Why did you decide that cyber security and surveillance deserved special coverage through your newsletter?

Media generally have been recovering technology the wrong way for a long time, as geek culture or through financial lenses. In Israel even more, because it’s a startup pornography nation. The idea of our desk is to consolidate a focus on technology and to make sure it’s coming from a political perspective. We’ve always been exposed to the Israeli high-tech scene, learning a lot about the offensive cyber industry over the past few years. But cyber is an empty word, it just means digital. The point is that we don’t yet have a language to talk about it. While we were familiarising with these cyber firms, we understood little of what they were and what they were doing. Of course, we reported that Israel was selling technologies to other countries, but digital weapons are not the same as selling an antivirus to Saudi Arabia, right?

When we joined the Project Pegasus, we learned more about digital arms, traded with government oversight for political reasons. It’s also when we understood that we have to work together, and that our ability as journalists to collaborate is really important because these surveillance firms are multinational trying to hide their fragmented operations: they produce the technology in Israel, the seller might be a Belgian businessman, the client might be Indonesian. You can’t cover the whole story alone, so working together really helps, because everyone has different skill sets. There’s a trend in journalism, what the New York Times calls visual investigations  , which I think is a pretty good term, or what Bellingcat calls open-source investigations. Which is not exactly what we do: our desk is an open-source investigation desk focused on technology from a non-technological perspective. This is our mandate and what we try to do in our NatSec+ newsletter.

 

Take us a bit more into your newsroom. How many people are there? What are the different tasks and skills that you put in place? How do you cooperate each other, so I’ll get the picture of

Our desk is de facto a 3-man investigation team, with different sets of skills. Oded Yaron is the person leading this to operation, he covers arms technology and he’s our open-source expert in terms of documents, corporate structures, all these stuffs, very classic, hardcore Osint work. The editor of the Newsletter is a man called Avi Sharf and he’s been Haaretz’s expert plane watcher for many years. We used to treat plane watching only as leads, to feed other reporters, now it’s a stand-alone. And I do cyber and human, I deal with sources, and I try to corroborate the leads we get from the open-source activities, and that’s a really important thing. There are a lot of desks that are doing open source-work only, Bellingcat doesn’t talk to people. We’re trying to bring this digital know-how back to the core of journalistic practice. Plus the moment you open up to thinking of the digital space as a political space, it’s really like you have more stories than time.

A small example, one of the beats that I’m really involved in covering, is Wikipedia. It is not just an online encyclopaedia, but also an open-source arena, right? So I’m looking at the actual editors, who they are, and map the people trying to influence the public discourse in Israel. Wikipedia feeds Google, feeds ChatGPT, if you can manipulate that, it has massive effects. Wikipedia is seen as a geek culture product, no one would ever think it’s connected to surveillance, but it is another example of a technological arena with high political stakes. The challenge for a newsroom is that it takes time to understand and adapt the meta-narratives, then put forward coherent stories that will educate not only the public, but also the newspaper itself to think about these stories in a different way.

 

Can you elaborate more on this different way? How would you advise another young journalist covering these topics?

It touches on the key point of education. I think the biggest problem with technology is that it is wrapped up in this discourse of innovation, which prevents the public from understanding it, but also prevents journalists from properly covering and working with it. You ask any person in the public what they think about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and they have an opinion, even though they have no clue how nuclear fusion works. When it comes to digital technology, people will tell you that they don’t understand how it works, so I don’t have answers. I think it doesn’t matter how it works. We’re trying to move away from a discourse that comes attached with technology and says this is new, innovative, cutting edge, and we can’t regulate it because we don’t understand it. This stuff is new at some level, but it doesn’t pose a new regulatory problem. We’ve been regulating arms for close to a hundred years, you can’t buy a nuclear bomb on Amazon and that’s great. Let’s reach a point where you can’t buy digital spyware technologies in this manner. We’re not even having this discussion!

