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TikTok ban in Albania threatens freedom of expression ahead…

SafeJournalists Network and Media Freedom Rapid Response: TikTok ban in Albania threatens freedom of expression ahead of general elections

SafeJournalists Network (SJN), the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) partners, and civil society organisations express serious concern regarding the Albanian Council of Ministers’ decision on March 6, 2025, to suspend nationwide access to the TikTok platform for 12 months. While we acknowledge the government’s stated intention to protect children from harmful content and safeguard personal data, we strongly underline that such protective measures must fully respect fundamental human rights, particularly freedom of expression, access to information, and due process.

11.03.2025

Freedom of Expression and Proportionality

We emphasise that a total platform ban represents an extreme restriction of the right to freedom of expression and access to information. An outright suspension of an entire platform significantly exceeds proportionality, impacting the legitimate expression of all users and restricting public debate and access to diverse sources of information.

Alternative targeted solutions, such as robust content moderation, age verification, and enhanced user education programs, should have been fully explored prior to introducing a total ban. This measure’s overly broad nature sets a dangerous precedent for disproportionate state interference with digital rights.

As an EU candidate country, Albania is expected to uphold European standards on rule of law and fundamental freedoms. The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) framework emphasises platform accountability and content moderation transparency with a risk-based and proportionate approach. The DSA favours holding platforms accountable for managing risks on their services rather than punishing users by shutting the services down. We encourage Albania to align its approach with this paradigm. 

Democratic and Electoral Concerns

With parliamentary elections approaching in May 2025, the timing of this suspension is particularly troubling. TikTok has become an emerging platform for political communication and voter engagement, especially for young people, first-time voters, and newly formed political parties and movements, who have argued that they will be disproportionately impacted. By limiting access to this platform, the government risks suppressing these emerging voices, diminishing political pluralism, and creating a chilling effect that may extend beyond TikTok users, affecting journalists, content creators, civil society activists, and civic watchdogs. 

Due Process and Transparency

We note that the decision follows Prime Minister Rama’s public announcement in December 2024 indicating consultations with selected parents and educators. However, there remains insufficient publicly available evidence on these consultations’ scope, representativeness, and outcomes. We emphasise that decisions of this scale and significance should be based on thorough, transparent, and inclusive consultations involving civil society organisations, media organisations, industry, digital rights advocates, and affected communities. 

Risks of Setting a Dangerous  Precedent

We express concern that implementing a platform-wide ban creates a troubling precedent for Albania and the region. When governments claim broad authority to shut down popular platforms due to content concerns, they risk opening the door to further restrictions, threatening internet freedom more broadly. We urge the Albanian authorities to avoid establishing such a precedent, ensuring that future content issues are addressed through targeted, evidence-based, and proportionate measures.

Recommendations

We call on the Albanian government to immediately revoke the suspension of TikTok and initiate an inclusive and transparent consultation process involving parliament, civil society, media organisations, digital rights advocates, and international partners. This consultation should aim to develop a proportionate and evidence-based regulatory framework in line with European standards, particularly the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA). This approach will enable Albania to effectively address legitimate concerns about child safety and data privacy, while fully safeguarding freedom of expression, democratic discourse, and due process—especially critical in the context of the upcoming elections.

Signed by:

SafeJournalists Network

  • Association of BH journalists
  • Association of Journalists of Kosovo
  • Association of Macedonian Journalists
  • Croatian Journalists’ Association
  • Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia
  • Trade Union of Media of Montenegro

Media Freedom Rapid Response partners:

  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)

Civil society organisations in Albania:

  • Center Science and Innovation for Development (SCiDEV)
  • Association of Journalists of Albania (AGSH-AJA)
  • Albanian Center for Quality Journalism (ACQJ)
  • Balkan Investigative Reporting Network in Albania (BIRN Albania)
  • Albanian Media Council
  • Res Publica
  • Citizens.al
  • Albanian Center MediaLook
  • Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
  • Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights in Albania (CRCA-ECPAT)

This statement was coordinated by the SafeJournalists Network and joined by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Georgia: Independent Journalism and Media Pluralism on the Brink

Georgia: Independent Journalism and Media Pluralism on the Brink

MFRR Partners warn that a new wave of repressive legislation threatens Georgian independent journalism with imminent extinction.

10.03.2025

We, the undersigned press freedom, journalists, and freedom of expression organisations, express deep concern over the recently proposed legislation, increasing threats to journalists’ safety, and the broader decline of media freedom in Georgia. We urge the international community, especially the European Union (EU), to address the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party and support Georgia’s embattled independent media sector.

On 24 February 2025, the Georgian Dream ruling party and its satellite party People’s Power introduced amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, strengthening the censorship powers of the broadcast regulator and restricting “foreign powers” from funding broadcasters or co-financing programmes. A “foreign power” is broadly defined, and includes foreign governments, non-citizens, and foreign based organisations. 

The amendments expand the  powers  of the Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC) to regulate factual accuracy, fairness, and privacy, previously overseen through self regulation. The GNCC will be able to issue penalties of up to 3% of annual revenue or even revoke a broadcaster’s license for breaching the new rules These changes will empower the GNCC to act as the government’s censor to silence critical media outlets.

On March 3, the Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee passed the first reading  of a new version of the “Foreign Agent Law,” entitled the “Foreign Agents Registration Act,” which could impose fines of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to five years for non-compliance.

According to the GD party, the legislation is a “Georgian translation” of the U.S. FARA law. The explanatory note attached to the draft law states that the primary reason for introducing a ‘precise analogue’ of FARA is that the majority of civil society organisations receiving foreign funding have refused to register under the existing foreign agents law, adopted in May 2024, titled the “Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence.”

Unlike Georgia’s legislation, which broadly targets media and NGOs, the U.S. FARA was adopted in 1938 to regulate lobbying for foreign adversaries, such as Nazi Germany. The scope of the US FARA has been significantly limited through case law and has been rarely employed beyond requiring the registration of foreign lobbyists.

While the Georgian draft includes exemptions such as broadcasting networks, and scientific, academic, religious, educational, and artistic activities, its scope is likely to be applied much more broadly, including media, due to a highly politicised administration and the absence of judicial independence.

Without the usual democratic safeguards these laws are likely to be weaponized to silence the government’s critics. 

The current “Transparency of Foreign Influence” law already empowers the Ministry of Justice to conduct investigations into organisations in receipt of foreign grants, allowing for direct interference in the activities of independent media, many of which rely heavily on foreign grants. 

These legal initiatives are part of a comprehensive government crackdown on the media over the past year that has seen the rapid deterioration of press freedom and of targeted violence against journalists, amid a broader democratic backsliding. 

Since the start of the post-election protests in November 2024 dozens of journalists have been viciously beaten, verbally assaulted, threatened, and detained. Their equipment has been confiscated and destroyed, and their reporting has been repeatedly obstructed.

Meanwhile, Mzia Amaglobeli, a veteran Georgian journalist and the founder and director of two of the country’s most prominent independent media organisations, has been unjustly held in pre-trial detention since her arrest in early January. 

The Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB), which has long been an instrument of the Georgian Dream government, has suppressed efforts by journalists who try to report free of political control.

The extensive capture of political institutions including the judiciary means that impunity for crimes against journalists remains widespread, with investigations often being insufficient and perpetrators rarely held accountable, particularly those from the police. 

