Montenegro: After a new acquittal, the hopes and projects…

30. January 2023

Montenegro: After a new acquittal, the hopes and projects of journalist Jovo Martinovic

After over seven years of judicial ordeal and after spending fifteen months in pre-trial detention on drug trafficking charges, investigative journalist Jovo Martinovic was acquitted for the second time by the Supreme Court on 17 January. We interviewed him while waiting for the final verdict.

Interview by Paola Rosà

One last step is still missing, but the trial of Jovo Martinovic, investigative journalist tried, convicted, acquitted, reconvicted, and acquitted again for criminal association and drug trafficking, seems over after almost eight years of authentic ordeal. Under the international spotlight since 2015, for over 15 months in pre-trial detention, the protagonist is now simply tired and eager to go back to doing his job in a country where journalism faces corruption and threats, and where reports of violence are ignored and even cases of murder often go unpunished.

A few days ago the second acquittal arrived in a process that the Supreme Court has asked to be redone twice. In all there were two convictions and two acquittals, with almost 15 months in pre-trial detention. How do you feel about this last decision?

The sentence is not final, it must be confirmed by the Supreme Court. At the same time I recognise that it will be a formality, as it was the Court itself that sent everything back to the sender, establishing that in the new trial other elements had to be taken into consideration and some gaps filled. So, it’s a formality, but to celebrate I have to wait a few more months.

In this last trial, your activity as a journalist was considered, acknowledging that those contacts with the criminal group were aimed at journalistic investigations. So, good news. But I guess you’re exhausted by now from telling your case: a journalist is more used to asking questions than receiving them, right?

That’s right!

If you had to find an explanation for what happened, would you mention revenge, punishment, injustice, or rather the will to control and silence journalism?

It’s just the legacy of the communist system. Unlike in all other countries, communists continued to rule in Montenegro until 2020. It was the same political party that came to power in 1945, and just changed the name after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

So, nothing personal?

The new communist system did all it could to retain control of each aspect of life. And if you work for international outlets, then you are automatically a foreign agent, a suspect. I have been treated as such for years. This is not my first incarceration: in 2004 I was in detention for the denigration of the good name of the country. It’s a charge that had not been used since 1974. But in 2004 they charged me for denigration of the good name of Montenegro because I happened to be a photographer for the British guy who wrote the story on the sale of Roma children in the country. The funniest thing is that when I was arrested I wasn’t questioned about the story at all. I was questioned about who was assisting Italian and German press coverage of the secret smuggling, that was the main topic of my interrogation, not the actual story that was used as a pretext for taking me in.

This episode tells us a lot about journalism in the country, isn’t it?

Exactly, if you don’t cooperate, if they can’t force you to submit, or to do whatever you are told by the secret service, be prepared for consequences.

Your case received a lot of solidarity and support from international organisations, including MFRR. What did you experience with your colleagues from Montenegro?

It must be said that they are not really my colleagues, in the sense that we don’t deal with the same things and I don’t work for Montenegrin newspapers; I also deal with other countries as well. So, it’s not like they knew me that much. Furthermore, at the beginning it was also difficult to let people know what was happening to me: the news of my preventive detention only came out after three months. In any case, I must say that they then made up for it, several journalists’ associations made themselves heard, as well as some independent newspapers, and even colleagues who work in state broadcasters showed empathy, some publicly, others privately.

So, there is hope for journalism in Montenegro. What do you think?

I think so! Since former communists no longer control the government, people are slowly getting rid of that legacy. It’s not just about massive surveillance, but also self-censorship, because even now, journalists are aware of what they can cover, or how far they can go in terms of certain issues.

Is the situation in Montenegro influenced by the fact that it is a small country?

What makes it unique is that the same political party ruled for 75 years, without interruption, from 1945 to 2020. It’s a small country, 600,000 people, which is easy to control and which is not strategically important to any big power, and the big powers were not that bothered with internal reforms, they just wanted stability and no big commotion, like in Bosnia or in Kosovo.

In the end, what is the outcome of your story? What have you lost, and what have you learned?

The consequences were bad, I’ve been marked. But on the other hand, when you have a clean conscience and you know that you were just doing your job, it just gives you strength to carry on. And I continue to do my work as before and even more. But secondly, I just won’t compromise, I mean, this is not the first time that I have encountered warnings and threats. I rather believe that this came as a result of me ignoring early warnings and threats. Eventually, it’s good for freedom of speech and the press, because giving in is something that backfires.

It seems you had no other choice.

I just carry on. I know it’s not pleasant, but it’s real. You find yourself under such charges, and of course in detention it’s like science-fiction meets you in a way, you have the feeling it’s happening to someone else, you’re just a by-stander, it’s surreal but it’s a reality at the same time.

What kind of message does your story hold for the rest of the country?

Well, the country is known for many unsolved attacks against journalists, there are many cases of physical assaults, threats, there’s a case when one editor-in-chief, Dusko Jovanovic, was killed in 2004, and it is still unsolved. So, freedom of the press has been constantly mentioned in many EU reports, the country was at the bottom of the Index by RSF, so it is something that has been known for years and remained unaddressed by the former government, except for promises.

If things go well in your case, are you expecting compensation?

Yes, once the verdict is final, I can claim compensation, but the main compensation is the clearing of guilt. I don’t believe money can compensate what I have been through. The main thing is just to clear my name. Having a pile of dirt thrown upon, a criminal record against someone who has fought all his life against injustice and crime and corruption, is a lot. Clearing my name is my main satisfaction, the rest comes after.

Will it be possible to name the perpetrators?

