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Greece: Executives of spyware firm used to surveil journalist…

Greece: Executives of spyware firm used to surveil journalist Thanasis Koukakis sentenced to prison

The International Press Institute (IPI) welcomes the recent criminal convictions handed down by a Greek court to four individuals from surveillance firm Intellexa whose Predator spyware was used to illegally surveil Greek journalist Thanasis Koukakis.

27.02.2026

The first-instance prison sentences, delivered in an Athens court on 26 February, provide long-sought but partial justice for one of the most prominent cases of spyware surveillance against a journalist in Europe in recent years, and follow a years-long campaign for accountability by IPI and other press freedom groups.

 

According to IPI monitoring, this is also thought to be the first case anywhere in the world of individuals in the commercial spyware sector being criminally charged and convicted of marketing, distributing and using spyware which was used to illegally surveil a member of the press – marking a major step forward for accountability for the abuse of spyware technologies globally.

 

The surveillance of Koukakis was part of a wider wiretapping and spyware scandal in 2022 which became known as the “Greek Watergate”, involving the targeted and coordinated surveillance of more than 80 people, including government ministers and military officials.

 

On Thursday, the court convicted four individuals from Intellexa, the private company at the heart of the scandal, with violating the confidentiality of telephone communications and illegally accessing personal data and conversations using Predator.

 

The businessmen, all founders, executives or shareholders in the companies involved, were each sentenced to 126 years in prison, of which eight years must be served. All defendants plead not guilty. The first-instance verdict will be appealed.

 

IPI Executive Director Scott Griffen said: “This verdict is a major legal victory which provides accountability and justice for the illegal surveillance of a respected journalist and IPI member Thanasis Koukakis. We hope this ruling will be upheld on appeal and IPI will continue to monitor the case closely. This is a win not only for all those who pushed for justice, but also for the Greek investigative media community, who have fearlessly documented the surveillance scandal and its implications in Greece in recent years, facing abusive lawsuits in doing so.

 

Griffen added: “The illegal surveillance of journalists using tools like Predator and Pegasus continues to pose a severe threat to press freedom and journalist safety globally. This ruling boosts efforts to hold those responsible to account, but more needs to be done – IPI continues to work with our members and partners around the world to document spyware attacks on journalists, support legal safeguards, and push for justice for abuses.”

 

Koukakis told IPI: “The decision of the Athens Single-Member Misdemeanor Court to impose exemplary punishment on the producers and distributors of the spyware and to refer the case for further investigation, including possible acts of espionage, marks a return to institutional normalcy. It reaffirms that no one is above scrutiny and that journalistic sources, democratic oversight, and the rule of law are not negotiable. Justice must now be pursued fully and without fear or favour. The rule of law is not anyone’s private domain.”

Surveillance case

In February 2022, it was revealed that Koukakis – a contributor to Greek investigative platform Inside Story as well as international media such as the Financial Times and CNBC – had his mobile phone surveilled for at least ten weeks in 2021 using Intellexa’s technology.

 

Predator is a highly invasive commercial spyware that, among other methods, utilises zero-click infections to target devices, allowing the attacker to gain full access to a target’s phone to extract data, contacts and messages, including those sent through encrypted applications, as well as turn on the microphone and camera. The infection was confirmed after a forensic analysis by digital security research centre Citizen Lab.

 

At the time, the surveillance of Koukakis was the first publicly confirmed case of a journalist in Europe being spied on using Predator. In October 2022, he sued Intellexa in Greece for criminal breach of privacy and communications laws. Though the technology is developed by Cytrox, it was marketed by Intellexa, at the time based in Athens.

 

The spyware scandal revealed multiple additional targets of Predator spyware in Greece, shaking the government and leading to widespread demands for answers.

 

After initial criticism over the slow pace of justice in investigating the case, a dedicated criminal trial concerning Intellexa began in March 2025 before the Single-Member Misdemeanor Court of First Instance in Athens. The trial was adjourned and resumed in the autumn. The almost four-month-long proceedings heard testimony from more than 50 witnesses, including Koukakis, who provided detailed testimony to the court.

