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Netherlands: International media freedom mission on the safety of…

Netherlands: International media freedom mission on the safety of Dutch journalists

As part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), Free Press Unlimited and the European Center for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) are organising an international media freedom mission to the Netherlands. With the mission the consortium members want to map the decreasing security of journalists in the Netherlands. We want to contrast this with the fact that with the establishment of PersVeilig (Press Safe) at the end of 2019 there is a strong security mechanism for journalists. The mission will be held at the beginning of 2022.

With attacks on journalists increasing, the public broadcaster NOS removing its logos from vans to protect its employees, and Peter R. de Vries being murdered in broad daylight, the state of press and media freedom in the Netherlands is receiving more and more international attention. That is why we are organizing an international mission on the safety of journalists in the Netherlands in close consultation with the Dutch Association of Journalists (NVJ). As part of the mission, we enter into discussions with journalists and editors-in-chief, policymakers, the police and the Public Prosecution Service, experts, and Members of Parliament. The end result will be a comprehensive report on the safety of journalists in the Netherlands that will be presented in an international press conference as the conclusion of the mission.

Safety of journalists in the Netherlands

The mission will address the issue of the safety of journalists in the Netherlands, focusing on the threats posed by organized crime, as well as increasing hostility to the members of press and media outlets by protesters and civilians. According to the NVJ, 82% of Dutch journalists have experienced aggression or intimidation in 2020. This is an increase of 20% compared to 2017. In 2017, 79% believed that threats to journalists pose a threat to press freedom. In 2021 this has increased to 93%. The increasing trends raise questions when it comes to the high ranking of the Netherlands on the Press Freedom Index and the internationally acclaimed PersVeilig (Press Safe) Mechanism. In addition, the mission will examine what prevention mechanisms currently exist, and what the Dutch authorities can do to prevent intimidation and violence against journalists.

MFRR Missions

The MFRR monitors violations of press and media freedom in the EU Member States and Candidate Countries and responds with practical and legal support and advocacy. Since the project’s start in March 2020, a number of similar missions have been organized to Greece, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Spain and Slovenia.

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Delyan Peevski Bulgaria Library

Bulgaria: Magnitsky sanctions against mogul Delyan Peevski shift media…

Bulgaria: Magnitsky sanctions against mogul Delyan Peevski shift media landscape

By IPI contributor Rossen Bossev

In the past six months, Bulgaria, considered the poorest and most corrupt country in the European Union, has undergone a serious change. After nearly 12 years of almost uninterrupted rule, prime minister Boyko Borissov left power. Following six months of political deadlock a four-party coalition appointed Kiril Petkov as Prime Minister. Parallel to the change of political power, however, there was another, no less significant change – in the media sector.

Last autumn Bulgaria was shaken by a wave of anti-corruption protests demanding the resignation of the center-right government of then Prime Minister Borissov and prosecutor general Ivan Geshev. Back then, the editorial policy of Telegraph and Monitor, two of the most popular daily newspapers in Bulgaria, suddenly changed. For years, the front pages of both publications, owned by then lawmaker and media oligarch Delyan Peevski, had run headlines targeting every independent voice against Peevski, Borissov and Geshev.

Judges, journalists, publishers, protesters, NGO activists, human rights defenders, EU diplomats, and opposition leaders were portrayed as members of a conspiratorial network undermining the country’s national interests. To illustrate this conspiracy, the two media outlets frequently resorted to the rhetoric of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán and the Kremlin, often packaging anyone who raised their voice against the status quo as “sorosoids”, enemies of the state or anti-Bulgarians.

But one year or so ago, those kinds of stories disappeared from both newspapers. Monitor and Telegraph continued to be supportive of Borissov’s government and the other powerful institution in Bulgaria – the state prosecution – but stopped attacking their opponents. In the following weeks, the archive of Monitor was suddenly purged of dozens of articles – either those praising Peevski or attacking his opponents.

This major shift in editorial policy was a clear indication that the Bulgarian media landscape was changing. In January 2021, United Group, the new owner of Nova TV, one of the three largest national TV channels, announced that it had agreed to buy Peevski’s newspapers – Telegraf, Monitor, Match Telegraf, Politika, Europost, Borba.

However, Peevski’s attempt to shrug off the image of a media mogul by simply selling the media he directly owned did not prove successful. On June 2, the US Department of Treasury announced sanctions against Peevski under the Global Magnitsky Act, which imposes economic sanctions and entry bans for acts of significant corruption or gross violations of human rights. Those targeted by sanctions, and the companies they own, face extreme difficulties in using even the most ordinary banking services.

Suddenly, the country’s media baron, who owned the most popular daily newspapers and claimed to control a huge part of the remaining media landscape, had begun unloading media assets and withdrawing from the newspaper market.

The rise of a media oligarch

For years, Peevski has been the most prominent example of the constantly degrading media freedom in Bulgaria. At 41, Peevski is ironically called the “wunderkind” of Bulgarian politics. Since 2001, he has been an MP, an investigative-magistrate and deputy minister of emergency situations. In 2007, his mother, the former chief of the national lottery, bought the newspapers Telegraph, Monitor, and the weekly Politika. In 2013, his appointment as director of the State Security Service provoked mass protests and he was forced to resign the very next day.

Until 2016, while holding a public office for 15 years, Peevski’s asset disclosure declaration listed just a few real estate properties and an old car. In 2016, though, the same year his mother donated him the media business, and he officially declared that he owned companies, some of them registered in Dubai. As of that moment, Peevski started declaring millions of euros as income from these companies. However, it remains unclear what exactly the business of his companies was and where their income came from during those years.

The Pandora Papers investigation revealed that Peevski controlled offshore companies that he did not disclose in his declarations, raising suspicions that his biggest investments remain secret. However, media investigations have linked Peevski to the ownership of Bulgartabac, a cigarette manufacturer sold in 2017 to British American Tobacco, as well as to construction companies that had won public tenders commissioned by the state. He is also linked to the ownership of “Sofia Print Investment” – a private printing house where approximately 90% of daily newspapers are printed.