It depends. Recently, the deputy chief of the special prosecutor’s office was arrested for abuse of his office, and some other things have changed in terms of the abuse of the previous special prosecutor office. So it may come a day when the prosecutor is not only involved in abuse of office or cooperation with the criminal cartels that were operating in the country, but some other evidence may come up that they were complicit in covering up attacks on journalists. Actually, recently a former police official accused the former attorney general of being complicit in covering up of the murder investigation of Dusko Jovanovic killed in 2004. It’s reasonable to conclude that there will be new details on how the former prosecutors worked, or failed to work in accordance with the law and the Constitution. But this is not my task, it’s up to the new prosecutors in power to deal with.

It must be quite hard to continue to believe in justice.

Thanks to the EU there are certain changes in the justice system. Unfortunately, all comes with big external pressure, but nevertheless it’s happening. And of course it will take some time. Well, it will take probably a lot of time till we have a judiciary which is on pair with the European Union. But it’s a process, and we’re all aware that it takes time.

Your plans for the future?

For the time being, I carry on with my work. After so many years, and after being incarcerated nearly 15 months, you just learn to live with that. You just carry on with your life despite all the difficulties. And I think that’s a good attitude to take, because if we cave into resentment and hard feelings, that’s bad, that backfires. My approach was to remain open, to take it easy and to just move on. And this gives you more strength than being resentful and bitter, blaming people and lashing out. It’s something that I have always wanted to avoid.

This interview was conducted Paola Rosà for OBC Transeuropa as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors, and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.

Albania: MFRR and Safe Journalist Network condemn attack on…

27. January 202327. January 2023

Albania: MFRR and Safe Journalist Network condemn attack on journalist Elvis Hila and his wife

The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) and the Safe Journalists Network today condemn the shocking physical attack on Albanian journalist Elvis Hila and his wife in Lezhë and urge state law enforcement authorities to swiftly detain the suspected perpetrators and ensure that all those responsible face justice.

The violent attack took place at around 4.40pm on Wednesday 25 January, one day after Hila had reported for shqiptarja.com and Report TV about a local court case in Lezhë in which a defendant had been sentenced to a year in prison for forgery of a court document.

Soon after publication, Hila said he received a phone call from an individual connected to the defendant who insulted and threatened him about the report. An hour later, another individual then called Hila and demanded that he meet him outside a bar in the city.

When the journalist arrived in the car with his wife, two men approached and insisted he get out of the vehicle to explain the article. During the incident that followed, the men allegedly punched and kicked Hila and punched his wife in the neck. Both required medical treatment following the assaults.

Speaking to media after being released from hospital, Hila publicly identified his alleged attackers and said the violence would not silence his reporting. Specialists for the Investigation of Crimes in Lezhë opened a criminal investigation and are currently searching for two male suspects.

Our organisations welcome the swift action by police and urge them to now conduct a thorough investigation to confirm the motive and quickly detain the alleged perpetrators. All those responsible for ordering, orchestrating and carrying out this serious attack must face justice.

We also welcome the swift condemnation of the attack by the country’s President, Bajram Begaj, and stress that vocal denunciation by political leaders in cases involving violence against the press should be the standard response in all such incidents, now and in the future.

This attack is a worrying indication of the continued threats that journalists in Albania reporting on the actions of organised crime groups continue to face. Hila was attacked simply for carrying out his public interest mission of covering the verdict of a court case.

As many of our organisations noted following a recent media freedom mission to Albania, while serious physical assaults such as this thankfully remain rare, cases of violence against journalists underscore the dangers and climate of distrust that journalists face due to their work.

Swift prosecution of those behind this attack by judicial authorities is vital for discouraging potential acts of violence against the media in the future and ensuring justice for the victims. Moving forward, our organisations will continue to closely monitor this case and hope to see positive developments in the coming days and weeks.

Signed by:

ARTICLE 19 Europe
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
International Press Institute (IPI)
OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
Safe Journalist Network

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

Bosnia and Herzegovina now covered under MFRR mandate

25. January 202325. January 2023

Bosnia and Herzegovina now covered under MFRR mandate

The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) mandate covers all EU member states and candidate countries.

Click here to read the statement in Bosnian.

On 15 December 2022, the leaders of the European Union voted unanimously to grant EU candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this development, the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) can now include the country in its activities – including monitoring, support projects, and advocacy work.

Journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been appearing frequently in reports related to attacks and threats against them. Reporters who focus on corruption, minority rights, LGBTI+, radicalism, and war crimes have been working under pressure from politicians and criminal groups. Politicians in the country have also been targeting journalists frequently and their influence over public media and regulatory bodies has been worrying. We are glad that our mandate now covers Bosnia and Herzegovina so we can help to protect journalists and strengthen media pluralism in a country that badly needs it.

As well as monitoring all media freedom violations that take place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and recording them on Mapping Media Freedom, the MFRR partners will now also be able to offer practical support to journalists and media workers in the country. This includes both legal support and practical support such as medical assistance, subsistence costs, psychological support, work provisions, family support, and preventative safety measures. Journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina facing harassment or threats as a direct result of their work will also be eligible to apply for the Journalists-in-Residence programme.

Read more about the MFRR’s support offerings here and monitoring work here.