Questions remain over wider state involvement

Despite the verdict against individuals connected to Intellexa, serious questions remain over the potential involvement of state intelligence bodies in the spyware surveillance of Koukakis and many other targets in Greece.

 

At the same time as the spyware surveillance, Koukakis had also been put under traditional wiretapping by the Greek intelligence body, the EYP. This surveillance of his phone was conducted in June–August 2020 under a “national security” justification and was approved by an EYP prosecutor.

 

At that time, Koukakis had been investigating alleged financial misconduct related to Piraeus Bank and figures later linked to the Predator supply chain.

 

When Koukakis then filed a complaint with the Greek communications authority ADAE to identify whether he had been wiretapped through his telecom provider, the EYP immediately terminated the surveillance the same day. This action by the EYP raised concerns that the wiretap was halted to avoid disclosure and wider institutional scrutiny.

 

Crucially, evidence shows that as soon as the official state surveillance of Koukakis was ended by the EYP, the illegal use of Predator spyware surveillance against Koukakis began. This surveillance continued for around two months.

 

The Greek government has publicly admitted that the EYP, which was previously put under the supervision of the Office of the Prime Minister, conducted legal, conventional surveillance of the journalist. However, it has repeatedly denied that the state purchased or used Predator or that it has any relationship with Intellexa.

 

One third of all individuals infected with Predator in Greece were, at the same time, also under traditional wiretapping surveillance by the EYP, pointing to a pattern of overlap and potential coordination of surveillance between state and non-state actors.

 

Although a substantial body of circumstantial evidence indicates the coordination or at least parallel use of traditional state wiretapping by the EYP and Predator spyware used by Intellexa, direct proof that EYP operated or requested the use of Predator has not been established.

 

In the recent court verdict against Intellexa the judge stated that the four defendants appeared to have acted with the participation of “unknown third parties”. The judge indicated this could have been officials from Greek and foreign intelligence services.

 

The judge also ordered that trial reports containing crucial information about this element of the trial could be sent to the Athens Prosecutor’s Office for assessment. This could open the door to espionage investigation involving state bodies in the future.

 

While four individuals from the private company Intellexa have now been criminally convicted, currently no government politicians or officials from the EYP or wider state intelligence or law enforcement bodies in Greece has been investigated or charged with involvement in the use of spyware, which was illegal at the time.

 

After the scandal emerged, in 2022 the Greek government responded by criminalising the use of commercial spyware in Greece. Before the revelations, no law had explicitly banned the use of such tools by private actors. However, the same law also effectively legalised the use of spyware surveillance by state bodies, under strict conditions.

Advocating for accountability

Throughout this process, IPI consistently documented and highlighted the surveillance of journalists in Greece. In cooperation with media freedom partners, IPI wrote to the Greek government to demand accountability and answers and engaged with the European Parliament’s PEGA Committee investigating spyware abuse within the EU.

 

During a 2022 press freedom mission to Greece by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), IPI questioned a government minister over the surveillance, who was unable to provide additional information. During the mission, the delegation also met with other authorities and institutions in Greece connected to the spyware scandal, as well as with journalists affected by surveillance, including Koukakis.

 

In 2023, IPI published an in-depth report into the targeting of journalists in Greece using Predator, which probed the potential involvement of state authorities.

 

IPI will continue to closely monitor the legal proceedings on appeal and push for accountability for the illegal surveillance of journalists in Greece, as well as strong implementation of the new European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) rules on spyware use.

 

Despite sanctions, Intellexa remains one of the world’s leading providers of advanced commercial spyware. It now operates outside Greece and continues to market and sell its surveillance tools to governments around the world.

This statement was coordinated by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Allgemein

Ukraine: Four years into full-scale invasion, journalism remains a…

Ukraine: Four years into full-scale invasion, journalism remains a deadly profession

On the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the undersigned partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) hail the continued courage of journalists in the country who continue to report on the war despite serious risks – and waning international attention.