Peevski’s name was also associated with the ownership of “Kanal 3”, a marginal private television channel, whose editorial policy often repeated verbatim the articles in Telegraph and Monitor. When another oligarch close to Borissov, Kiril Domuschiev, bought Nova TV in 2019, several key Kanal 3 journalists and managers were hired by Nova. In 2020, Kanal 3, as well as two other small music channels and three radio stations, were sold by Nova just before the deal with United Group.

Coverage and influence buying

It is believed that Peevski’s influence in the media sector goes far beyond direct ownership. Most likely the main reason for this is that for years Peevski has built the image of a power broker with strong connections within the judiciary, law enforcement, state regulators, and the executive.

For years, the editorial policy of his newspapers was replicated by national TV channels, websites, and other print outlets. Mainstream media abstained from even mentioning his name, as did official institutions. When Magnitsky Act sanctions were announced on June 2 this year, the news quickly made front-page headlines. However, in the evening news broadcast of Bulgarian National Television, no information was given on why Peevski had been sanctioned.

According to journalistic investigations, the businesses controlled by Peevski are much more than those he officially owns. This would enable him to channel financial resources to the media in an opaque way. In 2016, for example, court records revealed that Bulgartabac’s advertising agency had paid hundreds of thousands of euros for advertising to a website close to Peevski, without it having published any ads at all.

The close relationship that Peevski developed with the government during Borissov’s rule also gave him a strong role in the executive branch. In July 2020, in an attempt to ease the tension around the looming protests, Borissov dismissed three ministers over accusations of being linked to Peevski.

Controlling the executive means more control of the media. EU funds and advertising contracts with the national government or local authorities are an important source of revenue for Bulgarian media which could also be used as leverage to control editorial policy. For the past four years, €5 million was distributed by the government to the media to promote programs, funded by the EU. Appointments to the media regulator, which selects the management of the public Bulgarian National Radio and Bulgarian National Television, is also a way to control these outlets’ editorial policies.

Similar to the influence in the media, the influence that Peevski has in the judiciary, the executive, and the security services is hidden and much greater than the role of an MP who almost never set foot in Parliament till this year. In 2019, a judge revealed publicly what the informal procedure was to be appointed as head of a court at the lowest level of the hierarchy: he had to personally meet in a restaurant in the capital and be approved by Peevski. The meeting was brokered by the president of the Supreme Administrative Court.

According to the press release of the Treasury Department, the sanctions were imposed because he “negotiated with politicians to provide them with political support and positive media coverage in return for receiving protection from criminal investigations.” Such quid pro quo, of course, would not have been possible if Peevski did not control certain publications (much broader than the newspapers he officially owned), the security services, and the prosecution.

After the announcement of the sanctions under the Magnitsky Act, the Bulgarian prosecutor’s office announced it was launching a probe, reminding that Peevski had been investigated by the authorities many times before without finding any wrongdoings. The caretaker government adopted a list that expanded the circle of individuals linked to Peevski and the others sanctioned and effectively banned the state from having relations with them.

Media freedom continuing to deteriorate

There are two persistent but sadly true clichés about Bulgaria, namely that it is the poorest and most corrupt country in the European Union. Bulgaria also has the worst media freedom in the European Union, according to the World Press Freedom Index.

It does not take a rocket scientist to see that these three rankings are directly related. The lack of media freedom allows abuse of power and corruption to thrive. A dysfunctional judiciary makes even the few independent publications an easy target for politicians with consistent disregard for press freedom.

Paradoxically, the sale of Peevski’s newspapers to the United group, the only direct effect of the sanctions on the media landscape in Bulgaria, came before they were even imposed: the newspapers ceased the smear campaigns against Peevski’s opponents. However, this will hardly be enough to eradicate the problems of the media environment in the country.

While the sanctions imposed on the media mogul by the US authorities exposed his use of media ownership to yield political influence, they have done little to fix the toxic media environment in Bulgaria. They will not make the government distribute EU funds in a fair and balanced way. They will not guarantee the security of regional and investigative journalists. Nor will they stop the police from beating up reporters.

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

MFRR 3 consortium logos
Delyan Peevski, a Bulgarian politician, oligarch, entrepreneur and media mogul. Sofia, Bulgaria. 2019.Credit: Shutterstock Library

Bulgaria: Magnitsky sanctions against mogul Delyan Peevski shift media…

Bulgaria: Magnitsky sanctions against mogul Delyan Peevski shift media landscape

Ray of hope for change after oligarch offloads media assets following U.S sanctions

By IPI contributor Rossen Bossev

In the past six months, Bulgaria, considered the poorest and most corrupt country in the European Union, has undergone a serious change. After nearly 12 years of almost uninterrupted rule, prime minister Boyko Borissov left power. Following six months of political deadlock a four-party coalition appointed Kiril Petkov as Prime Minister. Parallel to the change of political power, however, there was another, no less significant change – in the media sector.

Last autumn Bulgaria was shaken by a wave of anti-corruption protests demanding the resignation of the center-right government of then Prime Minister Borissov and prosecutor general Ivan Geshev. Back then, the editorial policy of Telegraph and Monitor, two of the most popular daily newspapers in Bulgaria, suddenly changed. For years, the front pages of both publications, owned by then lawmaker and media oligarch Delyan Peevski, had run headlines targeting every independent voice against Peevski, Borissov and Geshev.

Judges, journalists, publishers, protesters, NGO activists, human rights defenders, EU diplomats, and opposition leaders were portrayed as members of a conspiratorial network undermining the country’s national interests. To illustrate this conspiracy, the two media outlets frequently resorted to the rhetoric of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán and the Kremlin, often packaging anyone who raised their voice against the status quo as “sorosoids”, enemies of the state or anti-Bulgarians.