In addition, amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences and the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations, adopted in a rushed manner,  introduce harsher penalties and significantly higher fines for administrative offences, further undermining and restricting the freedom of assembly and expression.

The deterioration of press freedom in Georgia, amid rising authoritarianism, is extremely alarming—and, if continued, will have wider implications for democracy in the region. 

We urge the Georgian government to stop the persecution of independent newsrooms and media professionals. We further reiterate our call to the European Union to place effective pressure on the Georgian Dream ruling party to withdraw the new legislation impacting media and halt the broader crackdown on journalism and civil society.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

IPI - Turkey Statement call for action as press freedom violations surge in Turkey in 2025 Library

Turkey: Media Freedom organisations call for action as press…

Media Freedom organisations call for action as press freedom violations surge in Turkey in 2025

Türkçe açıklama aşağıdadır

The International Press Institute (IPI), together with undersigned press freedom, freedom of expression, human rights, and journalists’ organisations, and media outlets, expresses serious concern over the recent escalation of press freedom violations in Turkey, marking a troubling start to the new year. The frequent use of arbitrary arrests, detentions, judicial control measures, and convictions poses an existential threat to independent media, democratic discourse, and fundamental human rights in the country.

5.2.2025

Turkey must ensure that its practices align with international standards for the protection of freedom of expression and press freedom, as well as with the protections enshrined in its own constitution, in order to safeguard the foundations of democracy and human rights.

In January 2025 alone, at least nine journalists were arrested, six were sentenced to prison, five were detained, 23 faced investigations and one encountered police obstruction. Here is a timeline of a concerning acceleration of press freedom violations over the last month (the following is not an exhaustive list):

  • On January 2, authorities launched an investigation against journalist Aslıhan Gençay for her reporting on corruption in Hatay. They blocked access to her article and charged her with multiple offences, including violations of the disinformation law—an apparent attempt to suppress investigative journalism.
  • On January 7, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation against 21 journalists who covered the Kobani trial’s final hearing. The journalists face potential fines for alleged unauthorised photography—a move that effectively criminalises routine court reporting.
  • On January 17, a coordinated crackdown led to the detention of six journalists – Reyhan Hacıoğlu, Necla Demir, Rahime Karvar, Vedat Örüç, Velat Ekin and Ahmet Güneş – across multiple cities. They were denied basic legal rights, including access to legal representation, and were subsequently arrested on January 20 without their statements being recorded. The authorities’ only justification appears to be their legitimate journalistic activities. (Note: Ahmet Güneş was released on February 4.)
  • On January 21, Rudaw TV correspondent Rawin Sterk Yıldız faced police interference while documenting a detention in Istanbul’s Beyoğlu district. Despite clearly identifying himself as a journalist, he was prevented from documenting the public incident.
  • On January 23, a troubling verdict resulted in five journalists – Yakup Çetin, Ahmet Memiş, Cemal Azmi Kalyoncu, Ünal Tanık, Yetkin Yıldız, Gökçe Fırat Çulhaoğlu – receiving harsh sentences—ranging from 25 months to over six years in prison—in a terrorism-related case, despite the absence of credible evidence.
  • On January 24, the arrest of journalist Eylem Babayiğit once again demonstrated the arbitrary use of “membership of an organisation” charges.
  • On January 28, the detention of journalists Barış Pehlivan, Seda Selek, and Serhan Asker following their broadcast of a recorded phone conversation with an expert witness raises concerns about limitations on the coverage of matters of public interest. The court released Seda Selek and Serhan Asker under judicial control measures.
  • On January 28, the launch of an investigation into T24 columnist Şirin Payzın for alleged “terror propaganda” over social media posts indicates a concerning expansion of surveillance and criminalisation of online expression.
  • On January 28, the conviction of journalist Safiye Alagaş, former news editor for the pro-Kurdish JINNEWS, resulted in a six years and three months prison sentence. Alagaş has already spent a year in pretrial detention and is currently free while awaiting appeal.
  • On January 29, Halk TV editor-in-chief Suat Toktaş, program coordinator Kürşad Oğuz, and journalist Barış Pehlivan were detained for broadcasting a recorded phone conversation with an expert witness. While Pehlivan and Oğuz were released under judicial control measures, Toktaş was arrested—authorities cited flight risk and potential evidence tampering, demonstrating a concerning use of arbitrary detention criteria. Halk TV, one of Turkey’s largest private TV channels, is recognised for its critical programming.

Broadcast regulator’s decisions threaten press freedom

Turkey’s broadcast regulator RTÜK has demonstrated a concerning pattern of targeting critical media outlets. Just before the journalists’ detention over broadcasting a recorded phone conversation, the RTÜK Chair warned of potential consequences for media outlets and journalists regarding the same broadcast—effectively signalling the impending crackdown. In his statement, he criticised Halk TV for recording and broadcasting a phone conversation with an expert witness without permission and allegedly attempting to influence ongoing legal proceedings.

This incident reflects a broader pattern of regulatory pressure on critical media. In 2024, RTÜK imposed 24 broadcast bans resulting in fines totalling 81.5 million Turkish lira (approximately €2.2 million or $2.3 million), with the majority targeting media critical of the government. 

The systematic use of regulatory powers to penalise critical media outlets raises serious concerns about the independence of broadcast regulation and its impact on media pluralism in Turkey.

In a recent example, following the devastating hotel fire in Bolu that erupted in the early morning hours of January 20, 2025, claiming 78 lives, the RTÜK Chair directed media outlets to report solely on information from official sources. Shortly after this directive, the Bolu 2nd Criminal Court of Peace imposed a broadcasting ban on coverage of the disaster at the request of the Bolu Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Judicial control measures: a new tool for censorship

While there appears to be a decrease in the number of journalists in prison, this masks a troubling shift toward using judicial control measures—such as travel bans, regular check-ins at police stations, and house arrest—as alternative means of restricting press freedom. This trend represents an equally antidemocratic practice aimed at controlling journalists’ freedom of movement and expression. The systematic implementation of these measures, combined with increasing online censorship, appears to be replacing traditional detention as a method of silencing independent journalism.

Recent cases exemplify this pattern. While journalists are released under judicial control measures shortly after being detained, the arbitrary imposition of travel bans, house arrests and other restrictions continues to impede their ability to perform their professional duties effectively. These measures, originally intended as exceptional remedies to ensure judicial proceedings, are increasingly being weaponized to create a chilling effect on press freedom.

In light of these egregious violations of press freedom in Turkey, we urge the Turkish authorities to uphold the principles of justice, release the journalists subjected to arbitrary arrests and detentions, and safeguard the vital role of journalism in fostering debate on matters of public interest and democracy.

Medya Özgürlüğü Kuruluşları, Türkiye’de basın özgürlüğüne yönelik artan baskılara karşı harekete geçilmesi çağrısında bulunuyor

Uluslararası Basın Enstitüsü (IPI) ve aşağıda imzası bulunan basın özgürlüğü, ifade hürriyeti, insan hakları, basın meslek ve haber kuruluşları, Türkiye’de gazetecilere yönelik hak ihlallerinin son dönemde ciddi ölçüde artmasından endişe duyuyor. Keyfi tutuklamalar, gözaltılar, adli kontrol tedbirleri ve hapis cezaları, ülkedeki bağımsız medya, demokratik söylem ve temel insan hakları için varoluşsal bir tehdit oluşturuyor.