24.02.2026

As we mark the anniversary, our organisations honour and remember the journalists who have been killed while reporting on the war and in the line of duty. We pay our respects to these reporters, who made the ultimate sacrifice in bringing news on the war to Ukrainian and international audiences.

 

As documented in our recently published annual media freedom monitoring report, 2025 stood out as the deadliest period for journalists in Ukraine since the first months of the full-scale invasion in February-May 2022.

 

In October 2025, three media workers were killed in Russian attacks in Donetsk region. French photojournalist Antoni Lallican was murdered on October 3 in a strike conducted by an FPV (first-person view) drone. Ukrainian journalist Aliona Hubanova and cameraman Yevhen Karmazin were killed on October 23 in another Russian drone attack. According to MFRR monitoring, 12 more journalists were injured over the past year as a result of Russian attacks.

 

In the past year, rapid advances in drone technology have made reporting work in Ukraine more dangerous than ever. Multiple incidents recounted by reporters over the past months seem to show that journalists are no longer protected by PRESS markings. Instead, these have become a target used by Russian forces to identify and attack media teams with drones.

 

In the past four years, 16 journalists have been killed while reporting from Ukraine, while 62 more have been wounded. The perpetrators of these war crimes continue to act with impunity and none of those responsible have been held accountable to date.

 

Twenty-six Ukrainian journalists are meanwhile still being held in Russian custody, mostly on trumped-up charges of ‘terrorism’ or ‘espionage’. Testimonies by journalists released from Russian captivity paint a picture of systematic mistreatment and torture.

 

In this context, the tragic and still unexplained death of Ukrainian journalist Victoria Roshchyna in Russian custody in September 2024 continues to underscore fears for the safety of other imprisoned journalists.

 

Across Ukraine media and journalists also face increasingly challenging working conditions, as Russian attacks continue to target the country’s critical infrastructure. These have left media offices without heating, power or running water, with Russia continuing to strike Ukraine’s energy systems throughout a harsh winter season and sub-zero temperatures.

 

On the anniversary of the full-scale invasion, MFRR partners continue to stand in full solidarity with journalists and media workers facing these situations. In the past four years, Ukrainian journalists have offered a remarkable example to their European colleagues by continuing their work in extremely challenging wartime conditions, with many losing their lives or injured while documenting the horrors of war. MFRR partners will continue to monitor, advocate and provide support to the Ukrainian media community now and in the future, as we continue to support the fight for free and independent journalism in Ukraine.

 

In this context, we call on all stakeholders with diplomatic and advocacy leverage to pursue immediate and sustained efforts towards the release of the Ukrainian journalists still held behind bars.

 

As peace negotiations continue, we also urge the international community to embed accountability for violations against journalists within broader justice and accountability mechanisms addressing the Russian war against Ukraine With regards to the situation of media on the frontline, we call for the respect by all parties of international humanitarian law, which guarantees journalists access to zones of armed combat and offers them protection as members of the press.

 

Finally, we call for an urgent refocusing of international support for Ukrainian media, including through funding mechanisms to rebuild critical media infrastructure destroyed across Ukraine.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Allgemein

Turkey: Media freedom, freedom of expression and human rights…

Turkey: Media freedom, freedom of expression and human rights groups urge authorities to release and drop charges against journalist Alican Uludağ

The undersigned media freedom, freedom of expression and human rights organisations strongly condemn the arrest of Deutsche Welle (DW) correspondent Alican Uludağ and call on the Turkish authorities to drop all charges against him and cease the judicial harassment of journalists reporting on matters of public interest.

20.02.2026

On the evening of February 19, investigative journalist Alican Uludağ was detained by dozens of police officers who raided his home in Ankara and confiscated his digital equipment. The journalist was then transferred to Istanbul for interrogation and formally arrested on February 20. 

 

The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced that Uludağ was detained as part of an investigation on charges of “insulting the president” and “disseminating disinformation,” citing his social media posts related to news coverage in its announcement. The journalist was subsequently arrested on the charge of “insulting the president” following his interrogation.