MFRR organizacija će monitorisati kršenja medijskih sloboda u BiH

Mandat orgamozacje Brzi odgovor na meidjske slobode ( MFRR) pokriva sve zemlje članice EU i zemlje sa kandidatskim statusom

Čelnici Evropske unije su 15. decembra 2022. godine su jednoglasno su usvojili kandidatski status Bosni i Hercegovini za članstvo u EU. Sa ovim napretkom, Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) sada može uključiti Bosnu i Hercegovinu u svoje aktivnosti kroz praćenje, projekte podrške i zagovarački rad u oblast meidjskih slbooda I sigurnosti novinara.

“Novinari u Bosni i Hercegovini se često pojavljuju u izvještajima vezanim za napade i prijetnje protiv njih. Reporteri/novinari, čiji je rad fokusiran na otkrivanje korupcije, prava manjina, LGBTI+, radikalizamu i ratnim zločinima rade pod pritiskom političara i kriminalnih grupa. Političari u zemlji također su često napadali novinare, a njihov utjecaj na javne medije i regulatorna tijela je zabrinjavajući. Drago nam je što naš mandat sada pokriva Bosnu i Hercegovinu, kako bismo mogli pomoći u zaštiti novinara i jačanju medijskog pluralizma u zemlji kojoj je to istinski potrebno.”, izjavili su iz MFRR –a.

Osim što će pratiti sva kršenja slobode medija koja se dešavaju u Bosni i Hercegovini i bilježiti ih na platoformi Mapiranje medijskih sloboda, partneri MFRR-a sada će moći ponuditi i praktičnu podršku novinarima i medijskim radnicima u zemlji. Ovo uključuje i pravnu pomoć i praktičnu podršku kao što su medicinska zaštita, troškovi života, psihološka podrška, radna zaštita, podrška porodici i preventivne sigurnosne mjere. Novinari u BiH, koji su suočeni sa uznemiravanjem ili prijetnjama kao direktnim rezultatom svog rada, također će imati pravo da se prijave za Journalist-in-Residence program.

Pročitajte više o podršci MFRR-a i monitoringu rada ovdje.

Hungary: Investigative media Átlátszó targeted in latest smear campaign

25. January 2023

Hungary: Investigative media Átlátszó targeted in latest smear campaign

IPI analysis: Few remaining independent media face increasing hostility over funding sources.

In January 2023, Hungarian investigative media outlet Átlátszó and its editor-in-chief, Tamás Bodoky, became the target of the latest smear campaign in pro-government news outlets aimed at discrediting what remains of the country’s independent media.

In the latest escalation of this pressure, Átlátszó and its journalists faced accusations in pro-government media of “betraying” the nation, attacking Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries, working for foreign interests and being a national security risk, due to their collaboration in a cross-border investigative project.

The unsubstantiated attacks were made in a series of articles published over consecutive weeks in media owned by allies of the Fidesz government, including the Magyar Nemzet daily, which is part of the pro-government KESMA conglomerate.

These texts about Átlátszó’s non-profit funding model included allegations that Átlátszó was receiving “Judas money” and being a “criminal association” involved in treason and anti-national activities. In a second defamatory article in Magyar Nemzet, Bodoky was directly referred to as a liar and a “national traitor”.

In a common pattern, these initial media smears were echoed by a pro-government foundation and then amplified in what appear to be a coordinated manner by the national news agency MTI, public broadcaster Magyar Televízió and dozens of regional media outlets which are part of KESMA, spreading them to a wider audience.

“It reminds us of the methods of Putin’s Russia and hints at a coordinated campaign, when first the government newspaper attacks us, mentioning a foreign agency and national treason, and then the government’s favourite pseudo-civilian organization urges intelligence intervention”, Bodoky said in response to the attacks.

Átlátszó and Bodoky were targeted over the media outlet’s role in a cross-border investigative project called “Hungarian Money” (hungarianmoney.eu), which was conducted in 2020 and led by Átlátszó Erdély, a Hungarian-language investigative outlet based in Romania. Five editorial teams from five European countries, including Átlátszó, investigated how the Orbán government spent at least €670 million in Hungarian minority organizations in neighbouring Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia over the past decade, and how it uses this “soft power” to exert influence abroad.

The project received funding from Investigative Journalism for Europe (IJ4EU), which is coordinated by the International Press Institute (IPI). IJ4EU supports cross-border investigations of public interest in the EU. It is financially backed by the European Commission and other donors but operates independently.

🇭🇺 #Hungary: Investigative media outlet @Atlatszo & its editor-in-chief @bodoky were the target of a smear campaign in pro-government media & accused of betraying the nation & being a 'national security risk'. @erdely_atlatszo. @MediaFreedomEU alert🔽https://t.co/I4LOY0BgKo pic.twitter.com/CrU5xofLoR
— IPI - The Global Network for Independent Media (@globalfreemedia) January 23, 2023

Wider pattern of discreditation

While the smear campaign was denounced by Átlátszó’s investigative partners in a joint statement and multiple journalists expressed solidarity with its team, concerns remain that these kinds of articles continue to act as an incitement of hostility and distrust towards Átlátszó and its journalists.

Far from being an isolated incident, in the past year Átlátszó and other of the country’s remaining independent media, including most recently Telex, have continued to face persistent attacks in government-aligned news outlets smearing them for receiving funding from abroad.

In recent months, the new buzzword in this strategy has been “dollar media”, accompanied by accusations that media are in the pocket of U.S or other unspecified foreign interests or of Hungarian-born billionaire businessman and philanthropist George Soros.

This follows a wider pattern in Hungary, outlined in a 2022 IPI report, that media critical of the government are smeared in an intertwined network of pro-government media as organs of misinformation spreading “fake news” in service of political opposition or foreign governments. These attacks often act as a signpost for online abuse and harassment of journalists. However, so far this harassment normally takes the form of insults from trolls rather than serious intimidation or death threats.