But I think the big lie with covering technology is that it is nowhere. Think of how we conceive cloud technology. No, cloud actually means servers in Iceland. If you’re covering cloud hacking, somewhere there’s an office, there are people. Many times, technology reporting is much easier than other fields because people in the business don’t perceive themselves as part of the defence apparatus. If I were to reach out to the head of the IDF’s military technology unit, he would hang up the phone. But if I’m calling a company whose clients are in the military, they think of themselves as a company, and they have a very specific vision of a journalist: as a troublemaker, or someone coming to do PR for them. The work is to break that dichotomy, people respond well if you know what the company does and you’re able to create a dialogue. Plus, they think they’re saving the world, right? That they’re inside this ethical tech club, they’re making the world a better place and they’re proud of what they do. You have an entry point here, because you can reach out to them, and they usually respond.

Of course, as an Israeli I was lucky, I come from a small country in which I am part of the élite: I’m white, I’m Jewish, and I’m from Tel Aviv. While some of my friends decided to go into media, many others did not, so there’s this elitist network all over this small country that you can tap into, which also includes family. But I still get tons of pushback, it’s okay that the people I write about disagree with me and explain that not all surveillance is bad and the like. It’s very important not to hide behind the keyboard, for example by making requests for comments face to face.

 

There is an urgence to define the ethics of surveillance technologies. How would you discuss that within your group?

The main challenge of our times is that we must not let the tech firms dictate the ethics of journalism. Such a debate would be completely linked to their desire to stay untaxed and unregulated. I know reporters who will tell me they would never use an avatar or fake accounts because it’s unethical due to the platform’s terms of use. Who cares, they’re not part of our ethical debate, they’re for profit companies. As journalists, ethical dilemmas are to be discussed with your editor, and each newspaper has their own ethical autonomy.

The other interesting ethical debate is that not all surveillance is evil. If you were to look at the field there, everyone thinks NSO is terrible. In that sense I have a quite conservative position. I don’t think we should ban spyware and I’ve become convinced that it’s a legitimate form of technology that we want governments to have. We want to be able to track people who smuggle, who turn women into sex slavery, and track revenge porn. We want that technology and we need the law and the international understanding to govern it. What is not legitimate is that military-level technology is being privatised and sold on the market. That is a massive problem.

 

Governments were responsible for serious abuses. Can journalists or others be targets of legitimate surveillance by law enforcement agencies?

In our ethical debate, we thought spyware is terrible and, post Pegasus project, we realised that all governments use it. Now we’re at the very phase of legal versus not legal, which I find childish. Let’s take the Spanish example: the government lawfully used spyware against the Catalan movement  . Whatever your political opinions are, they’re not blowing up buses, you might hate it, but it’s a political movement, not an armed military uprising, right? Then you have the Moroccan spying  on the Spanish government, unlawfully we say. So the issue is not about lawfulness, in a context where national security is the skeleton key concept that is being used to justify almost everything. After many investigations, we realised that a lot of surveillance practices are not illegal at all. Instead, it should be shameful for a person to sit in a meeting with the politician and say they also have 500,000 avatars to twist the public debate. The normative approach lacks the ability to create stigmatisation of bad surveillance abuses. We need public debate for that.

 

In Israel, how the context affects people’s mentality and approach to the idea of technology as a saviour or a threat?

If Edward Snowden  ’s case would have happened in Israel and he finds me, saying “I have a great story and I have documents: Israel is listening to everyone”, I’d respond “Great, but what’s the story?”. Israeli society is extremely jaded. People believe they’re under surveillance and they have zero problem with it, because they know the person surveying is their brother or cousin, and they accept that they must give up personal freedoms or that their rights might be exploited. This challenging mentality shapes the background of a lot of our journalistic work.

The second problematic aspect is that it creates an ethical framework in which a lot of Israelis think that whatever is good for Israel, maintains Israel’s security, or improves Israel diplomatic standing is okay. NSO sold surveillance tech to Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia did terrible things with it. It’s fine, because maybe soon Israel will make peace with the Saudi. Pegasus was in the backyard of the Abraham Accords  . We call it cyber diplomacy, the focus is not who you sell to or what they do with it, the problem is if it’s good or bad for Israel. This is the only question that matters.