 

DW has reported that the detention is specifically linked to Uludağ’s December 2024 coverage regarding the deadly 2016 Istanbul Atatürk Airport attack and his social media posts criticizing the measures taken by the Turkish government. 

 

In 2024, Uludağ detailed the overturning of aggravated life sentences for six ISIS members who were imprisoned in relation to the airport attack, leading to their subsequent release. Despite confirming the accuracy of the reported releases, the Directorate of Communications paradoxically accused the journalist of “disseminating disinformation,” claiming the reporting was intended to create a “false public perception.”

 

Uludağ’s unjustified detention is the latest example of the instrumentalization of criminal justice in Turkey to suppress press freedom. Reporting on court rulings and covering high-profile trials is a fundamental duty of the press and is essential for public accountability.

 

Our organisations stress that Uludağ is an award-winning journalist known for his rigorous coverage of judicial affairs, human rights violations, and corruption. The use of judicial harassment and disproportionate police presence to silence a well-known investigative journalist constitutes a clear act of intimidation and is aimed at chilling investigative reporting in Turkey.

 

The undersigned organisations call on the Turkish authorities to immediately and unconditionally release Alican Uludağ, drop all charges related to his journalistic work and social media commentary, and stop the systematic use of the “disinformation law” and “insulting the president” charges to stifle independent media.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)
  • Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
  • Dicle Fırat Journalists Association (DFG)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Foreign Media Association (FMA Turkey)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • Journalists’ Union of Turkey (TGS)
  • Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA)
  • Norwegian Helsinki Committee
  • PEN Norway
  • Progressive Journalist Association (ÇGD)
  • P24 Platform for Independent Journalism 

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Allgemein

Slovakia: MFRR partners continue to demand full justice for…

Slovakia: MFRR partners continue to demand full justice for Kuciak assassination

Ahead of the eighth anniversary of the murder of Slovak investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová, the undersigned partner organisations of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) renew our call for full justice for their brutal killing.

20.02.2026

With the new retrial of the twice-acquitted but alleged mastermind Marian Kočner now again underway in Bratislava as of January 2026, hope remains that all those responsible for ordering and carrying out this assassination will eventually face justice for their crimes.

 

On 21 February 2018, Kuciak and Kušnírová were fatally shot at their home outside Bratislava. Kuciak, a reporter for the investigative outlet Aktuality.sk, was known for exposing corruption and tax fraud schemes involving businessman Kočner and prominent figures linked to the ruling Smer-SSD party and organised crime networks.

 

Four people have so far been convicted and sentenced for the murders, including the hitmen and intermediaries. However, Kočner, who was accused of masterminding the crime after threatening Kuciak, has twice been acquitted due to a lack of conclusive evidence.

 

On January 26, the Special Criminal Court in Bratislava began deliberations in the retrial of Kočner. These new proceedings follow the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Kočner’s acquittal in May 2025. The case is being heard by a newly constituted court panel.

 

Eight years after the brutal assassination of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová, the media environment in Slovakia is under clear pressure, marked by dangerous rhetoric against the press by governing politicians, advancing media capture and the steady erosion of media freedom. 

 

Since the re-election of Prime Minister Robert Fico and the ruling coalition led by his populist Smer party in 2023, attacks on journalists have significantly intensified, including physical assaults, smear campaigns, verbal abuse and legal harassment.

 

As we honour the memory of Kuciak, our organisations urge the Slovak government to uphold media freedom, end all forms of harassment and smear campaigns against journalists, and ensure that the press can carry out its watchdog role without fear of reprisal. 

 

Our organisations will continue to closely monitor the ongoing retrial and plan to attend the verdict. Until then, we remain committed to advocating for justice for Ján and Martina until full justice is achieved, as in every instance where journalists’ safety is at risk or compromised.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI) 
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe 
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Hungary: Reports of potential corporate influence behind SPO investigations…

Hungary: Reports of potential corporate influence behind SPO investigations set dangerous precedent for press freedom

The International Press Institute (IPI) is alarmed by reports that multinational company Samsung SDI may have prompted Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) to launch a discriminatory investigation into Átlátszó, one of Hungary’s leading investigative newsrooms.