Türkiye, demokrasi ve insan haklarının yanı sıra, ifade ve basın özgürlüğünün korunmasına ilişkin uluslararası standartlara ve kendi anayasasında yer alan koruyucu hükümlere uygun hareket etmelidir.

2025 yılının Ocak ayında en az dokuz gazeteci tutuklandı, altı gazeteciye hapis cezası verildi, beş gazeteci gözaltına alındı, 23 gazeteci hakkında soruşturma başlatıldı ve bir gazeteci polis müdahalesiyle karşılaştı. İşte son bir ayda kaydedilen basın özgürlüğü ihlallerindeki endişe verici artışın kronolojisi (aşağıdaki liste temsili bir liste olup geçtiğimiz ayın tüm basın özgürlüğü ihlallerini yansıtmamaktadır):

  • 2 Ocak’ta yetkililer, gazeteci Aslıhan Gençay hakkında Hatay’daki yolsuzluklarla ilgili haberlerinden dolayı soruşturma başlattı. Haberine erişim engeli getirilerek, dezenformasyon yasası da dahil olmak üzere birçok suçlama yöneltildi—bu durum araştırmacı gazeteciliği bastırma girişimi olarak görülüyor.
  • 7 Ocak’ta Ankara Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı, Kobani davasının son duruşmasını takip eden 21 gazeteci hakkında soruşturma başlattı. Gazeteciler, izinsiz fotoğraf çektiği iddiasıyla para cezasıyla karşı karşıya—bu durum rutin dava haberlerinin suç unsuru haline getirilmesi anlamına geliyor.
  • 17 Ocak’ta evlerine yapılan polis baskınıyla gözaltına alınan altı gazeteci – Reyhan Hacıoğlu, Necla Demir, Rahime Karvar, Vedat Örüç, Velat Ekin ve Ahmet Güneş – avukatlarına erişim de dahil olmak üzere temel yasal haklarından mahrum bırakıldılar ve 20 Ocak’ta ifadeleri alınmadan tutuklandılar. Yetkililerin tutuklama gerekçesi ise gazetecilerin meşru gazetecilik faaliyetleri oldu. (Ahmet Güneş 4 Şubat’ta tahliye edildi.)
  • 21 Ocak’ta Rudaw TV muhabiri Rawin Sterk Yıldız, İstanbul Beyoğlu’nda bir gözaltı işlemini belgelerken gazeteci olduğunu açıkça belirtmesine rağmen polis müdahalesiyle karşılaştı.
  • 23 Ocak’ta beş gazeteci – Yakup Çetin, Ahmet Memiş, Cemal Azmi Kalyoncu, Ünal Tanık, Yetkin Yıldız, Gökçe Fırat Çulhaoğlu – terörle ilgili yeniden yargılandıkları davada, somut deliller olmamasına rağmen, 2 yıldan 6 yıla kadar ağır hapis cezalarına çarptırıldı.
  • 24 Ocak’ta gazeteci Eylem Babayiğit‘in mesleki faaliyetlerinden dolayı tutuklanması, “örgüt üyeliği” suçlamasının keyfi kullanımını bir kez daha gözler önüne serdi.
  • 28 Ocak’ta bir bilirkişi ile yapılan telefon görüşmesinin kaydını yayınladıkları gerekçesiyle gazeteciler Barış Pehlivan, Seda Selek ve Serhan Asker‘in gözaltına alınması, kamuyu ilgilendiren haberlere getirilen kısıtlamalar konusunda endişe yarattı. Mahkeme, Seda Selek ve Serhan Asker’i adli kontrol şartıyla serbest bıraktı.
  • 28 Ocak’ta T24 yazarı Şirin Payzın hakkında sosyal medya paylaşımları nedeniyle “terör propagandası” iddiasıyla soruşturma başlatılması, çevrimiçi paylaşımların suç unsuru sayılmasının endişe verici bir şekilde arttığını gösteriyor.
  • 28 Ocak’ta JINNEWS’in eski haber müdürü gazeteci Safiye Alagaş terör suçlamalarıyla yargılandığı davada 6 yıl 3 ay hapis cezasına çarptırıldı. Alagaş daha önce bir yıl tutuklu yargılanmıştı, şu anda temyiz sürecini tutuksuz bekliyor.
  • 29 Ocak’ta Halk TV Genel Yayın Yönetmeni Suat Toktaş, Program Koordinatörü Kürşad Oğuz ve gazeteci Barış Pehlivan, bir bilirkişi ile yapılan telefon görüşmesinin kaydını yayınladıkları gerekçesiyle gözaltına alındı. Pehlivan ve Oğuz adli kontrol şartıyla serbest bırakılırken Toktaş kaçma şüphesi ve delilleri karartma ihtimali gerekçe gösterilerek 30 Ocak’ta tutuklandı. Bu durum, keyfi tutuklama kriterlerinin endişe verici kullanımını gözler önüne serdi.

RTÜK’ün kararları basın özgürlüğünü tehdit ediyor

Türkiye’nin yayın düzenleyicisi RTÜK, eleştirel medya kuruluşlarını hedef alan endişe verici bir tutum sergilemeye devam ediyor. Gazetecilerin kayıtlı bir telefon görüşmesini yayınlamaları nedeniyle gözaltına alınmalarından hemen önce, RTÜK Başkanı konuyla ilgili medya kuruluşları ve gazeteciler için olası sonuçlar konusunda uyarıda bulundu – bu da yaklaşan gözaltı ve tutuklamaların sinyalini verdi. Açıklamasında, Halk TV’yi bir bilirkişi ile yapılan telefon görüşmesini izinsiz kaydetmek, yayınlamak ve devam eden yasal süreçleri etkilemeye çalışmakla eleştirdi.

Bu olay, eleştirel medya üzerindeki baskının devamını yansıtıyor. 2024’te RTÜK, çoğunluğu hükümeti eleştiren medyayı hedef alan, toplam 81,5 milyon Türk lirası para cezasıyla sonuçlanan 24 yayın yasağı uyguladı.

RTÜK’ün düzenleyici yetkilerini eleştirel medya kuruluşlarını cezalandırmak için sistematik şekilde kullanması, bağımsız yayıncılık ve Türkiye’deki medya çoğulculuğu noktasında ciddi endişeler uyandırıyor.

Yakın zamanda bir örnek olarak, 20 Ocak 2025’te Bolu’da meydana gelen ve 78 kişinin hayatını kaybettiği otel yangını sonrasında, RTÜK Başkanı medya kuruluşlarına yalnızca resmi kaynaklardan gelen bilgileri aktarmaları talimatını verdi. Bu talimatın hemen ardından, Bolu 2. Sulh Ceza Hakimliği, Bolu Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı’nın talebi üzerine felaketle ilgili haberler hakkında yayın yasağı getirdi.

Adli kontrol tedbirleri: Yeni bir sansür aracı

Cezaevindeki gazeteci sayısında bir düşüş görülse de, bu durum endişe verici bir gerçeği maskeliyor: Yurt dışı yasakları, düzenli imza verme zorunluluğu ve ev hapsi gibi adli kontrol tedbirleri basın özgürlüğünü kısıtlamanın alternatif araçları olarak kullanılıyor. Bu eğilim, gazetecilerin hareket ve ifade özgürlüğünü kontrol etmeyi amaçlayan eşit derecede antidemokratik bir uygulamayı temsil ediyor. Bu tedbirlerin sistematik olarak uygulanması ve artan çevrimiçi sansür, bağımsız gazeteciliği susturma yöntemi olarak geleneksel tutuklamanın yerini alıyor gibi görünüyor.