Economic asphyxiation of independent media

The focus on the recent ire on foreign funding sources also points to another phenomenon in the Hungarian media ecosystem: that under successive Fidesz governments, critical and independent media outlets have been systematically drained of state advertising funding, forcing some to seek project grants financed from abroad to stay afloat while also retaining their editorial independence.

This economic isolation is part of a wider campaign of media capture undertaken by the Fidesz government over the past decade, which has involved the coordinated exploitation of legal, regulatory and economic power to gain control over public media, concentrate private media in the hands of allies, and distort the market to the detriment of independent journalism.

In this captured media ecosystem, Fidesz has calibrated the market in its favour by rewarding alignment with its narrative while starving critical media of lucrative advertising funding from ministries and other state institutions. This carrot-and-stick approach has seen independent media excluded from advertising and other subsidies altogether, with public money channelled to finance Fidesz’s media empire. Many of these media in turn serve political interests by acting as the attack dogs of the government against its critics at home and abroad.

In the face of this economic climate, grants from foreign donors and the European Union have proven to be a lifeline for what remains of Hungary’s shattered independent media market. Set against the backdrop of the coordinated erosion of media pluralising recent years, is little surprise then that this financial support has been firmly placed in the crosshairs of the Fidesz media machine.

This article was originally published by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

MFRR Summit 2023 | Press Freedom on the Line

23. January 202329. March 2023

MFRR Summit 2023 | Press Freedom on the Line

The MFRR Summit is back, and this year we’re holding our conference under the title of “Press Freedom on the Line” from 29 – 31 March 2023.

Reflecting the MFRR’s core campaign areas, the online conference will host in-depth discussions on journalist safety, media capture, the rule of law, and SLAPPs.

Hosted on Zoom for interactive participation, and simultaneously livestreamed on the MFRR YouTube channel, the conference will play host to a range of panel discussions, live interviews, and keynote speeches with journalists, media freedom experts, policy-makers, and other stakeholders all working to defend press freedom. The Summit will also feature the award ceremony for the 2023 IJ4EU Impact Award for cross-border investigative journalism.

You can find the full Summit programme below, including information on how to register for each day.

Summit programme

MFRR Summit 2023 | Day 1

From online attacks to physical violence, Day 1 of the Summit will highlight threats to journalists in EU Member States and candidate countries.

MFRR Summit 2023 | Day 2

Day 2 of the Summit will shine a spotlight on the rule of law and SLAPPs as experts discuss initiatives to counter abusive litigation, impunity for crimes against journalists, and disinformation laws.

MFRR Summit 2023 | Day 3

The panels on Day 3 of the MFRR Summit will look into the crisis of political exploitation of the media through the abuse of state economic and regulatory levers.

10 Cross-Border Investigative Projects Shortlisted for IJ4EU Award

Ten cross-border investigations have been shortlisted for the third annual IJ4EU Impact Award, celebrating excellence in cross-border watchdog journalism in Europe.

IJ4EU Impact Award Ceremony

The final day of the Summit will close with the 2023 IJ4EU Impact Award Ceremony. Celebrating excellence in cross-border investigative journalism in Europe, the IJ4EU Impact Award is given annually to three teams of European cross-border investigative journalists. Read more about the IJ4EU funds and Impact Award here. The ceremony will take place on the evening of 31 March in Leipzig, Germany, and also streamed online.

In the coming weeks we will be sharing more information about the conference but for now we encourage you to save the date. Keep an eye on the MFRR newsletter, Twitter, and our website for all the latest updates!

Greece: MFRR alarmed by latest revelations of spying on…

21. December 202221. December 2022

Greece: MFRR alarmed by latest revelations of spying on journalists

The partners in the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) are alarmed by the continued lack of transparency of the Greek authorities about the surveillance of journalists.

As reported last week, an audit by the Authority for Communication Security and Privacy (ADAE) at telecom company Cosmote confirmed that the state security services wiretapped investigative journalist Tasos Telloglou for unspecified national security reasons. The ADAE conducted the audit on 15 December, following requests by Telloglou and MEP Giorgos Kyrtsos, who was expelled from the ruling New Democracy party earlier this year.

Cosmote unsuccessfully attempted to interfere with the inspection, as its legal adviser questioned the ADAE’s competence and contacted Supreme Court prosecutor Isidoros Dogiakos. The latter allegedly tried to intervene and stop the audit by stating that there should be an immediate opinion of the Supreme Court Prosecutor’s Office on whether ADAE or interested citizens are allowed to be informed of possible surveillance by the National Intelligence Service (EYP). The ADAE, however, invoked its constitutional authority and insisted on the audit. Dogiakos has meanwhile said that he simply expressed a non-binding view, even though he believes the audit was not legal. He also lashed out against media that have criticised the Greek judicial authorities for their handling of the ongoing investigation into “Greek Watergate”, and called for an extensive tax audit of the outlets.

Telloglou, who works for investigative platform Inside Story, leading daily Kathimerini and the ANT1 television news programme “Special Report, had written in October that he believed he was put under surveillance in connection with his reporting on a spyware scandal. In the article, he said his colleague at Inside Story, Eliza Triantafillou and journalist Thodoris Chondrogiannos of Reporters United had also been monitored. Both outlets repeatedly published breaking news about the use of spyware and alleged connections between companies that market the technology and Greek government figures.