18.02.2026

In wake of the revelations, IPI repeats our call for authorities in Hungary to immediately repeal the restrictive Protection of National Sovereignty Act and dismantle the Sovereignty Protection Office, which continues to pose a direct threat to media freedom.

 

On February 12, independent Hungarian media outlet Telex reported that senior managers at the South Korean multinational’s battery plant in Hungary had previously discussed different approaches for in some way restricting or silencing the ability of Átlátszó to investigate the company.

 

The apparently retaliatory action by Samsung followed the publication of an investigation by Átlátszó, based on official inspection documents, which revealed serious toxic‑exposure and safety problems at Samsung SDI’s factory in the city of Göd.

 

The recent Telex report, based on a leaked agenda from a Samsung management meeting in March 2024, suggests the firm was aware of the SPO’s scrutiny of Átlátszó’s foreign funding, and discussed wider government efforts to “stop or restrict” Átlátszó’s operations ahead of the next general election.

 

Three months later in June 2024, the SPO formally launched a probe into Átlátszó and then published a defamatory report accusing Átlátszó of disinformation and intelligence activities “against the Hungarian state and its institutions, disguised as legitimate data gathering.” Átlátszó rejected the accusations. They took SPO to court and in December 2025 won the case on first instance. The SPO has appealed that verdict, which has yet to be decided.

 

While the revelations by Telex do not provide clear evidence of direct lobbying by Samsung, it does suggest a major multinational firm considered requesting action from a politically-controlled body to censor an investigative media outlet in an EU member state. It is not known whether Samsung did approach the SPO and it is unclear what role any potential lobbying from the company played in the SPO launching its investigation into Átlátszó.

 

Tamás Bodoky, founder and director of Átlátszó, told IPI he was surprised to learn that the Göd Samsung factory may have lobbied the government for an SPO investigation: “We find it particularly ironic that the authorities are attacking the domestic press, which serves the people living here, on the grounds of protecting sovereignty in order to defend a giant foreign-owned company’s interests.”

 

Amy Brouillette, IPI’s Director of Advocacy, said: “The potential involvement of a foreign company in investigations into Átlátszó sets an alarming precedent of a corporation using a restrictive law on foreign funding and influence to help silence independent media and curtail independent voices. The media play a critical role in exposing potential abuses and harms by both public authorities and by private corporations.

 

“We remind the business community in Hungary that they have an obligation to protect and respect the rights of Hungarian citizens. These rights include the right to receive independent news and information, in line with Hungarian and EU law. We also reiterate our full solidarity with Átlátszó and with all independent Hungarian journalists and media organizations that continue to report on matters of public interest even in the face of mounting pressure.”

 

In May 2024, The European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Hungary, stating that the Sovereignty Protection Act violates EU law. The legal process is ongoing.

 

The SPO was established under Hungary’s Protection of National Sovereignty Act and began operating in early 2024. Ostensibly aimed at countering foreign influence on Hungarian elections, the office is an arbitrarily appointed body that operates without meaningful oversight.

 

IPI has strongly criticised the operations of the SPO, which since its establishment has been instrumentalised to ramp up pressure on free press and human rights NGOs in Hungary.

 

  • In 2025 and 2026, IPI documented 51 press freedom violations on the Mapping Media Freedom database which affected 76 journalists and media entities, including 12 legal incidents.  

This statement was coordinated by IPI as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Serbia: Coordinated bot attacks on Instagram accounts of independent…

Serbia: Coordinated bot attacks on Instagram accounts of independent media emerge as new weapon of censorship

The MFRR partners today raise alarm over a recent wave of bot-driven cyber attacks targeting the social media accounts of Serbian media outlets. Our organisations warn that the dozen recorded incidents are not isolated cases but part of a broader pattern of coordinated attacks on the free flow of news and independent information in Serbia, which remains in a period of media freedom crisis.