Son vakalar da bu durumu örnekliyor. Gazeteciler gözaltına alındıktan kısa süre sonra adli kontrol şartıyla serbest bırakılırken, keyfi olarak uygulanan yurt dışı yasakları, ev hapsi ve diğer kısıtlamalar, mesleki görevlerini etkili bir şekilde yerine getirmelerini engellemeye devam ediyor. Aslen yargı süreçlerini güvence altına almak için istisnai tedbirler olarak tasarlanan bu önlemler, basın özgürlüğü üzerinde caydırıcı bir etki yaratmak için kullanılıyor.

Basın özgürlüğüne yönelik bu ağır ihlaller karşısında, Türkiye’deki yetkilileri adalet ilkelerine bağlı kalmaya, keyfi gözaltı ve tutuklamaya maruz kalan gazetecileri serbest bırakmaya ve haberciliğin kamuyu ilgilendiren tartışmalar ve demokrasideki hayati rolünü korumaya çağırıyoruz.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Association of European Journalists (International)
  • Association of European Journalists in Belgium (AEJ Belgium)
  • Association of European Journalists in Bulgaria (AEJ Bulgaria)
  • Association of Journalists (GC)
  • Bulgarian Helsinki Committee
  • Catalan PEN
  • Center for Media, Information and Social Research of Georgia (CMIS)
  • Coalition For Women In Journalism (CFWIJ)
  • Danish PEN
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Freedom House
  • Foreign Media Association (FMA Turkey)
  • Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics
  • IFEX
  • Index on Censorship
  • International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)
  • Irish PEN/PEN na hEireann
  • Kurdish PEN
  • Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA)
  • Media and Migration Association (MMA)
  • Media Development Foundation (MDF)
  • Netgazeti / Batumelebi
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • OC Media
  • P24 Platform for Independent Journalism
  • Armãn PEN
  • PEN America
  • PEN Centre of Bosnia & Herzegovina
  • PEN Esperanto
  • PEN International
  • PEN Melbourne
  • PEN Norway
  • PEN Québec
  • PEN Sweden
  • PEN Türkiye
  • Progressive Journalists Association (PJA)
  • San Miguel PEN
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO)
  • Vietnamese Abroad PEN Centre
  • Yapay Gündem

This statement was coordinated by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries.

Credits: Novosti.hr. Library

Croatia: EFJ condemns far-right calls for an end to…

Croatia: EFJ condemns far-right calls for an end to funding for Novosti weekly

The European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) joined its Croatian affiliates, the Croatian Journalists’ Association (CJA) and the Trade Union of Croatian Journalists (TUCJ), in condemning the call by the far-right political party Homeland Movement to cut public funding for media outlet Novosti, which is published by the Serbian National Council, SNV, an organisation representing the Serb minority in Croatia.

On 8 May 2024, at a press conference in Šibenik, the leader of the far-right Homeland Movement, Ivan Penava, declared that his party would only support a new government coalition led by the conservative Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) if it cuts off funding for the weekly Novosti. In their views, the only print media for the Serb minority “represents an agenda to attack the foundation of the state, to present political attitudes under the guise of protecting minorities.”

Financed by the public body “Council for National Minorities as part of the Program for Cultural Autonomy of Minorities” and published by the Serbian National Council, Novosti is one of the most respected publications in the country, well-known for its investigative reports.

“The very idea of imposing the abolition of one media outlet as a condition for concluding a coalition agreement is scandalous and unacceptable,” said CJA President Hrvoje Zovko.”The financing of Novosti, as well as a number of newspapers and magazines of national minorities in Croatia, is prescribed by the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities. Encroachment on Novosti is therefore an encroachment on the constitutionally guaranteed rights of a minority community.”

“Blackmail over funding for Novosti is an attack on media pluralism and minority rights,” stated EFJ President Maja Sever. “If this agreement is ratified by the coalition government, it would mean that the Croatian government would not hesitate to seal the government pact on a violation of the rule of law and the Constitution. This is extremely serious.”

 

This statement was produced by EFJ as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Leader of Civic Platform (PO) and Poland Prime Minister Donald Tusk speaks during a rally on the 'Nowy Targ' square in Wroclaw, Poland, 24 June 2023. EPA-EFE/Tomasz Golla Library

Poland: Upheaval at Polish public broadcaster must lead to…

Upheaval at Polish public broadcaster must lead to comprehensive reform to restore and safeguard independence

Sudden dismissal of supervisory boards risks setting dangerous precedent. The new Polish government’s abrupt dismissal of the supervisory bodies of the country’s public television broadcaster TVP and national news agency PAP risks setting an alarming precedent that must be urgently rectified by new rules to permanently protect these institutions’ independence, the International Press Institute (IPI) said today.

The previous Law and Justice (PiS) government had shamelessly turned Poland’s public media into instruments of state propaganda. The new coalition’s goal of ending this situation is therefore unquestionably justified. However, these reform efforts must take care not to perpetuate a cycle of politicization or perceived politicization. The new government must now work to pass comprehensive reform that guarantees the right of Poland’s public media to work freely and shields them from future interference by political parties of all stripes.

On Tuesday, December 19, the new parliament passed a resolution calling for the restoration of “impartiality and reliability of the public media.”

On Wednesday, the minister of culture, Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, announced the appointment  of new supervisory boards for public television, public radio and the news agency PAP, as well as the appointment of new management in the three government-owned companies.

Minutes after the dismissal of the supervisory boards, TVP’s 24-hour news channel TVP Info, was taken off air, while TVP’s Channel One aired no news bulletins throughout the day on Wednesday.

The changes provoked a furious reaction from the outgoing party of Law and Justice (PiS) whose members staged an overnight sit-in on Tuesday in the broadcaster’s headquarters, also  joined by PiS  leader, Jaroslaw Kaczyński.

The new government asserted its right to act on two main grounds: firstly that the establishment of the National Media Council, the supervisory body for public TV and Radio set up by PiS in early 2016, had been ruled unconstitutional in December 2016; and secondly that the ministry of culture, as the sole owner of the public radio and TV, must now take on the NMC responsibilities and exercise the authority to restore impartiality to public media.

During their eight years in government (2015 to 2023) PiS converted the public media into an unapologetically hardline propaganda outfit designed not only to promote government policy but also to aggressively delegitimize its critics and the political opposition.

IPI visited Poland in September as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response mission and concluded that the public media had been fully converted into a propaganda arm of the ruling party. Successive reports of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring of Poland’s elections concluded that PiS “enjoyed clear advantage through its undue influence over the use of state resources and public media” during the 2023 October elections; and that the broadcaster was ‘frequently portraying the [party’s] main challenger as a threat to Polish values and national interests’ in the 2020 Presidential elections.

“While there is no question that the TVP and Polish Radio are both in need of drastic reform, IPI is troubled by the approach adopted that appears to be stretching the rule of law,” said IPI Deputy Director Scott Griffen. “While the ultimate aim is unquestionably legitimate, such an act may set a dangerous precedent for every incoming government to use legal loopholes to overturn the actions of the previous government.”

“The government must now ensure that what emerges from the changes is a fully independent public broadcaster that represents the voices and views of all of society without discrimination. The Tusk government must work with journalists groups and media experts from across Poland to establish the necessary legal safeguards that can protect public media in the future from all forms of political interference.”

