27 March 2026

On 26 March 2026, the Hungarian government said it intended to file a criminal complaint against Panyi, a journalist for VSquare and Direkt36, accusing him of spying for Ukraine. The espionage accusations surfaced just as the journalist, who has reported extensively on alleged links between Hungarian officials and Moscow, exposed unprecedented Russian influence operations aimed at boosting Orban’s re-election. Allegations involved Hungary’s foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, who reportedly updated his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, with the details of confidential EU meetings. 

 

Earlier this week, the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) – a state administration investigating alleged “foreign agents” activities – and pro-government media launched a smear campaign against Panyi, accusing him of being part of a foreign influence network. The campaign escalated after pro-government outlet Mandiner published an edited audio recording of a conversation between Panyi and a confidential source. Following its release, senior government officials and media outlets accused the journalist of colluding with foreign intelligence and undermining national sovereignty.

 

In a statement published on social media, Panyi denied the accusations entirely, stood by his reporting and pledged to protect his sources: “Accusing investigative journalists of espionage is virtually unprecedented in the 21st century for an EU Member State. This is typical of Putin’s Russia, Belarus, and similar regimes.” He added: “Defending myself publicly would be easier if I were not bound by source protection. But that remains my top priority. I cannot reveal who provides me information or what I receive, including from within Hungarian state structures.”

 

In 2021, Panyi was among the five Hungarian journalists targeted by the Pegasus spyware, which an investigation revealed was deployed by Hungarian intelligence or national security services between 2018 and 2019.

 

The MFRR partners strongly condemn the baseless accusation against Szabolcs Panyi as a serious escalation in Hungary’s campaign to crush independent journalism. The pending criminal complaint is not only an effort to intimidate and discredit one of the country’s most respected investigative reporters, but also a blatant attempt to expose and silence his sources. 

 

By targeting Szabolcs Panyi, the Hungarian government is sending a chilling message to deter investigative reporting, and shield those in power from scrutiny in crucial election times. The MFRR urges the Hungarian authorities to immediately stop its crackdown on independent journalism, as well as fully respect the rules of the democratic game. We further call that the European Union’s response to this direct threat to media freedom and European democratic values be swift and strong.

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

21 November 2025

Our organisations call on the European Board for Media Services (Media Board) – the independent EU advisory body established by the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) – to initiate an advisory opinion on the takeover, which we hope will be an important test case for ensuring free and pluralistic media inside the bloc.

 

In early November 2025, it was announced that Indamedia, a pro-government media group, had reached a deal with Ringier, a Swiss media company, to purchase its portfolio of media titles in Hungary for an undisclosed sum. The purchase includes Blikk, the country’s most popular tabloid, which has three million monthly online readers as well as several regional newspapers.

 

The acquisition represents yet another example of the consolidation of media under government-aligned ownership. Indamedia is linked to the Prime Minister’s business circle through the influence and partial ownership of Miklós Vaszily. Vaszily owns 50% of Indamedia and is also president of TV2, a major pro-government television channel. His career includes leading roles at other Orbán-aligned outlets, including Origo, which was transformed into staunchly government-friendly media under his stewardship.

 

Indamedia already owns Index, a formerly independent online news website which was captured in 2020. If the same policies enforced at Index and Origo are now implemented at Blikk, a market leader, it would further shrink the space for citizens to access pluralistic media content. With the recent appointment of a new editor-in-chief aligned with the new owners, the threat of editorial adjustments appears high.

 

Crucially, this merger comes less than six months before the April 2026 election in which the ruling Fidesz party is facing its biggest challenge in a decade and tails in the polls. The acquisition therefore looks timed to tighten media control ahead of the vote and increase the ability of the government to reach voters.

 

The takeover, and its timing, must also be viewed against the backdrop of the Hungarian government’s long term media capture strategy, in which media titles owned by foreign owners retreating from the market have been bought up at opportune moments in strategic acquisitions led by business interests linked directly or indirectly with the government or the Prime Minister, after which new editors are brought in, the editorial line is recalibrated, and overt criticism and watchdog journalism is silenced, and to differing levels replaced with political propaganda. Examples include the sale in 2016 – also by Ringier – of the newspaper Népszabadság to Mediaworks, a company with close ties to the government who promptly closed the paper.

 

Over the past 15 years, the government has successfully orchestrated this strategy to the point where it is estimated the government holds sway or indirect control over 80% of the media market. This has been combined with capture of the public broadcaster, the installation of former Fidesz MPs to control the key media regulator, and the deliberate bloating of state advertising budgets to prop up media towing the government line. As a new report published this week outlines, the result is the most sophisticated system of media capture and control ever developed within the European Union.

 

The EU Commission’s flagship European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which entered into full force in August 2025, was developed in part to address the systemic challenges to democratic systems posed by such state-led media capture. With this new regulatory framework in place, all key obligations under the EMFA are now mandatory for Member States. The Media Board, established specifically to advise the European Commission, now has a mandate, and a duty, to act.

 

Under EMFA, any media merger that could have a significant impact on media pluralism and editorial independence qualifies for assessment. Under the new rules, the Media Board can issue an opinion after being consulted by the relevant national regulator. In Hungary, the Media Council and the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) are tasked with assessing such mergers. However, there has been no indication so far that either body will do so. As the Hungarian government has challenged EMFA before the European Court of Justice seeking to have it nullified, any interaction with Hungarian regulators appears unlikely.