12.02.2026

The MFRR partners today raise alarm over a recent wave of bot-driven cyber attacks targeting the social media accounts of Serbian media outlets. Our organisations warn that the dozen recorded incidents are not isolated cases but part of a broader pattern of coordinated attacks on the free flow of news and independent information in Serbia, which remains in a period of media freedom crisis.

 

Between 8 and 30 January, the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS) recorded at least 12 coordinated bot attacks against Instagram accounts of independent media outlets in Serbia. Affected media outlets are Nova.rs, Nova S, Nova TV, Zoomer, Radar, Autonomija, VOICE, Danas, N1, Ozon Press, as well as photojournalists Irena Radosavljević and Gavrilo Andrić. 

 

The bot attacks successfully resulted in the temporary suspension of several media’s Instagram accounts, limiting their ability to disseminate news. While they used different tactics, the attacks occurred within a short timeframe and involved artificial activity, including sudden surges in followers driven by fake profiles, leading Meta to automatically suspend the targeted accounts. All cases of bot attacks resulting in a suspension of media accounts were documented on the MFRR’s platform Mapping Media Freedom.

 

For instance, in the case of photojournalists Irena Radosavljević and Gavrilo Andrić, their accounts were suspended after dozens of fake profiles filed false reports against them to Meta. In addition, three of Nova.rs and Čačak-based portal OzonPress’s Instagram accounts were temporarily suspended for 180 days due to alleged violations of community guidelines. In other cases, the attackers artificially flooded the Instagram accounts of media with thousands of new fake followers, triggering automatic suspension by Meta for unusual activity. In the case of the news portal Radar, the deletion of its account not only obstructed the media activity but also allowed a fake account to be created, raising concerns over spoofing.

 

All accounts were restored by Meta after media outlets and media professionals directly contacted Meta’s support team.  

 

In a letter to Meta, NUNS sought clarification from the tech company regarding the reasons for the suspensions, the safeguards in place to protect media outlets and journalists, as well as the existing mechanisms for human review and contextual assessment.

We support these requests for urgent clarification from Meta. We call on Meta to apply EU legal obligations under Articles 16 and 17 of the Digital Services Act (DSA), which require platforms to notify affected users of any restriction or suspension of content and accounts “without undue delay” and provide them with a clear and specific “statement of reasons”, including the legal basis for such decisions. Article 18 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) demands that media service providers be contacted by Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) prior to any potential removal of editorial content. While Serbia is not an EU member state, it’s an EU accession country that should respect EU standards in the process of becoming a fully-fledged member.  

 

The undersigned organisations emphasise that this unprecedented series of coordinated attacks on Instagram accounts constitutes an attempt to undermine media freedom and independent journalism in Serbia, given that Instagram serves as a critical communication channel for media outlets and journalists. It is especially important given that many young people rely almost exclusively on digital platforms for information on social and political issues.

 

MFRR partners warn that these attempts to block the social media platforms of media organisations represent a worrying new form of digital censorship in Serbia, and are part of a broader trend of increased threats, smear campaigns, and legal pressure against journalists. While the attacks were quickly addressed and the accounts were unblocked on this occasion, our organisations warn that these platform flaws could easily be manipulated by bad actors again in the future, either in Serbia or elsewhere in the world, unless additional safeguards are put in place.

 

These serious violations require a decisive response and clear, enforceable guarantees from Meta to protect both freedom of expression and the public’s right to be informed. The MFRR partners will continue to monitor these developments closely and will engage directly with Meta to seek clarification and accountability.

Signed by:

  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Albania: Democratic reform of public broadcaster RTSH remains only…

Albania: Democratic reform of public broadcaster RTSH remains only viable option

Using funding cuts, suspension, or closure as reform tools violates EU principles for public service media.

09.02.2026

MFRR partners join the undersigned Albanian and international media freedom and journalist organisations in calling on the Albanian government to support the reform of the public service broadcaster Radio Televizioni Shqiptar (RTSH) through lawful, democratic and institutional means, in line with democratic norms and EU standards.