Third interesting point is that all of my sources in all of these cyber firms belong to the Israeli left wing liberal standards: pro Lgbtq+, concerned by the environment, none of them is pro Netanyahu, and in theory they support peace and a government that was advancing a two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But they think that if these tech trade agreements allow Israel to make peace with the Arab world, it’s a good thing. It’s an extension of a logic that is directly connected to the occupation [of the Palestinian Territories, ndA]. Within the army culture, there’s a say, which is called the good soldier at the checkpoint. Somebody needs to be at the checkpoint, and the question is if it’s going to be a nice white liberal, or an angry racist right winger. And the answer is that it’s always better that it be someone like me. I did go to the army, even though we didn’t support the occupation, because it’s better for us to be there. And this logic continues into the tech space.

 

And into journalism as well?

The Israeli media is very much connected to the army and the military radio is where a lot of young journalists start. This also makes us very knowledgeable about the military. Organically we’re all experts, we all have inside sources, and so on.
The army’s ability to control the narrative in Israel is reduced because I can always call my cousin, who’s on the front line right now, and he’ll tell me what’s happening. In that sense we’re perceived as a threat because we’re now exposing Israel’s military-industrial complex, and we’re doing it in a way that undermines Israel’s ability to use these technologies for its benefits.
For instance, all of these surveillance technologies are used nonstop  in the West Bank, and that’s the elephant in the room: the fact that even for the most liberal Israelis, this is a given. Israelis don’t usually think their army may do something bad. Maybe the government is doing something bad with the army, but they trust the army and all its weaponry. This is extremely problematic, because the Palestinians living in the West Bank are not our civilians, they don’t have rights.

 

What kind of legal threats did you experience, what measures you implemented for your protection, and what kind of advice can you provide to other newsrooms who are willing to engage in this kind of reporting?

We always have a rigid legal process, even much more than most newspapers in terms of requests for comments. I really recommend telling companies at least a week or two before you’re publishing that you’re writing about them, and to give them the opportunity to meet you off-the-record to set the record straight. What concerns private companies may be different from what you are really interested in. Once you are within that dialogue, you can fact check and set the record straight on things that if you got wrong, you would get sued. We’re two years into this reporting on cybersec and we got zero lawsuits, which I think is a really good sign.

Also, this is really relevant for us, we live in a country with a military censor that has the right to tell me that I can’t publish certain things because they harm national security. It’s not a binding decision and the newspaper can challenge the decision. Ironically, really sensitive material will get flagged at that point: the fact that something will or will not be allowed for publication is actually a really big indicator of whether it’s true or not. So in that sense I can then rebuild my story in a way that it’s fine.

 

Is there a certain level of self-censorship in this sense when reporting on the tech surveillance industry?

I don’t think it’s self-censorship, not more than any other reporter who works with inside sources. Even if you write about the police right? You have to balance between maintaining your sources within the police but also be critical. But I think it’s the same challenges. Maybe that’s the real challenge: we have to cover the digital world like we cover everything else.

 

How do you manage your personal and digital safety? What kind of guidelines or protocols do you follow?

That’s the hardest stuff. I have two companies providing high-end, extremely expensive digital defence for me at a pro-bono level. I use a system of codes to maintain my notes, so if you were to open my phone notebook you wouldn’t be able to understand who I’m talking to. We do use 2-step verification. We once did an entire project completely on paper, the worst thing we’d ever done, it was terrible, it drove us crazy. The more you learn, the more you realise how much you’re exposed. You’re constantly updating and changing, but the sad answer is that you can’t stay safe. We have this joke that we like to tell ourselves: remember, in the end it’s going to be in a newspaper! There’s a phase for secrecy, then we have to let it go. And we have kind of reached the point of making peace with the fact that some information may leak.