But one year or so ago, those kinds of stories disappeared from both newspapers. Monitor and Telegraph continued to be supportive of Borissov’s government and the other powerful institution in Bulgaria – the state prosecution – but stopped attacking their opponents. In the following weeks, the archive of Monitor was suddenly purged of dozens of articles – either those praising Peevski or attacking his opponents.

This major shift in editorial policy was a clear indication that the Bulgarian media landscape was changing. In January 2021, United Group, the new owner of Nova TV, one of the three largest national TV channels, announced that it had agreed to buy Peevski’s newspapers – Telegraf, Monitor, Match Telegraf, Politika, Europost, Borba.

However, Peevski’s attempt to shrug off the image of a media mogul by simply selling the media he directly owned did not prove successful. On June 2, the US Department of  Treasury announced sanctions against Peevski under the Global Magnitsky Act, which imposes economic sanctions and entry bans for acts of significant corruption or gross violations of human rights. Those targeted by sanctions, and the companies they own, face extreme difficulties in using even the most ordinary banking services.

Suddenly, the country’s media baron, who owned the most popular daily newspapers and claimed to control a huge part of the remaining media landscape, had begun unloading media assets and withdrawing from the newspaper market.

The rise of a media oligarch

For years, Peevski has been the most prominent example of the constantly degrading media freedom in Bulgaria. At 41, Peevski is ironically called the “wunderkind” of Bulgarian politics. Since 2001, he has been an MP, an investigative-magistrate and deputy minister of emergency situations. In 2007, his mother, the former chief of the national lottery, bought the newspapers Telegraph, Monitor, and the weekly Politika. In 2013, his appointment as director of the State Security Service provoked mass protests and he was forced to resign the very next day.

Until 2016, while holding a public office for 15 years, Peevski’s asset disclosure declaration listed just a few real estate properties and an old car.  In 2016, though, the same year his mother donated him the media business, and he officially declared that he owned companies, some of them registered in Dubai. As of that moment, Peevski started declaring millions of euros as income from these companies. However, it remains unclear what exactly the business of his companies was and where their income came from during those years.

The Pandora Papers investigation revealed that Peevski controlled offshore companies that he did not disclose in his declarations, raising suspicions that his biggest investments remain secret. However, media investigations have linked Peevski to the ownership of Bulgartabac, a cigarette manufacturer sold in 2017 to British American Tobacco, as well as to construction companies that had won public tenders commissioned by the state. He is also linked to the ownership of “Sofia Print Investment” – a private printing house where approximately 90% of daily newspapers are printed.

Peevski’s name was also associated with the ownership of “Kanal 3”, a marginal private television channel, whose editorial policy often repeated verbatim the articles in Telegraph and Monitor. When another oligarch close to Borissov, Kiril Domuschiev, bought Nova TV in 2019, several key Kanal 3 journalists and managers were hired by Nova. In 2020, Kanal 3, as well as two other small music channels and three radio stations, were sold by Nova just before the deal with United Group.

Coverage and influence buying

It is believed that Peevski’s influence in the media sector goes far beyond direct ownership. Most likely the main reason for this is that for years Peevski has built the image of a power broker with strong connections within the judiciary, law enforcement, state regulators, and the executive.

For years, the editorial policy of his newspapers was replicated by national TV channels, websites, and other print outlets. Mainstream media abstained from even mentioning his name, as did official institutions. When Magnitsky Act sanctions were announced on June 2 this year, the news quickly made front-page headlines. However, in the evening news broadcast of Bulgarian National Television, no information was given on why Peevski had been sanctioned.

According to journalistic investigations, the businesses controlled by Peevski are much more than those he officially owns. This would enable him to channel financial resources to the media in an opaque way.  In 2016, for example, court records revealed that Bulgartabac’s advertising agency had paid hundreds of thousands of euros for advertising to a website close to Peevski, without it having published any ads at all.

The close relationship that Peevski developed with the government during Borissov’s rule also gave him a strong role in the executive branch. In July 2020, in an attempt to ease the tension around the looming protests, Borissov dismissed three ministers over accusations of being linked to Peevski.

Controlling the executive means more control of the media. EU funds and advertising contracts with the national government or local authorities are an important source of revenue for Bulgarian media which could also be used as leverage to control editorial policy. For the past four years, €5 million was distributed by the government to the media to promote programs, funded by the EU. Appointments to the media regulator, which selects the management of the public Bulgarian National Radio and Bulgarian National Television, is also a way to control these outlets’ editorial policies.

Similar to the influence in the media, the influence that Peevski has in the judiciary, the executive, and the security services is hidden and much greater than the role of an MP who almost never set foot in Parliament till this year. In 2019, a judge revealed publicly what the informal procedure was to be appointed as head of a court at the lowest level of the hierarchy: he had to personally meet in a restaurant in the capital and be approved by Peevski. The meeting was brokered by the president of the Supreme Administrative Court.

According to the press release of the Treasury Department, the sanctions were imposed because he “negotiated with politicians to provide them with political support and positive media coverage in return for receiving protection from criminal investigations.” Such quid pro quo, of course, would not have been possible if Peevski did not control certain publications (much broader than the newspapers he officially owned), the security services, and the prosecution.

After the announcement of the sanctions under the Magnitsky Act, the Bulgarian prosecutor’s office announced it was launching a probe, reminding that Peevski had been investigated by the authorities many times before without finding any wrongdoings. The caretaker government adopted a list that expanded the circle of individuals linked to Peevski and the others sanctioned and effectively banned the state from having relations with them.

Media freedom continuing to deteriorate

There are two persistent but sadly true clichés about Bulgaria, namely that it is the poorest and most corrupt country in the European Union. Bulgaria also has the worst media freedom in the European Union, according to the World Press Freedom Index.

It does not take a rocket scientist to see that these three rankings are directly related. The lack of media freedom allows abuse of power and corruption to thrive. A dysfunctional judiciary makes even the few independent publications an easy target for politicians with consistent disregard for press freedom.

Paradoxically, the sale of Peevski’s newspapers to the United group, the only direct effect of the sanctions on the media landscape in Bulgaria, came before they were even imposed: the newspapers ceased the smear campaigns against Peevski’s opponents. However, this will hardly be enough to eradicate the problems of the media environment in the country.