 

Even if it were to launch its own assessment, the Media Council is dominated by former Fidesz MPs and is the target of infringement proceedings by the Commission over its discriminatory decision to reject the license renewal of one of the country’s last critical radio broadcasters. It is therefore unlikely that any assessment conducted by the Media Council on this merger would be transparent, objective, proportionate and non-discriminatory – the criteria set out under EMFA for such assessments.

 

Instead, in the absence of an independent consultation by the national regulators, rules state that the Media Board may issue an opinion on its own initiative, or when requested by the European Commission. Given the clear impact the merger in Hungary will have, our organisations believe this represents an important first potential case for the Media Board. Rather than wait for the Commission’s appeal, the Board should swiftly launch its own assessment. This advisory opinion should address the wider landscape for media pluralism in Hungary, and examine the editorial practices imposed by Indamedia after previous acquisitions, as well as its connections to government.

 

When completed, the Media Board can then present its assessment to the Hungarian Media Council, which is, under EMFA rules, obliged to take its opinion “to the fullest extent possible”. If this opinion is disregarded, the regulator is obliged to submit its reasoning to the Board and the Commission explaining its position and why the opinion was not followed.

 

While any conclusions made by the Board assessment are non-binding, we believe this impact assessment can still play an important role in highlighting the undemocratic nature of the takeover at the European level. In addition, any actor seeking to challenge the merger under domestic law will be able to cite in the Board’s advisory opinion in court. Moving forward, assessments of the Media Board on Hungary must be combined with close monitoring of implementation of the EMFA in Hungary by the Commission, which should use all tools at its disposal to enforce the rules.

 

While our organisations recognise that the EMFA alone cannot and will not be a silver bullet for addressing systemic challenges in Hungary, its provisions must be utilised to the fullest extent to roll back entrenched media capture, to the benefit of a free and pluralistic media market, and more widely the country’s democracy. The EMFA’s new rules are now in place. No time should be wasted in using them.

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

22.07.2025

On 21 July, the Hungarian National Investigation Bureau’s Cybercrime Investigation Unit announced that they had raided the home of a 23-year-old man suspected of carrying out the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and confiscated numerous digital devices.

 

Police said the man, whose identity has not been revealed, is the cyberattacker known as Hano, who was identified as coordinating attacks on media websites in Hungary, as well as IPI. He was arrested and questioned on 9 July on suspicion of the crime of information system or data breach, according to authorities.

 

Formal charges have yet to be brought while police continue to assess digital evidence, and he has since been released from custody. Hungarian authorities added that evidence was found on the seized devices that clearly indicated the commission of the digital crimes.

 

“IPI welcomes the announcement of the arrest by Hungary’s Cybercrime Investigation Unit of the individual suspected to be the cyber attacker known as Hano,” said IPI Executive Director Scott Griffen. “We await further details on the investigation and planned charges. There are many questions here that must be answered to secure accountability. We urge authorities to clearly identify the motive behind these attacks as well as to fully and transparently investigate and determine whether any external coordination or funding was involved in these targeted attacks on independent media and civil society.”

 

IPI’s website was first hit by a DDoS attack on 1 September 2023, just days after we published a report detailing how at least 40 different media websites in Hungary had been hit by DDoS attacks, a form of cyberattack which crashes websites by overloading their servers with millions of simultaneous access requests. The majority of these attacks were directed against independent media platforms, including HVG, Telex, 444.hu, Magyar Hang, and Népszava, while pro-government media were left unscathed.

 

The attack kept IPI’s website offline for three days while our IT team fought to repel waves of attacks. An in-depth forensic analysis conducted in December 2023 by the Qurium, a non-profit based in Sweden, confirmed IPI’s initial assessment that the DDoS attack was carried out in retaliation for our work in support of independent media in Hungary.

 

Hungarian authorities said the man was identified by the Cybercrime Investigation Unit via digital traces and fake profiles. An analysis of access logs and examination of network traffic showed the perpetrator had used so-called “DDoS for hire” services and other online tools to carry out the attacks, which were executed under the name Hano – which he also used on service provider interfaces and in personal messages.

 

After it reported on the attack on IPI, the German newspaper taz was also hit by a similar attack a week later, mirroring a pattern of reprisals for media reporting on the DDoS attacks. Analysis of technical logs from the attacks on taz and IPI both show how the hacker used the nickname Hano – an acronym in Hungarian for a disorder which affects the human body. During many attacks, messages were left behind in the code, such as #HanoHatesU. The same message was left in the code of attacks on Hungarian media outlets, which continued in 2024.

 

Experts taz spoke to unofficially classified Hano as an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) – defined by the German Cybersecurity Agency as a well-trained, usually state-sponsored attacker who targets a system over a long period of time.

 

The Hungarian police report specifically mentions the attacks on IPI, which led authorities in Budapest to contact Austrian authorities due to the cross-border scope of the investigation.

 

IPI reported the case to Austrian police at the time and sent information to the Hungarian Cybercrime Investigation Unit in April 2025. IPI will be contacting Hungarian and Austrian law enforcement agencies to request further information.

 

“Cyber attacks pose a growing threat to press freedom worldwide, severely harming the public’s right to news and information. It is essential that law enforcement authorities take these attacks seriously whenever they occur and ensure full accountability for all those involved.”

In the wake of the attacks, IPI worked with Cloudflare to provide free digital security tools to a number of Hungarian media to help them defend against future DDoS attacks. If you are a media outlet in need of support in repelling DDoS attacks, IPI can provide referrals for enhanced defences free of charge. Please contact IPI for more information.

This statement was coordinated by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.