 

My final question is more about the psychological burden of doing this work. How do you cope with that, at personal level and at newsroom level?

A lot of journalists go through this kind of ups and downs. As a very internal newsroom dynamic, editors can be very demanding, and you need someone who actually understands you. As an investigative reporter, you step into very scary, crazy worlds. It’s scary to be inside them, but also it’s also very hard to carry the burden of knowledge, and the consequences of being unable to publish and people won’t know anything. If your editor doesn’t understand your urgency and the weight you’re carrying, and is just thinking about headlines and deadlines, then you’re going to reach a bad place. It’s also very important to share, you need other reporters that you can talk with, and I also say that I’m a very big fan of going into therapy. I do go to therapy, and while it’s not stigmatised in Israel, it’s also not that common in the newsrooms. The debate on mental health is now opening, there is a shift to that. And my newspaper has once sent me on vacation, telling me listen, I think you should take a few days off. That is the nice kind of thing that can happen, isn’t it?

This article was coordinated by OBCT as part of tthe Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries. 

“I absolutely rule out that there is or has been any wiretapping activity against MP Marco Cappato”. Thus, a few hours after the public alarm raised by the treasurer of the association Luca Coscioni, a statement   from the undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council Alfredo Mantovano denied on behalf of the government the rumors about an alleged permanent control operation against Cappato, candidate in the Senate by-elections in Monza in October. Similarly, with a much more detailed statement   which arrived very quickly, the undersecretary had responded in May to the allegations contained in the book by Luigi Bisignani and Paolo Madron, “The powerful at the time of Giorgia”, published by Chiarelettere, in which there was talk of 400 unauthorised interceptions against politicians, journalists, former members of the government, and members of the opposition.

Allegations and denials

“I have never authorised, as the delegated Authority for the security of the Republic, any form of interception of political representatives or journalists”, wrote Mantovano at the end of May  , defining the scenario envisaged by the book as “very concerning”.

These two sensational cases stirred up the political debate for a few days in recent months, but did not lead to complaints or requests for corrections: it had happened in May, with the advertising launch of the book by Bisignani and Madron, and it also happened at the end of August, with the video   posted on Twitter by Marco Cappato, then shared by Ansa   and by various newspapers, for a total of almost half a million views.

Cappato’s complaint was detailed: “I formally ask the Prime Minister to verify whether the information that reached me anonymously that from February 2023 I am allegedly subjected to ‘computer tapping’ of the telephone (permanent and total interception) with state trojans and that wiretaps have been underway in my usual places of work and life since March of this year. The monitoring would be carried out by the Information and Security Agency – Aisi – at the request of the Information Department for the Security of the Republic – Dis – Authority delegated by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers for any cases of contesting the crime of subversive association and any crimes found during the investigation”.

It is not yet known whether the leak that Cappato says he trusts blindly has been artfully manipulated, whether the institutions are hiding something or whether these are unfounded statements. Even in the case of the 400 alleged wiretaps against politicians and journalists, the only comments were by Matteo Renzi, former head of government, and Vittorio di Trapani, president of the Fnsi. “It is urgent to clarify the matter”, was the request   of the president of the journalists’ union. “It would be an unprecedented scandal”, Renzi wrote   in Il Riformista.

Preventive interceptions by the police and secret services

The interceptions mentioned by Bisignani and Madron are be the so-called preventive interceptions, legal for the police and secret services as long as they are authorised in advance by a magistrate. These wiretaps are different from those targeting suspects: the Criminal Procedure Code establishes the differences from procedural wiretaps, which allow the continuation of investigations (articles 266-271 of the Criminal Procedure Code) or facilitate the search for fugitives (art. 295, co. 3, 3-bis and 3-ter c.p.p.). On the other hand, preventive ones, whether police or intelligence, have public security functions and serve to understand whether there are potential risks for the stability of the country’s institutional and economic system.