While the sanctions imposed on the media mogul by the US authorities exposed his use of media ownership to yield political influence, they have done little to fix the toxic media environment in Bulgaria. They will not make the government distribute EU funds in a fair and balanced way. They will not guarantee the security of regional and investigative journalists. Nor will they stop the police from beating up reporters.

This article is part of IPI’s reporting series “Media freedom in Europe in the shadow of Covid”, which comprises news and analysis from IPI’s network of correspondents throughout the EU. Articles do not necessarily reflect the views of IPI or MFRR. This reporting series is supported by funding from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and by the European Commission (DG Connect) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response, a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

IPI as part of MFRR
LEX TVN Library

Poland: Media freedom groups urge President Duda to veto…

Poland: Media freedom groups urge President Duda to veto ‘Lex-TVN’

The undersigned international media freedom and journalists groups are writing to urge you to apply a presidential veto to the so-called “Lex-TVN” amendment passed by the Sejm on December 17, which we believe poses a fundamental threat to media freedom and pluralism in Poland. This bill represents a direct attack on the independence of the country’s biggest private broadcaster, U.S-owned TVN, and its news channel TVN24.

Dear Andrzej Duda, President of the Republic of Poland,

 

The undersigned international media freedom and journalists groups are writing to urge you to apply a presidential veto to the so-called “Lex-TVN” amendment passed by the Sejm on December 17, which we believe poses a fundamental threat to media freedom and pluralism in Poland. This bill represents a direct attack on the independence of the country’s biggest private broadcaster, U.S-owned TVN, and its news channel TVN24.

Rather than a sincere effort to protect Poland against hostile foreign media takeovers, our organisations are convinced that this media ownership law has always been about one goal: slicing through TVN’s ownership structure and forcing Discovery to sell a controlling 51% stake, opening the door for government-allied entities to potentially acquire stakes and ultimately engineer a shift in editorial position to one more favourable to the ruling party. Far from a secret, the Law and Justice (PiS) MP responsible for drafting the amendment, Marek Suski, has publicly stated the true intention of the law: obtaining greater influence over TVN’s programming.

Such a clear effort to enact media legislation that pushes out foreign owners is reminiscent of well-documented tactics used by governments in Hungary and Russia to bring independent channels under control via government-friendly entities. While laws restricting foreign media ownership do exist in EU member states, this bill is not a principled and proportionate effort to protect the Polish information landscape. Rather, it is clearly aimed at undermining one particular outlet and is part of a wider effort to “repolonise” the media. As you have previously outlined, any changes to media ownership must be conducted under market principles rather than via heavy-handed government intervention. Lex-TVN represents a clear and politically-motivated effort to strong-arm such changes through legislation and must therefore be opposed.

In addition to undermining fundamental democratic values, the proposed amendment to article 35 of the Broadcasting Act also raises legitimate doubts about its compliance with EU law and will almost certainly lead to a legal challenge from the European Commission. As the Senate has already identified, it is also inconsistent with the Polish Constitution. It also breaches the U.S-Poland Bilateral Investment Treaty, simultaneously undermining Poland’s reputation as a welcome climate for foreign investment and uprooting relations between Poland and its closest ally. That the bill was unexpectedly approved by the Sejm just before the parliamentary break, without prior announcement, and in violation of rules on adequate debate, is also deeply problematic.

The stakes of this decision for media freedom, democracy and the rule of law in Poland are high. Ultimately, your decision about this bill should not be about whether one agrees or disagrees with TVN’s coverage. It should be about the principle of media pluralism and the ability of citizens to access information from a variety of news sources. It should also be about the fundamental right of the media to fulfil its watchdog role and scrutinise those in power. And it should be about ensuring fair market conditions in a media sector free from government interference.

After the Sejm passed the initial bill in August 2021, you outlined your concerns over the law’s detrimental effect on freedom of speech and diplomatic relations. Despite being firmly rejected by the Senate, the bill awaiting your decision remains unchanged in both its form and its ultimate purpose. We therefore urge you to remain true to your word and use your veto power to outright reject this law and safeguard the freedom of the press in Poland.

Signed by:

  • Archiwum Osiatyńskiego / The Wiktor Osiatyński Archive
  • ARTICLE 19
  • Association of European Journalists (AEJ)
  • Civic Network Watchdog Poland (Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska)
  • Coalition for Women in Journalism (CFWIJ)
  • Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland)
  • IFEX
  • International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
  • Public Media Alliance (PMA)
  • Society of Journalists, Warsaw
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO)
  • The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Organizacje na rzecz wolności mediów apelują do Prezydenta Andrzeja Dudy o zawetowanie ustawy Lex TVN

Szanowny Panie Prezydencie Andrzeju Dudo,

 

My, niżej podpisane międzynarodowe organizacje działające na rzecz wolności mediów i dziennikarzy piszą, zwracamy się do Pana Prezydenta z apelem o zastosowanie prezydenckiego weta wobec nowelizacji ustawy medialnej znanej powszechnie jako „lex TVN”, przyjętej przez Sejm 17 grudnia 2021. Naszym zdaniem tworzy ona fundamentalne zagrożenie dla wolności i pluralizmu mediów w Polsce. Ustawa w obecnym kształcie stanowi bezpośredni atak na niezależność TVN największego, należącego do USA prywatnego nadawcy w kraju, i jego kanału informacyjnego TVN24.

 

Nasze organizacje są przekonane, że zmianie ustawy medialnej przyświeca cel zgoła inny niż szczera ochrona polskiego rynku przed wrogimi przejęciami mediów zagranicznych. Mianowicie chodzi o wpłynięcie na strukturę własnościową TVN i wymuszenie na Discovery sprzedaży kontrolnego pakietu 51% udziałów. To stworzyłoby warunki do potencjalnego przejęcia udziałów przez podmioty sprzymierzone z rządem, co w efekcie mogłoby wpłynąć na linię redakcyjną, tak aby była bardziej przychylna władzy. Sam Marek Suski, poseł PiS odpowiedzialny za przygotowanie nowelizacji, w publicznych wypowiedziach nie ukrywał prawdziwej intencji stojącej za zmianą ustawy jaką jest właśnie uzyskanie większego wpływu na przekaz programowy TVN. 