Last week’s revelations are the latest chapter in a sprawling scandal in Greece which has implicated the EYP and the government in the surveillance of journalists. This involves the confirmed hacking of the phone of freelance financial journalist Thanasis Koukakis through the use of Predator spyware by an unknown party and allegations that investigative reporter Stavros Malichudis was secretly monitored by the EYP. In November, newspaper Documento published an article alleging that numerous journalists, editors, media owners and others connected to the industry were targeted with Predator spyware.

These cases are major violations of the affected journalists’ privacy, journalistic source protection, and press freedom in general. Although an investigation into Koukakis’ case has been launched, overall accountability remains wanting, and the Greek authorities have provided no real transparency. Quite the opposite: soon after New Democracy came to power in 2019, it moved to bring the intelligence service under the direct purview of the office of the Prime Minister and amended the requirements for the position of Director of Intelligence so the Prime Minister’s favourite could be appointed. In March 2021, the governing party rushed through a legislative amendment that changed the legal provisions that allowed citizens to be informed by the ADAE about whether they had been under surveillance if it had taken place for national security reasons. The cases at hand, pertaining to journalists who report in the public interest, serve to underscore the problematic nature of this exemption, showcasing the potential for abuse of this clause.

Accordingly, the MFRR reiterates its calls on the Greek authorities to provide transparency and accountability for these severe attacks on press freedom and privacy, and to put an immediate halt to the practice. We also renew our calls for action at the EU level, including through the inclusion in the European Media Freedom Act of provisions that effectively protect journalists and media workers against illegal surveillance.

Signed by:

ARTICLE 19 Europe
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
International Press Institute (IPI)
OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

How the European Media Freedom Act could affect Hungary…

21. December 2022

How the European Media Freedom Act could affect Hungary and Poland

Meanwhile, the EU has existing tools to defend media pluralism and freedom

By IPI contributor Anna Wójcik

The European Union’s institutions are well aware of the concerted, structural attacks on media freedom and pluralism in Hungary and Poland plus several other member states, and the European Commission’s flagship annual rule of law reports are proof of that.

However, the EU’s treatment of the media freedom crises in Poland and Hungary, which are part of a broader backsliding of the rule of law, has been fragmented and differs qualitatively from the EU’s response to the assaults on judicial independence, academic freedom, or migrants’ rights by the Fidesz and PiS governments.

Other than monitoring the violations of media freedom and pluralism in the two Visegrad states the EU’s response has been limited to some action in the scope of the Article 7 Rule of Law procedure against Hungary, and a single EU law infringement action against the Hungarian government contesting the media regulator’s independence and accusing it of discriminatory action following its decision not to renew the license of independent radio broadcaster Klubrádió.

Frustrated by the lack of legal tools available to it, the European Commission is seeking new EU-wide legislation in the form of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), presented in September, that would harmonize some aspects of regulation over public and private media in member states.

Until now, public and private media regulation has been mainly the responsibility of member states. With no legal mandate to act on media freedom issues, the Commission has based the EMFA on rules protecting the single market.

Meanwhile, the Council of Europe has developed extensive standards for public media and media pluralism and the EMFA is a welcome opportunity to turn some of these standards into binding law in EU member states.

While the EMFA has not been devised solely to address the challenges that the current governments in Budapest and Warsaw have posed to media freedom and pluralism, the draft regulation holds specific promises in this regard.

New rules, new regulations

The first concern in Hungary and Poland is the media regulators’ lack of independence. The Media Council in Hungary, and, in Poland, the National Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji, KRRiT) and the PiS-established National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych) are part of the respective governments’ informal power grab. Loyalists with links to the governing parties dominate these media regulators, which have contributed to limiting media freedom.

In 2020, the Hungarian Media Council did not renew Klubrádió’s license, forcing the station to move online with a limited audience. After Fidesz secured a fourth term in power in April 2022, the regulator refused to renew the license of non-profit Tilos Rádió, citing violations of rules on the use of inappropriate language on air. Tilos won back the licence in the subsequent application process.

In Poland, in 2020/2021, KRRiT delayed the renewal of the broadcasting licenses of the television broadcasters TVN24 and TVN7, which are owned by the U.S. company Warner Bros. Discovery. In 2017, KRRiT fined TVN for reporting about a protest; the fine was rescinded in 2022.

The EMFA seeks to nurture greater independence through the enhanced European Board of Media Services that promotes cooperation between the national regulators. It doesn’t enhance any standards, but it does endorse the requirements of independence of national regulatory set out in Article 30 of the 2018-revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), which Hungary and Poland already transposed.

This means that the media regulators are required to be independent of political and business influence and exercise their powers impartially and transparently, in keeping with principles of media pluralism, cultural and linguistic diversity, consumer protection, accessibility, non-discrimination, the proper functioning of the internal market, and the promotion of fair competition. It also prohibits media regulators from seeking or taking instructions from any other bodies regarding the assigned tasks.

If it so wished, the European Commission could already have started infringement proceedings against the biased decisions of media regulators in Hungary and Poland that are detrimental to media freedom and pluralism, based on Article 30 AVMSD. The time to do so is of the essence, especially as the European Parliament elections and local elections in Poland and Hungary are approaching in 2024.

EU law protects European voters’ rights to participate in the EP and elections that are free and fair. The OSCE/ODIHR found in election observation mission reports on general elections in Hungary in 2018 and 2022 and in general elections in 2019 and presidential elections in 2020 in Poland that the elections were tarnished by the apparent bias of public media towards the governing majority or incumbent president and that public broadcasters failed in their duty to provide impartial coverage.