The mechanism for this type of wiretapping, carried out by the services delegated by the President of the Council of Ministers and subject to authorisation by the Attorney General at the Court of Appeal of Rome, is simple: the head of government can delegate, under their political responsibility, the directors of the security information services to carry out interceptions of communications or conversations between those present, even if these take place in the home, in a private place of residence, or in their appurtenances, including the acquisition of external data (the so-called metadata) relating to telephone and electronic communications and the acquisition of any other useful information. Thus the Code of Criminal Procedure integrated by other provisions contained in the Pisanu decree of 2005, in the Code of anti-mafia laws of 2011, and in the Budget Law of the Meloni government of December 2022.

Also on the Carabinieri   website, managed by the Ministry of Defence, there is a precise definition: “It is a tool that allows to detect live and with the maximum level of relevance the level of danger both of the clans operating in a territory and the danger of individual subjects. Regardless of the possibility of developing judicial investigations arising from the elements acquired, they can indicate the priorities on which to intervene with targeted preventive investigations”.

The right to defence and to be informed

But as Leonardo Filippi, professor emeritus of Criminal Procedure at the University of Cagliari, writes in the online magazine Penale Diritto e Procedura  , the changes recently introduced by the government increasingly lead to the question to what extent our Constitution tolerates “a limitation of fundamental freedoms for the purposes of crime prevention without even subsequent information to the person who suffers it”. The question is all the more justified by the fact that the recent changes do not indicate “any serious crime to be prevented, therefore an authorisation for any crime would be legitimate, even trivial or considered inoffensive, as long as the operations are considered indispensable for carrying out prevention activities” of the secret services. Instead, argues Filippi, “it is left to the Attorney General at the Court of Appeal of Rome to make a generic assessment of the indispensability of the prevention activity for the purposes of carrying out the prevention activities delegated to the security information services: if they consider them indispensable, they authorise, with their own reasoned decree, the interceptions”.

The change compared to the past is not insignificant: if preventive interceptions were previously approved when the Public Prosecutor believed there were “investigative elements” that justified the prevention activity, now the authorisation must be based exclusively on the fact that such interceptions are “essential for carrying out the activities delegated” to the services themselves.

A critical element of preventive interceptions lies, according to prof. Filippi, in the total absence of the right of defence, as there is no formal suspect or charges. Filippi writes: “Given the natural secrecy of preventive activities, the procedure for verifying the regularity of operations and subsequent destruction is not assisted by any guarantee to protect the person subjected to ante delictum collections, who is, ordinarily, destined to remain unaware of the activities carried out against them.

And he continues: “However, the targets of interception and therefore of the limitation of the secrecy of their communications or conversations would have the right at least to be informed of the capture of their dialogues, once the prevention needs have been satisfied”.

All the more disturbing, then, is the thought, fuelled by what is written in Bisignani and Madron’s book, that in recent years such interceptions have expanded and have included newspaper editors, MPs, and members of the opposition.

Unconfirmed rumors from Copasir

At the moment there are no complaints or requests for corrections on the book, which in any case has undergone some television censorship: at the beginning of June Mediaset had cancelled two appearances by Bisignani in Nicola Porro’s programme “Quarta Repubblica”, and in “Stasera Italia”, the talk hosted by Barbara Palombelli, communicating the cancellation a few hours before the broadcast.

On the other hand, there could be a judicial initiative against Bisignani by Tim, which at the beginning of July announced   that it had given a mandate to its lawyers to proceed in court to protect the actions of its employees and shareholders. In fact, on 2 July, Bisignani returned to the subject of wiretapping in an article in il Tempo   (“The 400 intercepted without their knowledge”), and had said that, in a hearing at Copasir (Parliamentary Committee for Security) on 20 June, Tim’s head of security and public affairs Eugenio Santagata confirmed that the activities of the former telephone monopolist would include not only carrying out interceptions useful for national security, but also extending them, if the authority so considered, to ordinary citizens, with what is commonly defined as a “trawl” system.