 

Strategia wprowadzania w życie przepisów medialnych, które wypychają z rynku zagranicznych właścicieli, przypomina dobrze znaną taktykę stosowaną przez władze na Węgrzech i w Rosji. Chodzi o kontrolę niezależnych kanałów za pośrednictwem podmiotów przyjaznych rządowi. Chociaż w państwach członkowskich UE istnieją przepisy ograniczające własność mediów zagranicznych, proponowana przez PiS nowelizacja ustawy medialnej nie spełnia warunków do traktowania jej w kategorii proporcjonalnego środka służącego ochronie krajobrazu medialnego w Polsce. Wręcz przeciwnie – ma wyraźnie na celu osłabienie jednego konkretnego podmiotu i wpisuje się w szerszy plan dążenia do tzw. „repolonizacji” mediów w kraju. Wszelkie zmiany dotyczące własności mediów muszą być przeprowadzane na zasadach rynkowych, a nie poprzez arbitralną interwencję rządu. Lex-TVN jest wyraźnym i umotywowanym politycznie działaniem na rzecz usankcjonowania takich zmian w ustawodawstwie czemu należy się przeciwstawić.

 

Proponowana zmiana art. 35 ustawy o radiofonii i telewizji oprócz podważenia podstawowych wartości demokratycznych budzi również uzasadnione wątpliwości co do jej zgodności z prawem UE i istnieje wysokie prawdopodobieństwo, że zostanie zaskarżona przez Komisję Europejską. Jak już wskazał Senat, jest ona również niezgodna z Konstytucją RP. Ponadto narusza również polsko-amerykański dwustronny traktat inwestycyjny, jednocześnie podważając reputację Polski jako przyjaznego klimatu dla inwestycji zagranicznych i zrywając stosunki między Polską a jej najbliższym sojusznikiem. Głęboko problematyczne jest również to, że ustawa została niespodziewanie uchwalona przez Sejm tuż przed przerwą parlamentarną, bez uprzedniej zapowiedzi i z naruszeniem zasad jakimi powinna cechować się debata sejmowa. 

 

Pańska decyzja dotycząca nowelizacji ustawy medialnej ma ogromne znaczenie zarówno dla wolności mediów, jak i demokracji i rządów prawa w Polsce. Dlatego też niezwykle istotnym jest, aby nie była ona podyktowana osobistym stosunkiem do przekazu jaki reprezentuje TVN i tym, czy zgadza się Pan z treściami tam przedstawionymi. Decyzja powinna być podjęta w duchu zasady pluralizmu mediów i możliwości dostępu obywateli do informacji z różnych źródeł wiadomości. W podjęciu tak ważnej decyzji priorytetem powinno być zabezpieczenie fundamentalnego prawa mediów do pełnienia swojej roli strażnika i kontrolowania rządzących. I wreszcie – decyzja musi być w zgodzie z zasadą zapewnieniem uczciwych warunków rynkowych w sektorze medialnym, wolnym od ingerencji rządu.

 

Już po uchwaleniu przez Sejm wstępnej ustawy w sierpniu 2021 roku  wyraził Pan Panie Prezydencie swoje obawy dotyczące szkodliwego wpływu ustawy na wolność słowa i stosunki dyplomatyczne. Pomimo zdecydowanego odrzucenia projektu przez Senat, projekt, który obecnie oczekuje na Pańską decyzję pozostaje niezmieniony zarówno w swojej formie, jak i jeżeli chodzi o cel, któremu przyświeca. Biorąc pod uwagę wszystkie omówione przez nas zagrożenia i obawy, zwracamy się do Pana Panie prezydencie z apelem, by dotrzymał Pan słowa, wykorzystał swoje prawo weta by odrzucić proponowane zmiany i tym samym jasno opowiedział się po stronie wolności mediów w Polsce.

Signed by:

  • Archiwum Osiatyńskiego / The Wiktor Osiatyński Archive
  • ARTICLE 19
  • Association of European Journalists (AEJ)
  • Civic Network Watchdog Poland (Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska)
  • Coalition for Women in Journalism (CFWIJ)
  • Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland)
  • IFEX
  • International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
  • Public Media Alliance (PMA)
  • Society of Journalists, Warsaw
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO)
  • The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

The team of journalists at KRIK. Credit: Oliver Bunic (NIN) Library

Serbia: Wave of lawsuits against investigative portal KRIK chills…

Serbia: Wave of lawsuits against investigative portal KRIK chills media freedom

We, the undersigned partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), express our concerns over the recent wave of vexatious lawsuits against the investigative portal Network for Investigation of Crime and Corruption (KRIK) in Serbia. We believe that these lawsuits are a form of strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPPs) that aim to stifle scrutiny and critical issues of public importance and demand urgent action from the Government and judiciary to impartially and swiftly address the growing phenomenon of SLAPPs in the country.

In recent months, KRIK’s newsroom has been targeted by ten different procedures filed, in most cases, by people in power or businesspeople close to the government, requesting a total of 90 million dinars in damages – three times more than the media outlet’s annual budget. These include seven lawsuits under the Media Law for reputational or financial damages and one lawsuit before the Commercial Court of Serbia for unfair competition and reputation damage. Additionally, one criminal complaint was filed under the Criminal Code for illegal use of data (which would bring prison sentence for journalists), and one misdemeanour procedure was started for failure from KRIK to pay an environmental tax within a set deadline.    

We believe that these cases are a form of SLAPPs, which are initiated not necessarily to win cases, but to drag KRIK through lengthy legal processes and ultimately prevent them from exercising the fundamental right to freedom of expression and press and media freedom. These lawsuits’ ultimate goal is to silence critical reporting and distract them from their core journalistic work of exposing corruption and probing the nexus between politics and organised crime as well as to drain KRIK financially and psychologically.