Moreover, the EMFA envisages the creation of the European Board for Media Services, which would succeed the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) and include national media regulators’ representatives. The Board would advise the Commission on regulation and EU law application issues. It is yet unclear how the Board could insulate itself from internal disruption by rogue member states that are systematically assaulting media freedom and pluralism and quite successfully playing catch-me-if-you-can with Brussels.

Unwinding media capture

Another significant problem is the media capture process, particularly advanced in Hungary and mimicked in Poland. Fidesz has captured media through a network loyal oligarchs, who in 2018 “donated” media to the Central European Press and Media Foundation (Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány, KESMA). Outside of KESMA, the process of forcing journalists to resign or closing some captured media outlets continues.

The PiS party in Poland used the state-controlled oil and gas company PKN Orlen in 2021 to acquire the country’s the most prominent regional daily newspaper group, Polska Press, from the German publisher Verlagsgruppe Passau. The transaction raised major concerns about editorial independence and media concentration. The EMFA would require member states to carry out a “media pluralism and independence” test when taking any new regulatory measures that impact the media market. It would apply, for instance, to decisions impacting media concentration or on private media licensing.

Governments in Hungary and Poland also boost friendly private media with state funds through advertising and partnerships. The EMFA would include rules enhancing transparency and fairness in the allocation of state advertising to media outlets. It would require member states to distribute state advertising to media in a non-discriminatory way.

Article 24 would further require member states’ central and local governments to publish a list of the media supported with public funds and the amounts allocated to them. The national media regulators would be responsible for verifying government-provided information. Without independent regulators however, this provision is unlikely to be effective.

Strengthening the existing toolbox

It is uncertain what shape the EMFA will eventually take in the long EU legislative process. Several objections have been posed to it from interest groups, notably European association of press publishers. Moreover, member states governments may raise objections to specific elements of the act.

Negative developments regarding media freedom impact also other member states than Hungary and Poland, where such problems further entrench democratic backsliding. Greece scores the lowest among member states on RSF’s Press Freedom Index. In the countries ranking high in media freedom, threats of media concentration in the hands of businesspeople with solid political agendas risk destabilizing the electoral process. The opposition to various solutions included in the EMFA may come from a variety of interest groups.

It must also be emphasized that although the EMFA brings some opportunities, focusing on developing new legislation should not be an excuse for not taking action, as the EU already has avenues for legal actions to protect media freedom and pluralism in member states and could apply more political pressure, for example, at the Article 7 hearings against Hungary. The Council should also consider expanding the Article 7 procedure against the Polish government to include specific issues negatively affecting media freedom and pluralism. For now, the EU is not acting as strongly as it could.

Anna Wójcik, PhD, is an assistant professor at the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences. She was Re:Constitution fellow at the CEU Democracy Institute in 2022. She specializes in the rule of law and freedom of expression. As RethinkCEE program fellow, has recently published with the German Marshall Fund of the United States a policy report on the EU’s response to the media freedom and pluralism backsliding in Hungary and Poland.

This article is part of IPI’s series “Media freedom in Europe in shadow of Covid”, which comprises news and analysis from IPI’s network of correspondets throughout the EU. Articles do not necessarily reflect the views of IPI. The reporting series is supported by funding from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for FReedom and by the European Commission (DG Connect) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response coalition.

France: Three journalists summoned by security agency over suspected…

13. December 202213. December 2022

France: Three journalists summoned by security agency over suspected violation of national defence secrecy

The partner organisations of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) today express concern over the latest summons issued by France’s top security agency to journalists from investigative platform Disclose and public broadcaster Radio France over the suspected violation of national secrecy in connection with their reporting on the armed forces.

Our organisations raise the alarm that the three journalists summoned for voluntary questioning could face potential prison sentences of up to five years and a fine of €75,000 if charged and ultimately found guilty. We therefore urge the General Directorate of Internal Security (DGSI) to seriously consider the implications of this case for press freedom.

The trio – Geoffrey Livolsi, co-founder of investigative media outlet Disclose, Jacques Monin, head of investigations at Radio France and Benoît Collombat, an investigative journalist at Radio France – have been summoned to the DGSI for questioning on 14 December as part of an ongoing judicial investigation into alleged violation of national defence secrecy.

The summons is linked to a March 2018 investigation authored by Collombat and Livolsi, entitled “Air transport: suspicions of influence peddling in the army”, which reported that the National Financial Prosecutor’s Office (PNF) was probing allegations of financial misconduct in the military. The article revealed that high-ranking officers including a named official of the Special Operations Command (COS) were being investigated over alleged air transport subcontracting fraud.

The trio are due to be questioned on the suspicion that they “committed or attempted to commit the offense of revealing or disclosing information allowing the identification of a member of a special forces unit”. According to reports, the summons comes after an unnamed former member of the French special forces filed a complaint. Livolsi from Disclose has stressed that all the officers named in the investigation work in the logistics services of the army, rather than on a mission or in a conflict area and were not in any danger. Both Disclose and Radio France stand by the accuracy and public interest nature of the publication.

Our organisations note that this summons is part of a wider pattern of criminal investigations against media by DGSI in recent years. Journalists from Disclose and Radio France were the subject of a separate investigation in 2019. That summons was based on a complaint by the Ministry of the Armed Forces about publication of classified information about French complicity in supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia which were used to commit war crimes in Yemen. In that case, the DGSI questioned the two co-founders of Disclose and Collombat about a potential violation of national secrecy and attempted to identify their sources.