Here Bisignani quotes his co-author Madron: “According to what Madron was able to ascertain from some members of the Parliamentary Committee for Security (and the Secret Services) who requested anonymity”, the manager would have reported that among the institutional activities of his group there is the possibility of listening to the voice and airwaves of unaware Italian citizens. With the possibility, depending on the interest of the conversations captured, to extend the listening to other users too: the so-called trawl system. With this Bisignani alleges that under the grounds of national security there would be a risk of violating everyone’s privacy.

The hearings at Copasir and a parallel investigation by the Rome prosecutor’s office are at the moment the only concrete consequence of Bisignani and Madron’s book; the hearings are secret, and everything Bisignani writes in retrospect are conjectures which, although denied by the government and Tim, remain debated on the political scene. For the rest, there are no other complaints or requests for rectification affecting the book, which over the summer had some success with the public, including at the Trento Economics festival and in presentations in Capalbio, Avellino, Rome, the Vicenza Golf Club, and the Kalè bathing establishment in Castellaneta Marina in the province of Taranto.

This article was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.

Turkish translation available here.

 

This year’s parliamentary and presidential elections have brought no relief for press freedom. On the contrary, pressure continues to mount on critical journalists ahead of next year’s municipal vote, including mayoral elections in Istanbul and Ankara. And the tragic February 2023 earthquakes laid bare efforts by authorities to control news and information, with local media being particularly targeted.

 

This week, five international media freedom and journalism organizations met with a range of key stakeholders in Turkey, including journalists, civil society groups, the Turkish Constitutional Court, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), and diplomatic representatives, including the EU Delegation, to discuss Turkey’s media freedom crisis. The delegation also met with members of parliament of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), Green Left Party (YSP), and Labor Party (EMEP). The delegation also monitored the trial of Tele1 Editor-in-Chief Merdan Yanardağ in Istanbul on October 4.

 

Led by the International Press Institute (IPI) and IPI’s Turkey National Committee, the mission included representatives from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT), and Reporters Without Borders (RSF).

 

The mission’s requests for meetings with the Minister of Justice Yılmaz Tunç, Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya, head of the Turkish Parliament’s Chair Human Rights Investigation Commission Derya Yanık, head of the Digital Platforms Commission Hüseyin Yayman, head of the Justice Commission Cüneyt Yüksel, RTÜK Chair Ebubekir Şahin and Fahrettin Altun, the head of Directorate of Communications, were left unanswered.  The mission regrets not having the opportunity to engage in dialogue with key public officials and public authorities responsible for upholding fundamental rights and the rule of law and ensuring media freedom and pluralism in the country.

 

A key topic of this year’s mission was Turkey’s disinformation law. Last year, the AKP head of the Human Rights Investigation Commission of the Turkish Parliament assured our delegation that disinformation law would not be used to punish journalists. But in the past year, at least 20 journalists were targeted (with three jailed) on the basis of the disinformation law, mainly in relation to coverage of the earthquake.

  

Physical safety remains an issue of grave concern. In meetings with journalists, the delegation heard alarming examples of threats to reporters’ safety with authorities in some cases turning a blind eye, failing to uphold their duty to conduct an effective investigation and provide safety measures. Meanwhile, politicians, government authorities, and the courts continue to equate critical journalism with “terrorist propaganda”, disinformation, or a threat to national security, further increasing journalists’ physical and legal vulnerability.

 

Journalists targeted with legal harassment continue to face egregious violations of rule of law guarantees. The systematic use of pretrial detention for journalists has now become the norm, effectively resulting in punishment without conviction. Recent cases have seen Kurdish reporters jailed for over a year pending trial following mass arrests.

 

The granting of official press cards remains arbitrary – and their power is limited in the face of information control. Independent journalists fortunate to receive such cards reported that they were in some cases prevented by authorities from reporting in the earthquake zone despite providing their credentials. 