We are also concerned about the pattern of attacks on KRIK. We are aware that KRIK and their journalists have previously been targeted by lawsuits that would be described as SLAPPs and are very often victims of threats and insults. Lately the houses of three KRIK staff were broken into; all three cases are currently still in pre-investigative procedure. Early in December, KRIK’s staff received death threats on social media. Bojana Jovanovic, deputy editor of the KRIK believes these threats were related to the story they published about the son of the Serbian President, Danilo Vucic. 

We urge the Serbian judiciary to deal with cases promptly and impartially and consider international freedom of expression standards in their deliberations. In order to prevent similar attacks in the future, we also call on the Serbian Government to adopt a comprehensive strategy to address SLAPPs against journalists, as part of its efforts to the protection, safety and security of journalists. This should include a full review of key defamation provisions and align them with international freedom of expression standards and procedural safeguards to allow for early dismissal of SLAPP cases. 

The full scale of required reforms is further outlined in the report by ARTICLE 19, the ABA Center for Human Rights and NUNS (forthcoming in January 2022). We stand ready to provide further support to the Government in this process, along with key recommendations to the Government of Serbia to address abusive litigation against journalists and the media.

Signed by:

  • ARTICLE 19
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Peter R. De Vries Library

Killing of Peter R. de Vries highlights press freedom…

Killing of Peter R. de Vries highlights press freedom challenges in Netherlands

By IPI Contributor Tan Tunali

The line in front of the Royal Theatre Carré in Amsterdam was almost a kilometer long, and the waiting time was over two hours for mourners who had come to pay tribute to renowned Dutch crime reporter Peter R de Vries. The 64-year-old journalist had been shot in the evening of July 6, only moments after leaving a TV studio where he had participated in a talk show. He died in hospital nine days later.

The details behind the murder are still unknown, but the office of public prosecution has suggested a link to de Vries’ role in the so-called Marengo trial, a criminal case against leading members of a criminal organization involved in drug trafficking. De Vries had been acting as advisor to Nabil B., a former member who is testifying against Ridouan Taghi, the principal suspect in the trial.

Following the deadly attack on De Vries and threats made against the TV program, the studio moved its broadcasting to a different location outside of Amsterdam. In recent years, organized crime has been linked to threats made against other media outlets and crime reporters in the Netherlands.

In June 2018, the Amsterdam offices of leading Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf was attacked when a van repeatedly rammed the paper’s entrance before been set on fire by the driver. In the same month, the editorial offices of weekly Panorama were attacked with an anti-tank weapon. Perpetrators were convicted to prison sentences, but the exact background of the attacks remains unclear.

The killing of de Vries comes at a time when the media in the Netherlands are under increasing pressure. For the moment, the country still ranks high on international freedom of expression lists. However, the Netherlands witnessed a clear drop on the World Press Freedom Index last year.

Last year, Dutch public broadcaster NOS decided to scrub its well-known logo from satellite busses and other equipment amidst a rise in attacks on the station’s journalists reporting from anti-government demonstrations, often related to protests against the Dutch government’s Covid-19 measures. The decision came as a shock to large parts of the Dutch public.

However, many of the county’s journalists were less surprised because they had experienced the increasingly hostile environment themselves. NOS editor-in-chief Marcel Gelauff warned in a statement after the decision to forego the station logo: “Journalism is under attack of people who only want to see their own world[view], trying to impede other perspectives, hence harming press freedom.”

Increasing attacks on journalists

The global Covid-19 pandemic has also put the issue of rising violence against journalists in stark relief. Hate speech and attacks on journalists are increasing. During nationwide riots following the government’s announcement of evening curfews, stones were thrown at photographers, and camera crews were violently attacked. At a Covid-19 testing facility in the town of Urk, a NOS reporter and his bodyguard were attacked with pepper spray.

The recent outburst of physical violence towards journalists is unprecedented, but attacks have already become the norm online. Clarice Gargard, a columnist for daily NRC and founder of the feminist platform Lilith Magazine, received thousands of hate messages during the live registration of an anti-Black Pete demonstration in 2018. Gargard reported the messages to the police which eventually led to the convictions of several of the people behind the threats, who were fined or were sentenced to several hours of community service.

Several politicians in the rightwing opposition have joined the fray and publicly lashed out against the media. Leader of the far-right Freedom Party (PVV) Geert Wilders called journalists ‘riffraff’ (‘Tuig van de Richel”) in a Tweet. Thierry Baudet, leader of the far-right Forum for Democracy (FvD) repeatedly attacked the media as well, for example by repeatedly calling broadcaster NOS ‘fake news’.

In reaction to the increasing difficulties Dutch journalists are facing, the local journalist’s union NVJ, the Institute of editors-in-chief, in cooperation with the public prosecutor and the Dutch police established a joint initiative called PersVeilig (“Safe Press”) in 2019. One of the main goals of the initiative is to train and advise journalists on how to react to threats and, if necessary, to prioritize court cases against perpetrators. In the first seven months of this year, PersVeilig received 176 cases resulting in 41 reports to the police, versus 121 over the entire last year.

While the Dutch government often stresses the importance of a free press, it has been accused of playing an active role in the stifling the work of the media by preventing access to crucial state documents, something public authorities are legally bound to facilitate under the freedom of information act (Dutch: Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur, WOB). Often documents which are released arrive late and are incomplete. Sometimes they are not released at all.

Earlier this year, the government was forced to resign over a childcare subsidies scandal, in which the government withheld crucial information to press and parliament, allowing state misconduct to continue, at great human cost to the victims who in some cases lost their livelihoods.

In the cabinet’s resignation, prime-minister Mark Rutte, promised ‘a new governance culture’, and ‘more transparency’. But old habits die hard. Recently, the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) lost a court case against current affairs program Nieuwsuur. The journalists had demanded access to state documents regarding the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, instead of putting the caretaker prime minister’s promise of more transparency into practice, the ministry defied the court and refused to provide the requested documents, appealing the court order instead.