A second investigation into Disclose was then initiated in November 2021 in connection with its revelations about the alleged complicity of French military intelligence in the arbitrary executions of civilians in Egypt. That time, the Ministry of the Armed Forces filed a complaint alleging the non-profit platform had violated national defence secrecy. Both of these previous probes targeted legitimate and public interest journalism which had led to serious questions and criticism about the operations of the French military and intelligence services.

As in those cases, this summons has serious implications for media freedom. Firstly, serious questions arise as to why this complaint was made now, nearly five years after the journalists’ investigation was published. Moreover, as this probe is being conducted within the scope of national security, the DGSI has the full range of investigatory powers at its disposal, including the use of surveillance tools. This not only creates a stressful climate for the media outlets but could also discourage sources and potential whisteblowers from speaking out.

Our organisations recognise the challenges which come with striking the right balance between safeguarding press freedom and protecting national security. However, it is vital for democracy that journalists and media outlets carrying out investigative reporting on matters of public interest, including about the armed forces and even the special forces, must be able to work free from all forms of pressure or retaliation.

Ahead of the summons on Wednesday December 14, our organisations emphasise that we will closely monitor developments and will respond strongly to further escalations which negatively affect the freedom of the press. If required, we also stand ready to provide assistance to the affected journalists through our MFRR legal support fund.

Signed by:

ARTICLE 19 Europe
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
International Press Institute (IPI)
OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

Italy: Lawsuits against Saviano and Domani highlight wider SLAPP…

12. December 2022

Italy: Lawsuits against Saviano and Domani highlight wider SLAPP problem

Ongoing litigation against media by new PM and Defence Minister raise media freedom concerns

By IPI contibutor Christian Elia

In recent weeks there has been much talk in Italy about a recently opened legal case against the journalist and writer Roberto Saviano, who is accused of defamation in a lawsuit filed in 2020 by Giorgia Meloni, the new prime minister. Saviano had called Meloni and Lega leader Matteo Salvini ‘bastards’ during a La7 television programme for their policy on rescuing migrants at sea.

There have been multiple stances in defence of Saviano in newspapers and by associations for freedom of the press and freedom of expression. They have been critical of Meloni and of Salvini, who is a plaintiff in the trial, and say that Meloni’s lawsuit is intimidatory and aimed at discouraging criticism of Saviano and her.

This is not an isolated incident, however. At the end of November 2021, Prime Minister Meloni also filed a defamation case against the daily newspaper Domani. The court decided to indict journalist Emiliano Fittipaldi and the newspaper’s editor-in-chief, Stefano Feltri, over a year-old article about Meloni, who was not prime minister at the time.

The article dates back to October 2021 and reported on Domenico Arcuri, former extraordinary commissioner for the Covid emergency. Arcuri mentioned, talking to magistrates, the names of some MPs who, according to him, had contacted him to promote individuals or companies able to supply masks on “far less advantageous” terms. The MPs included Meloni, Domani reported.

In response, Meloni has demanded €25,000 in damages from the newspaper. The requested financial compensation is part of civil proceedings that can be claimed in addition to criminal proceedings, which is the legal framework for “aggravated defamation” lawsuits.

“Until a law on reckless litigation is passed, lawsuits and civil lawsuits remain the sword of Damocles over freedom of information in the country”, Feltri said in an article.

Domani’s journalists have also pointed out that while is possible for Meloni to sue the newspaper, the PM – herself under investigation for aggravated defamation for a tweet against one of her former candidates – is sheltering behind parliamentary protections from prosecution.

“Meloni as a ‘citizen, journalist and politician’, as she had her lawyer write, decided to take this newspaper to trial but her personal position has changed. As prime minister she is called upon to protect among the constitutional values also freedom of expression of all, also because as a ‘politician she can already protect her own,’” the journalists of Domani wrote.

The new Italian government had already come out against Domani. Last month, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto had announced his intention to sue the newspaper for defamation over an investigation by journalists Emiliano Fittipaldi and Giovanni Tizian into the current minister’s potential conflict of interest with companies in the sector he now oversees. For now, Minister Crosetto has not followed up on the announcement.

Italy’s SLAPP problem

The president of the Federazione Nazionale della Stampa Italiana (FNSI), Giuseppe Giulietti, recalled how ”the law to oppose gagging complaints and punish reckless actions has been at a standstill since 2002 and will remain so due to increasingly clear transversal intentions”.

The law Giulietti is referring to is the law against SLAPPs, as lawsuits are called in which there is a gross disproportion of power between the person or organization suing and the accused. The goal of accusers or plaintiffs in SLAPP cases is not necessarily to win the case, but to intimidate the defendant – even if only through the many burdens and effects of a trial – and discourage his or her work, taking away time, money and initiative. Plaintiffs also take advantage of the public bias against the presumption of innocence, placing the defendant in a position of weakness and risk.

Most of the time the accusation in SLAPP cases is defamation, and these cases are almost always directed at journalists, bloggers or activists who have written or said something in public that someone claims is defamatory against them. The consequences can be both criminal and civil.In Italy, both civil and criminal lawsuits are often referred to as “querele temerarie” (reckless lawsuits), with some confusion: “querela”, however, in legal language refers only to criminal cases. They are referred to as “reckless” because they are brought despite the uncertainty of the final outcome, but precisely for the purpose of responding or threatening the defendant.

A 2016 dossier edited by the association Ossigeno per l’informazione, based on data provided by the Ministry of Justice, estimated that around 70 per cent of defamation lawsuits are dropped by the public prosecutor and therefore do not go to trial.