 

The Constitutional Court continues to issue important rulings in support of press freedom. However, it is hampered by a lack of resources, a failure by lower courts to implement the Court’s rulings, and a failure by the Turkish Parliament to introduce legislation addressing systematic violations identified by the Court.

 

Local elections are due to take place in Turkey in March 2024. The free flow of independent news and information is an essential condition to any democratic election. We call on the government of Turkey to guarantee that journalists are able to do their work free of intimidation and harassment in particular during the election period. 

 

Finally, amid the continued crackdown by the Turkish authorities, the delegation notes with concern a pattern of visa denials, delays, and arduous procedures for Turkey journalists applying for visas to Europe. This trend undermines the ability of Turkey’s journalists to build and sustain links to their peers abroad. The delegation calls on European governments and the EU to maintain firm and active support for Turkey’s free press. In addition to strong and clear public support for independent journalists, this must include ensuring that journalists’ applications for visas for professional purposes are fast tracked. 

Uluslararası heyet açıklaması: Türkiye’de basın özgürlüğü krizi deprem ve genel seçimlerin ortasında derinleşti

 

Beş uluslararası basın özgürlüğü ve gazetecilik kuruluşu Türkiye’deki basın özgürlüğü misyonunu tamamladı

 

Türkiye’nin basın özgürlüğü krizi geçtiğimiz yıl daha da derinleşti. Gazeteciler, keyfi tutukluluk ve kovuşturma dahil olmak üzere, mesleki faaliyetlerinden ötürü ağır tehditlerle karşı karşıya kaldı. Basına yönelik saldırı ve tehditlerden sorumlu olanlara karşı cezasızlık artarak devam etti. 

 

Bu yıl yapılan meclis ve cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri basın özgürlüğü açısından herhangi bir rahatlama getirmedi. Aksine, gelecek yıl yapılacak yerel seçimler öncesinde eleştirel gazeteciler üzerindeki baskı artmaya devam ediyor. Şubat 2023’te meydana gelen yıkıcı depremler sırasında yerel medyanın özellikle hedef alınması, yetkililerin haber ve bilgi akışını kontrol etmeye yönelik çabalarının açık bir örneğiydi.

 

Bu hafta, basın ve ifade özgürlüğü alanında çalışan beş uluslararası kuruluş; Türkiye’de gazeteciler, sivil toplum grupları, Anayasa Mahkemesi, Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (RTÜK) ve Avrupa Birliği Türkiye Delegasyonu gibi pek çok paydaş ile ülkede medya özgürlüğünün içinde bulunduğu krizi görüşmek üzere toplantılar düzenledi. Heyet ayrıca Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), Demokrasi ve İlerleme Partisi (DEVA), Emek Partisi (EMEP) ve Yeşiller ve Sol Gelecek Partisi (YSP) milletvekilleriyle de bir araya geldi.

 

Uluslararası Basın Enstitüsü (IPI) ve IPI Türkiye Ulusal Komitesi öncülüğündeki heyette Gazetecileri Koruma Komitesi (CPJ), Avrupa Basın ve Medya Özgürlüğü Merkezi (ECPMF), Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT) ve Sınır Tanımayan Gazeteciler (RSF) temsilcileri yer aldı.

 

Heyetin, Adalet Bakanı Yılmaz Tunç, İçişleri Bakanı Ali Yerlikaya, TBMM İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu Başkanı Derya Yanık, Dijital Mecralar Komisyonu Başkanı Hüseyin Yayman, Adalet Komisyonu Başkanı Cüneyt Yüksel, RTÜK Başkanı Ebubekir Şahin ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanı Fahrettin Altun ile görüşme talepleri yanıtsız kaldı. Heyet, temel hakların ve hukukun üstünlüğünün korunmasından ve ülkede medya özgürlüğü ve medyada çok sesliliğin sağlanmasından sorumlu görevlileri ve kamu makamlarıyla diyalog kurma fırsatı bulamamaktan üzüntü duyuyor.

