV8 correspondent Viorica Tataru, as well as more recent cases, testify to the risks of exercising independent journalism in Transnistria.

 

As reported by journalists who cover Transnistria and the bordering regions, reporting trips to the territory are complex operations conducted undercover, which at times leads to detention by the authorities. While to date all journalists detained in such circumstances were promptly released following the intervention of the Moldovan government or foreign embassies in Chișinău, this situation still creates high-risk conditions for journalists seeking to report from Transnistria.

 

Issues also persist in Moldova’s southern region of Gagauzia, which is under the control of the central government but enjoys a wide degree of autonomy. In Gagauzia, according to data published on the MapMF platform, journalists are regularly intimidated and harassed for their work, to a greater degree than in other regions of the country. While Gagauzia only comprises approximately five percent of Moldova’s population of around two million, close to one-third of all MapMF alerts registered in Moldova are directly linked to Gagauzia.

 

Equally important, independent journalists carry out their duties in a climate of hostility from a majority of the local population, which has traditionally elected pro-Russian parties.

 

Similar issues also persist in Taraclia, a region populated mainly by representatives of Moldova’s Bulgarian ethnic minority. In Taraclia, journalists face a situation similar to Gagauzia. Moreover, local journalists, reporting on their communities, can be exposed to greater risks of threats and intimidation as they are easier to identify and locate.

 

Conclusion

Overall, IPI’s mission to Moldova confirmed the situation depicted in data collected by the MFRR consortium since 2022, which showed a relatively healthy level of press freedom in the country despite its numerous challenges. While the situation remains overall positive, fears over the upcoming election have revealed the fragility of media freedoms in Moldova.

 

Serious issues remain with regards to Moldova’s vulnerability in the face of Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The fear expressed by some interviewees regarding the possible need to relocate independent media outside of Moldova, if pro-Russian parties obtain a majority in parliament in upcoming elections, is worrying in the context of the overall satisfactory situation of press freedom in the country today.

 

While the risk of Russian interference in Moldova was the greatest concern of interviewees, other long-present issues remain, such as the continued lack of even basic media freedom in Transnistria, and the continued intimidation of journalists in regions such as Gagauzia and Taraclia.

 

All in all, Moldova’s vulnerable position shows the need for additional support for the country’s vital independent media sector, the situation of which has become particularly unstable as a result of the Trump administration’s decision to terminate development aid programmes worldwide.

 

While the climate for media freedom in Moldova is positive overall, the situation remains fragile and the future of journalism could hinge dramatically on the outcome of the upcoming elections.

This statement was coordinated by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Analysis: Strengthening Moldova’s independent press in the shadow of…

Analysis: Strengthening Moldova’s independent press in the shadow of polarisation and propaganda

By IPI Contributor Daniel Salaru

Following the election of a pro-EU president in 2020, Moldova’s independent press has grown in strength and significance. However, challenges remain as a result of the country’s political and social instability, its vast levels of corruption, and the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine. Among growing regional tensions, Moldova’s independent press is preparing for an uncertain future.

Moldova, historically a frontier between empires, continues to suffer as a result of its past. Despite gaining independence from the USSR in 1991, its society has been continuously divided between aligning with the west or the former Soviet sphere.

 

The conflict between these opposing viewpoints led to the tumultuous early years of independence, with the tiny nation being divided between one central government, an autonomous territorial unit, Gagauzia, and a separatist region occupied by Russian forces, Transnistria.

 

The coming to power of President Maia Sandu’s pro-western government in 2020 brought new hopes for an independent press. However, against the backdrop of the nearby war in Ukraine, growing political and economic uncertainty continues to impede press freedom and pluralism to this day.

 

Between jingoists, oligarchs, and politicians 

Moldova’s press environment, though diverse, remains highly polarized. While the news conglomerates of oligarch and former Democratic Party of Moldova leader Vlad Plahotniuc collapsed after he fled the country in 2019, a new threat soon emerged. Another media empire rose to prominence under the control of the pro-Russian Socialist party (PSRM). Seven notable TV channels, several dozen news portals and Telegram channels, alongside dozens of political commentators, came under the direct or indirect control of the PSRM and its leader, Igor Dodon. Their rhetoric was continuously bolstered by Russian propaganda, exploiting the popularity of the Russian language in Moldova.

 

Despite an often-hostile environment, independent outlets continued to reveal the corruption of leading officials and fight disinformation. RISE, a leading independent Moldovan investigative outlet, released a notable series of reports discussing the ties between Kremlin and Dodon. Other investigative outlets often used their platforms to expose the opulence and schemes of oligarchs, public officials, and members of the judiciary. The free press has had successes in exposing the root causes of disinformation.

 

However, the combined efforts of the pro-Kremlin and pro-PSRM media networks continued to undermine popular confidence in state institutions and the very concept of Moldovan independence, making it difficult for independent outlets to gain the trust of the public. Despite domestic and international efforts, low levels of media literacy often rendered many in Moldova susceptible to disinformation campaigns.

 

“Propaganda is like radiation, it is very hard to contain,” said Vladimir Thorik, the Russian-language editor of RISE, in an interview with IPI. “No matter what you do, you can’t succeed. Propaganda appeals to the ideas of the good old Soviet times and that the West is foreign to Moldovan society. It uses corrupted methods and ideas.”