The Media Freedom Rapid Responses mission report from September 2023 outlines the full range of challenges facing media freedom in Poland including media pluralism, vexatious lawsuits and safety of journalists. We urge the Civic Platform-led government to make media independence and journalists rights a central element of their programme.

This statement by IPI is part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries, and Ukraine. The project is co-funded by the European Commission.

IPI as part of MFRR
Library

Podcast: Engrained challenges for press freedom in Bulgaria

Podcast: Engrained challenges for press freedom in Bulgaria

New episode of ‘MFRR in Focus’ podcast series examines challenges facing independent journalism in one of the EU’s most corrupt countries.

Bulgaria has long been one of the EU countries with the most problematic landscape for press freedom. In this European country, journalists face corruption, legal threats, and smear campaigns on a monthly, weekly or even daily basis.

To explore these issues further, in this episode of MFRR in Focus host Anne ter Rele speaks with Bulgarian journalist Boryana Dzhambazova, a researcher and freelance journalist from Sofia, and Assen Yordanov, founder and director of Bivol.bg – an independent investigaitve news outlet whose journalists have faced waves of pressure because of their work.

Credits

Host and Producer: Anne ter Rele, IPI Advocacy Officer.

Editor: Jamie Wiseman, IPI Advocacy Officer.

Digital Producer: Alex Klint, IPI Contributor.

Also available on

This podcast publication was coordinated by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

IPI as part of MFRR
Library

Albanian ‘Ministry of Propaganda’: Where we are today?

Albanian ‘Ministry of Propaganda’: Where we are today?

New government Media and Information Agency (MIA) up and running. Lines of communication between the Albanian government and the media have long been tenuous. Whoever is in power picks and chooses the media they interact with and feeds them with information to report, whereas those who are out of favour or ask difficult questions often find themselves sidelined.

By IPI Contributor Alice Taylor

Whether journalists ask spokespersons for comment or file formal requests, information is hard to come by. Some portals report a response rate in the single digits, while those who do get a response often find key information withheld.

A 2021 report found that the Albanian Ministry of Health was the worst performing institution in the region in terms of answering freedom of information (FoI) requests. The institution also had the highest number of complaints filed with the Data Commissioner.

This is despite the fact that Albania has one of the world’s top 10 best FoI laws. The implementation of this law continues to face challenges and difficulties as public institutions remain silent, don’t answer requests, and classify increasing amounts of information.

In April, the Data Commissioner tabled changes to the law that would give him more power to demand information be made public. This came after a record 992 complaints against state institutions during 2021 for failing to provide requested information to media, civil society, and the public. With an increase in complaints of 39% on the year before, the commissioner found in favour of 700 of the complaints.

These facts and figures are just the tip of the iceberg but give an idea of the need for change in Albanian society. But a set of recent measures introduced by Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government have left the media community concerned.

Introduction to the Information and Media Agency

Following his reelection for a third mandate in April 2021, the first decision of Prime Minister Edi Rama’s new government was to create the Media and Information Agency (MIA), dubbed the ‘Ministry of Propaganda’ by critics.

The MIA functions as a public legal entity, under the prime minister, based in Tirana and funded from “the state budget, donations, and other legal sources”. According to the government, its mission is to ensure transparency regarding policies, activities, projects, events and other matters including acts of the Council of Ministers and any state institution.

Its sole responsibility is to inform and communicate with the public and the media and prepare government positions on issues of public interests. In addition, it creates press releases and media content to supplement the reams of pre-edited footage produced by Rama’s personal TV channel, which is currently sent to every newsroom. The MIA also monitors media and “means of mass communications” to assess opinions on the government.

The general director of the new agency is Endri Fuga, Rama’s long-time communications chief, who is accountable and answerable only to him. Fuga holds a position equal to that of Minister of State, a position at the same level of an elected MP but without accountability before parliament or the public. Each ministry and government department currently has its spokesperson, appointed by the minister. Requests for comment and information are addressed to that spokesperson, who then responds.

The new system is supposed to work similarly, except the MIA manages everything behind the scenes. All responses are coordinated centrally, and press materials are created and sent out from one location. Communication with the media or members of the public can only take place with the explicit authority of Fuga, who also has the power to hire and fire spokespersons.

‘German model’

The Albanian government has consistently claimed that the MIA was built “exactly” on the German model, following two visits to the country. Exit asked EURACTIV.de – a partner media in Germany – to explain how the German model works. They explained that Germany has a government agency that is the first stop for journalists to put forward media inquiries: the Federal Press Office. This entity organises three press conferences a week and journalists are invited to answer specific questions here and in federal press conferences.

In Germany, the responsibility for appointing spokespersons is down to each institution, whereas in Albania, it lies with Fuga. Furthermore, Albanian fact-checking site Faktoje.al reported that the agencies were not similar. “As far as I know, there is no such agency [the same structure as MIA] in Germany, I have never heard of it,” said Corrective.org, German fact-checking organisation. The website of the Federal Press Office also explains that the institution does not supervise the media in any way, something the Albanian MIA does.

For Koloreto Cukali, the head of the Albanian Media Council, it is clear that the similarities are negligible. “First, ‘based’ is the wrong term to adjudicate it. They got the idea from there and adopted it according to their ‘wish’. Second, our society, media and government are different and work substantially different from German,” he told Exit.

Albanian media lawyer Dorian Matlija was also quick to debunk the government’s claim. “It has a similar name but not similar functions. In Germany, the main objective is to coordinate between ministries…It is not obligatory for ministers, and no one is overlooking ministers. It is totally different,” he told Exit.

The situation has raised concerns amongst the country’s media community, particularly when combined with other legislative and institutional measures. In 2018, the government put forward an anti-defamation package to bring online media under state supervision, with media facing high fines for vague violations.

While the package has undergone several facelifts in the following years, the latest public draft is not in line with Venice Commission recommendations or EU standards. There have been multiple calls to drop the package, but it sits on the agenda of parliament, where it can be passed at any moment with a simple ruling party majority.

In addition, the Albanian Audiovisual Media Authority, which would take on the role of judge and jury as per the above package, is now headed by Armela Krasniqi, another long-time comms aid of Rama and the Socialist Party. She was voted into the role against the calls of the European Commission by parliament, which at the time did not feature an opposition.

When you put all the pieces of the puzzle together, it is not hard to come to the conclusion of total state capture of public interest information.

“If you combine intimidated media and no guarantee for free speech, with lack of access to information, confused journalists, and a centralised agency, you see the big picture. Everything is related to how the government wants to control the message from the government to the media and media to the public,” Matlija explains. “The government wants to create its own landscape and narrative.”

Where we are now

While the decision to set up the MIA agency was taken in September, it has been functional since January 2022. Described by Fuga as “a modest agency in terms of budget and assets”, it is currently funded entirely from the state budget.

The agency currently has a total of 69 employees spread across six directorates; the Directorate of Citizen Information, the Directorate of Media Information, the Directorate of Information of Institutions, the Directorate of Coordination of Ministries and Agencies, the Directorate of Production and Events and Directorate of Finances.

According to Deputy Secretary of the Council of Ministers Elira Kokona, the agency’s budget is in total EUR 1.93 million, including salaries, insurance contributions, capital expenditures and operating services.