 

Bu yılki heyet ziyaretinin öne çıkan başlıklarından biri Türkiye’nin dezenformasyon yasasıydı. Geçen yıl TBMM İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonunun AKP’li başkanı, dezenformasyon yasasının gazetecileri cezalandırmak için kullanılmayacağı konusunda heyetimize güvence vermişti. Ancak geçtiğimiz yıl, başta deprem haberleriyle ilgili olmak üzere, en az 20 gazeteci dezenformasyon yasasına dayanılarak hedef alındı (üçü hapse atıldı).

 

Gazetecilerin fiziksel güvenliği ciddi bir endişe konusu olmaya devam ediyor. Heyet, gazetecilerle yaptığı görüşmelerde, muhabirlerin güvenliğini tehdit eden birçok endişe verici örnekle karşılaştı ve yetkililerin bazı durumlarda etkili bir soruşturma yürütme ve güvenlik önlemleri sağlama görevlerini yerine getirmek yerine bu tehditlere göz yumduklarını gördü. Aynı zamanda siyasetçiler, hükümet yetkilileri ve mahkemeler eleştirel gazeteciliği “terör propagandası”, dezenformasyon veya ulusal güvenliğe tehditle eş tutmaya devam ederek gazetecilerin fiziksel ve yasal savunmasızlığını daha da artırdı.

 

Hukuki tacizin hedefi olan gazetecilerin yasal güvenceleri, ağır ihlallere maruz kalmaya devam ediyor. Gazetecilerin sistematik bir biçimde tutuklu yargılanması artık olağan bir hale geldi ve bu durum sıklıkla mahkûmiyet kararı olmaksızın cezalandırma ile sonuçlandı. Geçtiğimiz yıl görülen bazı davalarda, Kürt gazeteciler toplu gözaltıların ardından bir yıldan fazla tutuklu kaldı.

 

Resmi basın kartlarının kime verileceği konusundaki keyfi uygulamalar devam ediyor ve bu kartlar bilgi kontrolü karşısında sınırlı bir güce sahip. Basın kartı alma şansına sahip olan bağımsız gazeteciler, kimlik bilgilerini vermelerine rağmen deprem bölgesinde bazı durumlarda haber yapmalarının yetkililer tarafından engellendiklerini bildirdi.

 

Anayasa Mahkemesi (AYM) basın özgürlüğünü destekleyen önemli kararlar vermeye devam ediyor. Ancak, kaynak yetersizliği, alt mahkemelerin AYM kararlarını uygulamadaki başarısızlığı ve TBMM’nin AYM  tarafından tespit edilen sistematik ihlalleri ele alan mevzuatı yürürlüğe koymadaki yetersizliği nedeniyle AYM’nin çalışmaları sekteye uğruyor.

 

Bir sonraki yerel seçimlerin Mart 2024’te yapılması planlanıyor. Bağımsız haber ve bilginin serbest dolaşımı tüm demokratik seçimler için hayati bir koşul. Türkiye hükümetini, özellikle seçim döneminde gazetecilerin işlerini tehditlere ve ihlallere maruz kalmadan yapabilmelerini güvence altına almaya çağırıyoruz.

 

Son olarak heyet, Türkiye’de baskıcı koşullar altında çalışırken Avrupa’ya vize başvurusunda bulunan gazetecilerin vize reddi, gecikme ve zorlu prosedürlerine ilişkin endişelerini dile getiriyor. Bu eğilim, Türkiye’deki gazetecilerin yurtdışındaki meslektaşlarıyla bağlantı kurma ve sürdürme imkanlarını azaltıyor. Heyet, Avrupa hükümetlerine Türkiye’deki özgür basına yönelik kararlı ve aktif desteklerini sürdürmeleri çağrısında bulunuyor. Bağımsız gazetecilere yönelik güçlü ve belirgin desteğinin yanı sıra, gazetecilerin mesleki amaçlarla yaptıkları vize başvurularının hızlı bir şekilde işlem görmesi de bu desteğin bir parçası olmalı.

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and candidate countries.