 

After 2020, the increasingly hostile rhetoric of the pro-Russian media, both external and internal, continued to sow instability. A 2021 poll by the Institute of Public Politics, a Moldovan civil society organization, found that 90 percent of the inhabitants of Gagauzia got their news from Russian-language media outlets. A total of 62 percent of the respondents expressed their extreme confidence in Russian-language news. These channels were controlled either by the Kremlin or the PSRM.

 

Russia’s influence remained strong in all territories of the Republic, as Moldova’s governmental institutions were simply not strong enough to counter the barrage of disinformation.

 

However, the war in Ukraine brought the battle against disinformation into the spotlight.

 

A new fight 

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in an effort to counter the increasingly damaging effects of Kremlin propaganda, the Moldovan parliament effectively banned the broadcast of news, military, political and analytical Russian programmes on June 22. However, even this radical ban was not able to counter the effects of years of disinformation.

“In Gagauzia and Transnistria they air Russian news channels and the Chisinau authorities cannot do anything about it,” said Thorik.

Disinformation continued to spread through the internet. The Socialist-controlled TV channels, while supposedly airing Moldovan news, ignored the war in Ukraine at best and disseminated Kremlin talking points at worst.

“Some media chose to not talk about the war, but talked a lot about refugees, failing to discuss who started the war and how the war was going. It was bizarre,” said Nadine Gogu, the executive director of the leading Moldovan press freedom NGO Center for Independent Journalism (CJI), in an interview with IPI. “A lot of Russian content replaced this, like shows and movies. Once Russian talk shows were banned, even the shows not discussing politics still discussed politics, as the Russians adapted and tried to reach outside Russia.”

Facing a weakened, yet persistent network of disinformation, Moldovan outlets continue to look for new ways to counter disinformation and strengthen their presence. However, the ever-present military threat from Russia via Transnistria and Gagauzia has created a permanent level of uncertainty for all outlets in Moldova.

 

Adapting to the new reality 

The full-scale conflict in Ukraine, at its start, presented an unprecedented challenge to Moldovan outlets. Amidst a drastic increase in work intensity, advertising revenues collapsed, while staffing shortages became more acute.

 

“The first months were very difficult,” said Gogu. “Advertising revenues fell drastically… a lot of mass media institutions were left without the few revenues that were coming from advertising. Some said that this withdrawal was even selective, advertising was taken from the outlets that were actually reporting about the war, while others who chose to ignore the war or be silent on it continued to receive revenues.”

 

“The volume of work has grown massively, editors are few and continue to remain in small numbers,” Gogu added. “People continue to be exhausted, working seven days a week as things are changing hour to hour, minute to minute. They do not have the resources to hire people, due to the fall in advertising revenues.”

 

Despite these hardships, the free press has attempted to adapt to the new reality. Through new international partnerships and methods of financing, as well as long-term education campaigns, many hope to break the media bubble that some Moldovans have found themselves in.

 

“We started talking more intensively with Ukrainians and Russians,” said Thorik. “We have the Transnistrian problem and many other threats that we did not talk about much before.” Indeed, in cooperation with the independent Ukrainian outlet Slidstvo, RISE published an investigation into the use of Ukrainian passports by leading Transnistrian leaders in order to travel freely through Europe. “On the one hand, they organized a mini North Korea and on the other hand they used the passports to go abroad,” said Thorik.

 

Many in the independent press have also increasingly looked to outside grants to compensate the loss of advertising revenues. As advertising contracts are often politically motivated, grants act as a guarantor of editorial independence for many outlets. “Today many Moldovan outlets have accessed international grants,” said Gogu. “They wish to continue their work.”

 

However, problems with grants persist.

 

“There was some international aid,” stated Thorik. “There were some grants for improving safety. However, they were not structural or institutional grants, they were one-time, purchasing equipment piece-by-piece for the time being. As we see from the example of Ukrainian journalists, once war starts, we have to be prepared. We are in a period of uncertainty, we do not know the threats that are facing us.” Like Ukrainian journalists themselves, members of the Moldovan free press have expressed their concern over the short-term nature of many of the grants.

 

Leading outlets and press freedom NGOs have also made efforts to increase levels of media literacy and critical analysis skills to improve the population’s ability to detect disinformation. Thanks to CJI support and leadership, in the 2021-2022 school year, the optional school subject of media education was taught by 128 teachers to 4,208 schoolkids across the entire country. The center supported numerous other projects promoting critical analysis skill and media literacy. “We work on media education and hope to integrate this concept in other institutions,” said Gogu.

 

Uncertainty on the horizon 

“It is calm now, but we do not know what will happen in the fall,” says Gogu. Independent journalism in Moldova, while currently showing remarkable progress, is ultimately under grave threat.

 

With the continuously evolving situation in Ukraine, as well as growing domestic hardships, it is likely that the challenges that the Moldovan press will face in its near future will be immense. With the growing potential for Moldova’s domestic situation to be exploited by external forces, it is imperative that the work of a free and independent press is continuously supported, both domestically and internationally.

This article is part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries, and Ukraine. The project is co-funded by the European Commission.

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