Compared to their colleagues in many other countries of the world, journalists in the Netherlands are able to freely investigate and work. However, as the events of the past few years have shown, a sense of deteriorating safety for the media is a slippery slope even in a country that until recently led international press freedom rankings.

This article is part of IPI’s reporting series “Media freedom in Europe in the shadow of Covid”, which comprises news and analysis from IPI’s network of correspondents throughout the EU. Articles do not necessarily reflect the views of IPI or MFRR. This reporting series is supported by funding from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and by the European Commission (DG Connect) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response, a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Germany protests Library

Germany: MFRR expresses concern over rising attacks against journalists…

Germany: MFRR expresses concern over rising attacks against journalists covering protests

The undersigned partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) today express their concern about the increasing number of attacks against journalists across Germany, particularly in the context of anti-vaccine demonstrations. We call for better safety measures and protection as well as thorough investigations of attacks against journalists covering such demonstrations. Moreover, preventative measures are needed to stop such attacks from happening. Finally, we encourage media workers to report press and media freedom violations.

Already in 2020, reported attacks against journalists had more than doubled compared to the previous year. This dramatic increase to 255 aggressions can be attributed to the regular demonstrations taking place across Germany against government Covid-19 measures, including planned mandatory vaccination. According to MFRR data, right-wing extremist rallies are also particularly hostile environments for media professionals. 

From January 1 until December 15, 2021, the MFRR recorded 108 violations to press and media freedom in Germany, with 85 of these violations taking place as attacks against journalists during demonstrations. Yet, the real figure is expected to be much higher: due to safety reasons, many journalists choose not to go public when they receive threats. A common misperception is also that attacks, particularly online harassment, are simply “part of the job”. The MFRR aims to reverse such attitudes and joins the German Journalists Association (DJV) in urging journalists and media professionals to press charges, should they receive threats or be subjected to other kinds of violence.

During demonstrations, journalists are frequently physically attacked, their equipment is targeted and insults and threats are also common. Freelance photojournalist Aaron Karasek, who has been subjected to repeated violence during protests, shared on Twitter: “At this point, there are almost no Querdenker demonstrations where I or colleagues do not get attacked.” Due to such experiences, TV crews from large broadcasters now usually go to Querdenker demonstrations with security guards. While this might create a feeling of safety, it does not always prevent journalists from being attacked, as for instance the aggression against an SWR TV team accompanied by three security staff shows. Further, a lack of resources does not allow all journalists to make use of such support.

Against this backdrop, we have repeatedly called for better police response and training in order to guarantee the safety of journalists. However, as recent protests – such as in Dresden – have shown, police officers even obstruct journalists in their work when they should be protecting them. The MFRR has recorded physical attacks, threats, confiscation of materials, reporting restrictions and detentions against journalists and media professionals. In 26 alerts on the Mapping Media Freedom (MMF) platform in 2021, police or state security were reported as the sources of attacks. This attitude targeting members of the media is unacceptable and the MFRR stresses the need to actively support press and media freedom. 

The German Journalists Union (dju in ver.di) and the German Journalists’ Association (DJV) have repeatedly demanded to increase the number of police officers at demonstrations to better focus on the needs of journalists. The Federal Ministry of Interior indicated that safety procedures will be improved. Right now, the police are often highly understaffed and overwhelmed. While they frequently set up separate areas for media workers to be shielded from aggressions, journalists criticise that such zones separate them from the demonstrations. Strategic de-escalation and unhindered press work, in contrast to reported tedious press card checks and journalists’ expulsions, are desirable.

Another major problem, that often goes hand in hand with anti-Covid-measures demonstrations, is the use of online messaging application Telegram, to plan attacks and exchange information about journalists. The police should do everything in their power to punish these unacceptable acts and application managers should take reports of plans of violence on their platforms seriously and manage the groups according to their community standards. While it is difficult to regulate Telegram, keyword Network Enforcement Act, investigative authorities still have options to counter the spread of calls for violence there. Threatening cases on online platforms involving journalists should be prioritised.

While the amount of attacks against journalists in Germany is particularly alarming, it should also be noted that aggressions during demonstrations and threats via Telegram channels are on the rise in various European countries, such as in France, Italy, the Netherlands or Luxembourg. The MFRR is closely monitoring these violations and calls on the governments and police to take preventive measures and to thoroughly investigate these attacks. 

Good practice examples to better promote a safer environment for journalists are listed below: 

  • In the Netherlands, the police and the public prosecutor’s office give priority to incidents concerning journalists. Following an agreement in 2018, concrete guidelines and training have been offered to law-enforcement services to better respond to threats against the media. A hotline enabling journalists to report acts of aggression has been set up.  
  • In the UK, the government has adopted a national action plan to protect journalists from abuse and harassment. Every police force is to deal with a designated journalist safety liaison officer, and at national level a senior police officer will take responsibility for crime against journalists at national level.
  • In Sweden, the government has commissioned the Swedish Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority to produce a training and information resource on support for journalists exposed to threats. The government has also commissioned Linnæus University to build a knowledge centre and a OBCservice offering advice and support to journalists and editorial offices, including freelancers, small offices and smaller production companies.

Signed by:

  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Spanish Flag SLAPPS Library

ARTICLE 19 published Report on Spain: SLAPPs – legal…

Article 19 published Report on Spain: SLAPPs – legal harassment against journalists

Journalists and media outlets in Spain are facing multiple lawsuits for exposing corruption, reporting on matters of public concern or covering protests. Known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs, public officials, businessmen, politicians or police officers typically initiate these lawsuits. They do so to evade public scrutiny, and to harass or subdue journalists who expose their wrongdoings.

Those who file such suits aim to drain the target’s financial and psychological resources and to chill critical voices. These costly civil lawsuits target journalists, activists, or whistle-blowers, in other words, individuals, who are often ill-equipped to defend themselves. As a result, public debate within Spanish society is under threat.