Journalists needing information are not convinced that it is worth the money. The editor-in-chief of Faktoje, Viola Keta, said: “There has been a decrease in transparency since January 2022. In my opinion, there is a misuse of the law on the right to information.” She added that answers were not received within the legal deadline in more cases than before, meaning journalists had to take the matter to the Data Commissioner.

In a parliamentary hearing, Fuga said that the only thing that has changed is that “there is better coordination on issues that affect several ministries together”.

Keta said that since the MIA started, refusals to provide information appear more coordinated and are using the same response, namely, an article of the transparency law which provides no answer to the question.

Criticism

The Albanian government has been adamant that the purpose of the agency is to promote better transparency and communication with the media. Exit asked Cukali if he felt this was genuine.

“In Albania, the government is opaque and non-transparent; it has made a habit to keep successfully secret every decision and operation. Getting the information that is due by law is already a ‘hell’ for independent media or journalists. This institution will add another layer of opacity to the information flow,” he said.

Cukali explained that there are concerns of troll factories operated by the government, backed up with in-depth investigations, that could be pushed through the new agency. “There is fear that these troll factories will be included in the new “Ministry” and paid by the taxpayers,” he said.

But are these fears justified? Cukali and Matlija both agree that we will just have to wait and see, although hopes are not high.

What the government says

Exit reached out to Fuga to ask for figures on requests made and granted since January, what methods are used for media monitoring, if monitoring includes social media, and for a response to allegations from media that transparency has actually decreased since MIA was established.

Having previously taken issue with reports in multiple media, including Exit, that criticised his public claims in parliament the MIA was based on the German model, his response focussed predominantly on that.

Fuga replied by dismissing the claims made by some media, adding “the answer is no, we respond to everyone and our job is not to keep numbers, but to respond. As I am doing to you now, even though your question is baseless.”

Even when it comes to the functioning of the agency, it seems that transparency will remain hard to come by, let alone when it comes to getting answers on important documents or government actions.

This article is part of IPI’s reporting series “Media freedom in Europe in the shadow of Covid”, which comprises news and analysis from IPI’s network of correspondents throughout the EU. Articles do not necessarily reflect the views of IPI or MFRR. This reporting series is supported by funding from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and by the European Commission (DG Connect) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response, a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

IPI as part of MFRR
Greek journalist Thanasis Koukakis Library

Greece: Letter to government after spyware surveillance of journalist…

Greece: Letter to government after spyware surveillance of journalist Thanasis Koukakis

The partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response are concerned about surveillance measures hitting journalists in Greece.

Dear Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of Greece

Panagiotis Pikramenos, Deputy Prime Minister,

Takis Theodorikakos, Minister of Civilian Protection,

Konstantinos Tsiaras, Minister of Justice,

Dimitris Galamatis, Secretary General Communication and Information,

Panagiotis Kontoleon, Commander of the Greek National Intelligence Service

cc.

Didier Reynders, European Commissioner for Justice

Sophie in ‘t Veld, MEP, Rapporteur of Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware

Jeroen Lenaers, Chair of Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware

 ———————————————————–

The undersigned European and international press freedom and journalists’ organisations are writing to express our serious concern over the recent surveillance of Greek financial journalist Thanasis Koukakis using a powerful new spyware tool, Predator.

Our organisations are equally alarmed by state documents which reveal that one year prior to the spyware surveillance, the same journalist’s private communications were intercepted by the Greek National Intelligence Service (EYP), a body which is overseen by the office of the Prime Minister.

In light of these revelations, we urge Greek authorities to first provide further information about the source of the spyware attack and second to immediately explain the state surveillance of a journalist, and to indicate clearly whether these two incidents are linked.

On April 11 it was first revealed that Koukakis, an investigative journalist for CNN Greece who writes for multiple international publications including Financial Times and CNBC, had his mobile phone infected between July and September 2021 by Predator, an advanced spyware tool developed by a North Macedonian company called Cytrox.

In the wake of the initial revelations, on April 12 government spokesman Giannis Oikonomou suggested the Predator hack had been carried out by an “individual” or private actor and denied that the Greek government had any role in monitoring Koukakis using the spyware tool.

Days later, however, it was revealed that the EYP had itself been carrying out surveillance on Koukakis in June, July and August 2020 for what it said were “national security reasons”. Documents show that when the journalist asked the independent Authority for Ensuring the Confidentiality of Communications (ADAE) to confirm whether his phone had been tapped, the EYP stopped the surveillance the same day.

When Koukakis sought to confirm his suspicions about being wiretapped, he did not receive a response from ADAE for a year. During this time, in March 2021 the Greek government passed an amendment which blocked the ADAE, with retroactive effect, from informing citizens if they had been surveilled if it had been carried out under national security grounds, meaning the journalist was blocked from knowing whether or not his phone had been bugged.

These two cases of surveillance are troubling on many levels. Our organisations urge the Greek government to first provide greater clarity and answers about how, and by whom, Predator was abused to target Koukakis. Intellexa, which owns Cytrox, maintains that it sells its services to law enforcement agencies – not private individuals. Moreover, like other advanced spyware products, Predator is extremely expensive to acquire, making it unaffordable to many private actors. The Greek authorities should take all steps to determine if a private actor or individual was responsible, ensuring a full and independent investigation with a view to bringing the alleged perpetrators to justice.

However, our organisations note that the confirmed state surveillance of Koukakis just one year before the Predator attack undermines the claim that state intelligence agencies had no role in the recent surveillance. It is deeply concerning that an agency under the control of the office of the Prime Minister spied on a journalist investigating corruption in the business and financial world.

The grounds for the surveillance in 2020, which were approved by an EYP prosecutor, appear to be completely groundless and point to potentially unlawful monitoring by the agency. We therefore welcome the preliminary investigation launched by the head of the Athens Prosecutor’s Office, which must establish why the decision to surveil Koukakis was approved and whether it violated telecommunications privacy legislation.

At a wider level, the timing of the retroactive legislative change in 2021 regarding the EYP also poses questions about whether the government changed the law in order to block Koukakis’ surveillance from becoming public. We note with concern that this is not the first time that potential evidence has surfaced that the EYP has intercepted the private communications of journalists and their sources. These cases have had a chilling effect on public interest journalism in Greece and pose serious questions about the mandate of the EYP, its closeness to the PM’s office, and the rule of law in Greece.

Moving forward, we believe it is important that Greece take immediate steps to better regulate spyware technology so that it cannot be abused in the future. As we have seen over the past year, governments around the world, including those in the EU, have used this kind of spyware to snoop on journalists, posing serious threats to source confidentiality and journalists’ safety. We therefore urge the government to clearly confirm or deny whether its own law enforcement or intelligence agencies have acquired Predator or other privately developed spyware products, now or in the past, including the Pegasus spyware sold by Israeli company NSO Group.

Greater transparency about the trade of these technologies inside the EU is also vital for understanding the scale of the surveillance-for-hire industry inside the bloc and for providing accountability when abuses occur. In light of these allegations in relation to Intellexa, a Greek company, the national authorities must also ensure full compliance with the EU’s new Recast Dual Use Regulation, which seeks to prevent human rights harm resulting from digital surveillance by establishing controls on exports of surveillance technology by EU companies, including by providing transparency around export licenses and full human rights assessments to target countries for export.

As questions about the surveillance mount both in Greece and in Brussels, our organisations believe it is important to add greater clarity to this case. We look forward to your response.