There is no more recent data, but lawyer Andrea Di Pietro, who has been dealing with the issue for many years, said in an interview that in 2019 the ministry confirmed to Ossigeno that that percentage was still valid. According to him and several other experts in the field, it probably still is today.Until recently, Article 13 of Law 47 of 1948 on the press, which set forth a mandatory term of imprisonment from one to six years “in the event of conviction for libel in the press committed by attributing a specific fact”, was also taken into account for defamation in the press.

This article was declared illegitimate in June last year by the Constitutional Court. By contrast, the court deemed Article 595 of the Criminal Code, which deals with defamation, compatible with the Constitution, since that provision allows the judge to apply a prison sentence only in cases of exceptional gravity and in all other cases to limit it to a fine.

Article 595 of the Criminal Code concerns anyone who”’by communicating with several persons, offends the reputation of others”. It is punishable by imprisonment of up to two years or a fine of up to EUR 2,065, but both can be increased if the offence is against “a political, administrative or judicial body”.

In the case of defamation “in the press” – a definition that today includes both newspapers and other media, e.g. social networks, and therefore potentially concerns almost everyone – the penalty can be up to three years and the fine is at least EUR 516.

EU anti-SLAPP directive on the way

After years of calls for action, last April the European Commission presented two measures that are still awaiting approval. The first is a legislative proposal for a directive that would intervene precisely on the problems of civil lawsuits, which also exist in Italy: the most important measure is the introduction of a mechanism that would allow civil lawsuits that are manifestly unfounded to be dismissed quickly.

This mechanism, should the directive be approved, will, however, only be valid for cases of European relevance: i.e. cases relating to articles or public speeches involving, for example, more than one EU member country.

The directive also envisages protection for journalists working in the EU who receive convictions from courts in non-EU states, and penalties to discourage the frequent use of SLAPPs, including the possibility for an accused party who proves his or her innocence to claim damages from the plaintiff.

The other measure proposed by the European Commission is a recommendation to member states to implement measures to encourage this kind of practice in their national legislation. The recommendation, however, is not binding, and much will depend on whether and how it is implemented in each country.

The next hearing in Saviano’s trial has been set for December 12, 2022. Many journalists and members of the cultural world will be present at the hearing in support of the defendant. In the courtroom will also be the president of the FNSI, Giuseppe Giulietti, and the spokesperson of Articolo 21, an association that fights for press freedom, Elisa Marincola, as well as a delegation of CASE Italia observers who are following the case with a view to write a repor.

“It is necessary to say ‘enough to reckless lawsuits’ with a law that at this point can only be induced by the European Directive given that the Italian Parliament has failed to produce even a minimal amendment that could act as a deterrent against gag lawsuits,” Giulietti commented.

Latvia: Media regulator urged not to revoke Dozhd license…

7. December 20227. December 2022

Latvia: Media regulator urged not to revoke Dozhd license pending court review

Decision revoking broadcast license is clear violation of media freedom.

The undersigned partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) today express serious concern over the decision by Latvia’s National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) to revoke the broadcast license of exiled independent Russian TV station Dozhd, which is based in Riga. Given the clear implications for media freedom, our organisations urge the regulator to refrain from enforcing the revocation until a court has reviewed the decision.

On 6 December, the NEPLP’s chairperson said that Dozhd’s license had been withdrawn “in connection with the threat to national security and the public order” and citing three serious violations of the country’s broadcast law since it began broadcasting last summer. Dozhd’s broadcasting ban enters into force on December 8, but it has the right to appeal. The NEPLP also announced its intent to block Dozhd’s YouTube channel within the country.

Our organisations acknowledge and welcome the steps taken by Latvian authorities since the war began to provide visas for more than 470 Russian journalists and their families, including those from Dozhd, who were forced to flee the country. This allowed Dozhd and others to re-establish operations and continue working. Latvia has provided a welcome example for Europe to follow and deserves praise for its overall support for free and independent media.

While our organisations recognise the sensitivity of this issue in Latvia, our shared view is that the decision to revoke their broadcast license is disproportionate and ultimately counterproductive.

In our assessment, appropriate steps were taken by Dozhd to address the three violations of Latvia’s broadcast law cited by the regulator. The presenter who misspoke about ‘support’ to Russian troops has apologised and been dismissed; the use of a map downloaded from the internet showing Crimea as part of Russia’s territory was a clear mistake for which the editor has since apologised; and the single reference to Russia’s military as “our army” was dealt with and the media outlet was fined. While Dozhd must respect Latvian law, in our view these three editorial errors were mistakes and do not meet the threshold for the outright revocation of a media outlet’s broadcast licence.

Arguments raised about Dozhd’s journalists posing a potential national security or intelligence threat are very serious accusations that need to be addressed by independent courts rather than a broadcast regulator. There is clear guidance on restricting freedom of expression on the basis of national security that needs to be followed by the authorities.

The wider implications of this decision for the Russian anti-war movement are significant. As the most influential exiled Russian broadcast media outlet, Dozhd’s resolutely anti-war coverage of issues such as mobilisation, Russian atrocities and the realities from the front lines have provided a crucial alternative to government propaganda.

Moving forward, we urge the NEPLP to refrain from enforcing the decision on revocation of Dozhd’s licence. We also urge the Administrative Court to reverse the NEPLP decision until a court has reviewed the decision on appeal. The Court must is should consider both the violations committed and the alleged national security or intelligence allegations, as well as the broader implications the decision will have for Dozhd, its editors and journalists, and other exiled Russian media.

Until then, our message is clear: independent Russian journalism should be provided a safe refuge in Europe. Dozhd’s mission of providing independent news to Russian-speaking audiences is a crucial one and we hope this matter can be resolved.