In its latest report, ARTICLE 19 looks at the scope and interpretation of criminal and civil law provisions used to bring such legal actions against journalists and the media. We also examine current Spanish laws that are misused to file these suits, and look at patterns across key cases. Finally, we identify the defences and procedural safeguards that the Spanish Government needs to implement to prevent more SLAPPs.

Key findings from the report reveal:

Over broad legal provisions in the Spanish Penal Code are open to abuse which limits free expression for all

The Spanish Penal Code contains a number of problematic speech-related offences. These include criminal insult and defamation, offences against public officials and public institutions, and revelation of secret information. Despite the fact that the Courts are dismissing prosecutions for defamation and overturning convictions, the very existence of over broad legal provisions leaves them open to abuse,  creating a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

People with power target journalists simply for doing their jobs

The Spanish courts have set out relevant defences the media can use when doing their work. These include defences for ‘reasonable publication’ or ‘public interest’. They have also stated that public officials should tolerate a higher level of criticism than private individuals. Despite this, public officials who mismanage funds still misuse laws on honour, privacy, and reputation to target journalists.

Criminal prosecutions and abusive civil lawsuits have implications for the financial sustainability of the media

Firstly, many journalists face permanent threats of criminal sanctions simply for doing their work. Secondly, they must bear the costs of legal proceedings.  In addition, they bear the negative consequences of investigations, sometimes for years, until a verdict is reached and regardless of the result of the judicial proceedings.

 

ARTICLE 19 considers that the Spanish Government should review the laws that limit people’s right to freedom of expression. This will prevent public officials, institutions, and influential individuals from bringing SLAPP cases against journalists and the media.

Library

EFJ Statement on Croatia: fact-checking portal Faktograf.hr threatened with…

EFJ Statement on Croatia after fact-checking portal Faktograf.hr got threatened with death and lawsuits

The European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) joined its affiliates in Croatia and the SafeJournalists Network in condemning the threats received by the fact-checking portal Faktograf.hr and its employees, targeted by intimidations attempts since 10 December 2021.

The threats and lynching were prompted by entrepreneur Nenad Bakic, a businessman known for his inclination to sue the media. Bakic used his Facebook profile, which has over 40.000 followers, to threaten to launch a criminal lawsuit against the portal for allegedly censoring his post and comments of Faktograf’s social media pages. He then wrote that he would be interested in  “whether it would be legal to form a fund to finance such lawsuits” adding that in his opinion, “shouldn’t be very complicated.”

The Faktograf’s editorial team starting receiving insulting messages and death threats against their staff in the days following the above mentioned post’s publication. The messages were sent via Facebook or emails. In one email, it is written that someone is following journalists from Faktograf, that no one is untouchable and that a scenario similar to the one from two years ago – referring to the killing of two persons – could happened at the Faktograf publisher’s address. The threats were reported to the police.

The Faktograf also reported that on 14 December the website was under attack from DDos, a cyber-attack in the form of denial-of-service (denying access to the platform). “Starting on the evening of December 13th and continuing to 11am on December 14th, there were more that 27 million log-in attempts to [Faktograf]’s page in less than 13 hours. In this organized DDoS attack most of the log-in attempts were from Russia and Indonesia,” they said.

“Since February 2020 Faktograf has reported around 40 violent or death threats to the police. While Faktograf’s journalists are constantly exposed to online harassment (often gender specific threats or insults) we have published over 550 articles that challenge and debunk misinformation related to the pandemic in the same period,” said Ana Brakus, Faktograf’s director.

“The threats we receive will not prevent us in our work, nor will they scare us,” she added.

The European Federation of Journalists joined the President of the Croatian Journalists Association (HND) Hrvoje Zovko in calling on the Croatian authorities to condemn these threats in the strongest possible terms and to launch a prompt investigation into the case.

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Danish media freedom Library

EFJ Statement on Denmark: Intelligence services warn media against…

EFJ Statement on Denmark: Intelligence services warn media against publishing classified information

Danish intelligence services warned the Danish media companies JP/Politikens Hus, Berlingske Media and DR Nyheder not to publish any classified information. This happened after the recent arrest of four intelligence officers accused of leaking information. The European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) and the Danish Union of Journalists (DJ) strongly condemned this disturbing “warning” to Denmark’s leading media outlets and called on the concerned services to stay away from the press.

On 13 December, the Danish Police Intelligence Service, PET, and the Defence Intelligence Service, FE, warned Stig Ørskov, JP/Politikens Hus’ CEO, Anders Krab-Johansen, Berlingske Media’s chief executive, and Sandy French, DR Nyheder’s Director, against the penalties under Section 109 of the Danish Criminal Code on the disclosure of state secrets, for which the risk of imprisonment is up to 12 years. In those meetings at the media houses, the two highest-ranking intelligence chiefs stressed that the media are not exempted under this section and that “it may be a criminal offence to pass on classified information.”

It is not clear what part of their journalistic work was referred to. Last week, the intelligence services revealed that four current and former employees had been arrested and charged under Section 109 for the “unauthorised disclosure of highly classified information.” At least three of them appeared before a closed-door hearing last week and two remained in custody. What information exactly they had leaked is not known.

Mads Brandstrup, Chief Executive Officer of Danske Medier, the Danish Media Association, reacted: “The intelligence services must subject themselves to public scrutiny just as any other part of the government. I find this kind of approach deeply concerning and it should have no place in a democratic society.” Brandstrup further emphasised that such generic warnings are naturally perceived by media organisations as a threat.

The EFJ urged Danish authorities to make it very clear that the unwanted move from the intelligence services is unacceptable in a democratic society.

EFJ President Mogens Blicher Bjerregård said: “For free media and democracies, it is crucial that authorities including intelligent services stay away from newsrooms and don’t attempt any kind of interventions. It is shocking and disturbing that Danish intelligence services have warned Danish top media in advance to publish any potentially classified information.”

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.