Signed by:

  • Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Emilia Șercan | Culisele operațiunii „Kompromat” - Interviu cu Emilia Șercan | YouTube/HotNews Romania Library

Romania: Open Letter calling for swift and independent investigation…

Romania: Open letter calling for swift and independent investigation concerning publication of stolen pictures of Emilia Șercan and leak from criminal investigation

Ten European and international press freedom and freedom of expression organisations, members of the MFRR and their partners, have reacted to the harassment of Emilia Șercan, expressing serious concerns about the case and its implications for media freedom in Romania. Today, the ten organisations sent an open letter to the Romanian authorities calling for swift and independent investigations. The letter recalls that the threats and harassment of Șercan are set against a background of recent aggression and undue pressure against journalists and media workers in Romania coming from politicians, prosecutors, police, and military officers. 

Open letter, sent electronically

14 April 2022

 

Dear Prime Minister of Romania Nicolae Ciucă,

Dear Minister of Internal Affairs of Romania Lucian Bode,

Dear General Inspector of the Romanian Police, Quaestor of police Benone-Marian Matei,

Dear General Prosecutor of Romania Gabriela Scutea,

We, the undersigned organisations in the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) and partners, are disturbed by the harassment of journalist Emilia Șercan through the publication of her private pictures and the alleged leak from the criminal investigation into the matter. We call for swift and independent investigations of both issues and previous threats against Șercan. 

On 16 February, Șercan found a dehumanising message from an unknown person among her spam on Facebook Messenger, which alerted her that five personal pictures taken about 20 years ago had been published on 34 porn websites. The next day, Șercan filed a police complaint about cybercrime (concerning the theft of the pictures) and violation of privacy (concerning their upload on the porn websites). In the process, she also provided a screenshot of the Facebook message. 

On 18 February, Șercan discovered that a Moldovan website had published an article containing the five stolen pictures, as well as the Facebook Messenger screenshot made by Șercan, and submitted only to the Romanian police, plus a short comment on Șercan’s professional conduct. Șercan ascertained that the article was published approximately 40 minutes after she left the Criminal Investigation Service. A link to the article was subsequently posted by 74 websites, primarily Romanian and some from the Republic of Moldova. 

Șercan filed another criminal complaint regarding the possible leak from the criminal investigation and violation of privacy with the Internal Affairs Department of the Romanian Police. On 21 February, chief of the Romanian Police Mr Matei presented Șercan with an analysis of the media spread of the pictures, which would have cleared the police and supervising prosecutor of suspicion. Șercan characterised the police’s analysis as implausible and “fabricated”. On 8 March, Șercan discovered that the Internal Affairs Department had sent her complaint to the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the 4th District Court of Bucharest, which is potentially a source of the leak. Subsequently, the file was transferred to the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest Court of Appeal.

We have serious concerns about the harassment of Șercan and the implications for media freedom in Romania more broadly, especially given the context: on 18 January 2022, Șercan revealed in an article that Prime Minister Ciucă plagiarised his doctoral dissertation. The following day, she received a threat to her personal safety on her professional email address, followed by another threat on 2 February via Facebook Messenger. Both threats are under investigation by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Bucharest Police. 

Moreover, the threats and harassment of Șercan are set against a background of recent aggression and undue pressure against journalists and media workers in Romania coming from politicians, prosecutors, police, and military officers. These include, among others, the threat against the wife of G4Media editor-in-chief Pantazi by an employee of the Ministry of National Defence, in March 2022; a reporter and her crew working for Italian public broadcaster RAI who were kept for hours in a Bucharest police station after an anti-vaccine Romanian Senator kept them locked up inside her office during an interview, in December 2021; attacks on two women journalists at a congress of the National Liberal Party congress by party members in September 2021; and, judicial pressure on Libertatea and Newsweek Romania following a criminal complaint and several SLAPPs filed by a Mayor of a Bucharest district, in May 2021. 

The European Commission has made it clear that Member States “should investigate and prosecute all criminal acts committed against journalists, whether online or offline, in an impartial, independent, effective, transparent and timely manner”, as underlined in its recent Recommendation on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union, “to ensure that fundamental rights are protected and justice is swiftly delivered in particular cases and prevent the emergence of a ‘culture’ of impunity regarding attacks against journalists” (Rec. 4). 

On 8 March, the MFRR partners, together with ActiveWatch, wrote to the Romanian authorities, urging them to ensure that the complaints filed by Șercan in relation to the stolen photos, the leak from the criminal investigation and the earlier threats are swiftly and diligently investigated.  Unfortunately, to date, a substantive response to these asks has not been provided.

Accordingly, we renew today our call for quick and independent investigations. Any criminal acts these investigations reveal must be duly prosecuted, so those responsible are held to account. Particularly as concerns the complaint about the leak from the criminal investigation, sufficient safeguards that effectively guarantee the investigation and prosecution’s independence must be in place.

Sincerely,

Signed by:

  • ActiveWatch
  • ARTICLE 19
  • Center for Independent Journalism Romania
  • Coalition For Women In Journalism (CFWIJ)
  • Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

This open letter was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Zece organizații europene și internaționale care militează pentru libertatea presei și pentru libertatea de exprimare, membri ai MFRR și partenerii acestora, au reacționat la hărțuirea Emiliei Șercan, exprimând îngrijorări serioase cu privire la acest caz și la implicațiile pe care acesta le aduce pentru libertatea presei în România. Astăzi, cele zece organizații au trimis o scrisoare deschisă către autoritățile române, prin care cer investigații prompte și independente. Scrisoarea amintește faptul că amenințările și hărțuirea la adresa lui Șercan au loc pe un fond de agresiune recentă și presiune nejustificată împotriva jurnaliștilor și a lucrătorilor media din România, venite din partea politicienilor, procurorilor, poliției și a ofițerilor militari.

Scrisoare deschisă, trimisă electronic

14 aprilie 2022

Re: Publicarea fotografiilor personale ale Emiliei Șercan, sustrase ilegal, și scurgerea de informații din ancheta penală trebuie investigate cu promptitudine și independent 

Prim-ministrului României Nicolae Ciucă, 

Ministrului Afacerilor Interne Lucian Bode, 

Inspectorului General al Poliției Române, Chestorul de poliție Benone-Marian Matei, 

Procurorului General al României Gabriela Scutea, 

Noi, organizațiile semnatare ale Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) și partenerii noștri, găsim tulburătoare hărțuirea jurnalistei Emilia Șercan prin publicarea fotografiilor personale sustrase ilegal și prin presupusa scurgere de informații din ancheta penală ce investiga fapta respectivă. Cerem anchetarea promptă și independentă a ambelor situații, precum și a amenințărilor precedente adresate lui Șercan. 

Pe 16 februarie, Șercan a primit un mesaj dezumanizant de la o persoană necunoscută, ce ajunsese în Spam pe Facebook Messenger, mesaj care a alertat-o cu privire la faptul că cinci fotografii personale făcute acum 20 de ani au fost publicate pe 34 de website-uri cu conținut pornografic. Următoarea zi, Șercan a făcut o plângere penală referitoare la infracțiunile comise prin sisteme informatice (cu privire la furtul fotografiilor personale) și la violarea vieții private (cu privire la încărcarea lor pe website-urile cu conținut pornografic). Tot atunci, a pus la dispoziție organelor de cercetare și o captură de ecran cu mesajul primit pe Facebook. 

Pe 18 februarie, Șercan a descoperit faptul că un website din Republica Moldova publicase un articol ce conținea cele cinci fotografii furate, precum și captura de ecran ce suprindea mesajul primit pe Facebook Messenger, pusă la dispoziție doar Poliției Române, alături de un scurt comentariu asupra conduitei sale profesionale. Șercan a constatat faptul că articolul fusese publicat la aproximativ 40 de minute după ce părăsise sediul Serviciului de Investigații Criminale. Link-ul către articolul respectiv fusese postat ulterior de 74 de website-uri, în mare parte din România, și unele din Republica Moldova. 

Șercan a făcut o nouă plângere penală, referitoare la posibila scurgere de informații din ancheta penală și la violarea vieții private, la Direcția Control Intern a Inspectoratului General al Poliției Române. Pe 21 februarie, șeful Poliției Române, dl. Matei, i-a prezentat Emiliei Șercan o analiză a modului în care fotografiile s-au răspândit în media, analiza ce ar fi arătat că poliția și subcomisarul atribuit cazului erau în afara oricăror suspiciuni. Șercan a catalogat analiza poliției drept neplauzibilă și „fabricată”. Pe 8 martie, Șercan a descoperit faptul că Direcția Control Intern trimisese plângerea sa către Parchetul de pe lângă Judecătoria Sectorului 4 București, care este o potențială sursă a scurgerii de informații. Ulterior, dosarul a fost transferat la Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel București. 

Avem serioase motive de îngrijorare cu privire la hărțuirea lui Șercan, în mod special, și, în sens general, la implicațiile asupra libertății presei în România, cu atât mai mult cu cât aceste fapte au loc în următorul context: la 18 ianuarie 2022, Șercan dezvăluise într-un articol faptul că Prim-ministrul României a plagiat în teza de doctorat. A doua zi, a primit amenințări cu privire la siguranța sa personală pe adresa de e-mail profesională, urmate de altele – pe 2 februarie, primite pe Facebook Messenger. Ambele incidente sunt investigate de Serviciul de Investigații Criminale din cadrul Poliției București. 

Mai mult, amenințările și hărțuirea la adresa lui Șercan au loc pe un fond de agresiune recentă și presiune nejustificată împotriva jurnaliștilor și a lucrătorilor media din România, venite din partea politicienilor, procurorilor, poliției și a ofițerilor militari. Aceste incidente includ, printre altele, amenințarea împotriva soției redactorului-șef G4Media Pantazi de către un angajat al Ministerului Apărării Naționale, în martie 2022; un reporter și echipa sa, care lucrează pentru postul public de televiziune italian RAI, ținuți timp de mai multe ore într-o secție de poliție din București, după ce un senator român anti-vaccin i-a închis în biroul ei în timpul unui interviu, în decembrie 2021; atacuri asupra a două jurnaliste la un congres al Partidului Național Liberal, de către membri de partid, în septembrie 2021; și, presiunea judiciară asupra Libertatea și Newsweek România în urma unei plângeri penale și a mai multor acțiuni în instanță și plângeri depuse de un primar al unui sector din București, în mai 2021.

Comisia Europeană face foarte clar faptul că statele membre „ar trebui să investigheze și să urmărească penal toate actele criminale comise împotriva jurnaliştilor, fie ele efectuate online, sau offline, într-o manieră imparțială, independentă, eficientă, transparentă și în timpul corespunzător”, după cum este subliniat și în recenta Recomandare privind asigurarea protecției, siguranței și susținerii jurnaliștilor și a altor profesioniști media din Uniunea Europeană, „pentru a se asigura că drepturile fundamentale sunt protejate și justiția este făcută prompt în cazuri particulare și pentru a preveni apariția unei „culturi” a impunității în ceea ce privește atacuri împotriva jurnaliştilor” (Rec. 4).

Pe 8 martie, partenerii MFRR, împreună cu ActiveWatch, au scris autorităților române, îndemnându-le să se asigure că plângerile depuse de Șercan în legătură cu fotografiile furate, scurgerea de informații din ancheta penală și amenințările anterioare sunt investigate cu promptitudine și diligență. Din păcate, până în prezent, nu am primit un răspuns substanțial la aceste cereri. 

În consecință, reluăm astăzi apelul nostru pentru investigații rapide și independente. Acele fapte penale care reies în urma investigațiilor trebuie urmărite în mod corespunzător, astfel încât cei responsabili să fie trași la răspundere. În mod particular în ceea ce privește plângerea cu privire la scurgerea de informații dintr-o anchetă penală, trebuie să existe suficiente garanții care să asigure eficient independența anchetei și a demersului urmăririi penale.

Cu stimă,

Semnat:

  • ActiveWatch
  • ARTICLE 19
  • Center for Independent Journalism Romania
  • Coalition For Women In Journalism (CFWIJ)
  • Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

This open letter was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

MFRR fact finding mission to the Netherlands February 2022 Library

Netherlands: Towards a safer haven: Advancing safety of journalists…

Netherlands: Towards a safer haven: Advancing safety of journalists amidst rising threats in the Netherlands

Following interviews with more than twenty local stakeholders, the MFRR concludes that policy and practice around the safety of journalists in the Netherlands in many ways constitutes a best practice example, thanks to its pioneering PersVeilig mechanism. Nevertheless, there remains a need to strengthen several areas to better protect journalists and media workers against the increasingly hostile climate pursuant to intensified societal polarisation and threats emanating from organised crime.

The report details the findings and recommendations of the MFRR’s online fact-finding mission that took place in February 2022, led by Free Press Unlimited (FPU) together with the European Centre of Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) and the International Press Institute (IPI), with the participation of the other MFRR partners plus the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Without Borders, and in collaboration with the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Journalisten (NVJ).

The Netherlands generally remains a safe haven for journalists and media workers. The pioneering PersVeilig mechanism is a key actor in ensuring and advancing journalists’ safety and is a noteworthy example of constructive cooperation and dialogue between the journalistic community and state authorities. Both symbolically and practically, PersVeilig makes it clear that attacks and harassment of reporters are not tolerated and are addressed collectively.

While the assessment of PersVeilig is overwhelmingly positive, both among the MFRR’s partner organisations and its interlocutors during the fact-finding mission, room for improvement remains in a number of areas. These include implementing agreed-upon protocols more consistently and ensuring the project’s capacity and continuity.

Despite the relatively favourable conditions for press freedom and a pioneering mechanism, the MFRR mission confirmed that aggression against journalists is on the rise amidst a hardening of public debate and increasing polarisation in society. Subsequently, and despite the high willingness to cooperate between the journalistic community and law enforcement, the need remains to ensure a better understanding of the role of the press during protests, as well as changes to operational procedures to protect this role.

Certain categories of journalists suffer specific threats, particularly freelance reporters and women journalists. In this regard, it became clear throughout the mission that the Dutch approach to the safety of journalists lacks a gender lens. Moreover, while the Dutch policy approach scores well when it comes to putting in place mechanisms to protect journalists and prosecute offenders, there is room for improvement as concerns prevention.

Furthermore, with regard to threats from organised crime, there is a need to study the creation of tailored protection packages and consider improvements to the protection of journalists who cover high-profile criminal trials.

In light of its findings and to ensure that the Netherlands maintains its leadership position when it comes to the safety of journalists, the MFRR issued more than twenty specific recommendations to the authorities of the Netherlands, law enforcement, the journalistic community, PersVeilig and social media platforms.

The fact-finding mission to the Netherlands was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.