 

Our organisations note the recent public remarks by Prime Minister Edi Rama about the performance and funding of RTSH, which set out potential options of funding suspension, privatisation or eventual closure. The critical comments renewed public debate on the future of the broadcaster in the EU candidate country.

 

There is broad recognition domestically and internationally that RTSH has faced serious, systemic and long-standing problems, including weaknesses in independent governance and oversight, financial instability, declining public trust, and professional shortcomings in fulfilling its public service remit.

 

The conclusions have long been shared by our organisations. We jointly agree that these challenges require credible reform and clear accountability, particularly in light of the appointment in 2025 of a new Steering Council and a new General Director, whose mandate is to address precisely these issues.

 

At the same time, European standards draw a clear distinction between the need for reform and the means through which reform is pursued. Agreement on reform objectives does not imply agreement on all instruments used to achieve them.

 

RTSH is a public service media institution established by law and operating under a continuous public mandate. It is financed through a combination of lawful public sources, including a mandatory public service broadcasting fee paid by households via the electricity bill, alongside other public and commercial revenues. This funding model is designed to guarantee continuity and to shield public service media from political leverage.

 

For this reason, European standards are clear that public service media funding must be stable, predictable, and safeguarded from political discretion. Funding mechanisms exist to enable reform and protect editorial independence—not to serve as leverage through performance-based or political conditionality. Using funding withdrawal, suspension of broadcasting, or institutional closure as reform tools is incompatible with the EU principles governing public service media.

 

Reform of RTSH must therefore be pursued through lawful and institutional means. This must include effective oversight by the Steering Council and other competent bodies; transparent performance benchmarks, public reporting and accountability of management; independent supervision and enforcement of governance standards; legislative or regulatory improvements where gaps are identified; and strong guarantees for editorial independence and journalists’ professional autonomy.

 

Public service media operate under a mandate distinct from that of commercial broadcasters. Their role is not to compete on market terms, but to ensure universal access to impartial information, cultural and educational programming, and democratic debate. Market performance or audience metrics alone cannot replace public service accountability frameworks.

 

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) and Council of Europe standards require states to safeguard public service media from direct and indirect political interference, including through financial pressure, and to ensure that reform strengthens—rather than destabilises—the conditions for independence, accountability, and public trust.

 

In the context of Albania’s EU accession process, particularly under Cluster 1 – Fundamentals, a stable, accountable, and independent public service broadcaster is a core democratic requirement. Our organisations, which have long supported and called for the democratic reform of RTSH as part our wider advocacy for free and independent media in Albania, therefore urge all national authorities to ensure that:

  •   RTSH reform is pursued through governance, oversight, and accountability mechanisms provided by law;
  •   Public service media funding remains safeguarded and insulated from political conditionality;
  •   Reform efforts strengthen institutional independence, editorial freedom, and public trust;
  •   Public debate on RTSH supports constructive, standards-based reform rather than institutional uncertainty.

 

We stand ready to support and engage in a serious, inclusive and standards-based reform process that strengthens RTSH as a genuinely independent, accountable, and future-oriented public service media institution, in line with European principles and the public’s right to independent and pluralistic information. International organisations remain open to visiting Albania in the coming year to take part in ongoing debates.

Signed by:

Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) Partners 

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)

Reporters Without Borders

SafeJournalists Network

  • Association of BH journalists
  • Association of Journalists of Kosovo
  • Association of Macedonian Journalists
  • Croatian Journalists’ Association
  • Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia
  • Trade Union of Media of Montenegro

Civil society organisations in Albania:

  • Association of Professional Journalists of Albania (APJA)
  • Center Science and Innovation for Development (SCiDEV)
  • Albanian Media Council (KSHM)
  • Union of Journalists and Media Workers (SGPM)
  • AWA (Albanian Woman in Audiovisual)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Library

Georgia: Restrictive new funding law would further cut off…

Georgia: Restrictive new funding law would further cut off media and journalists

The MFRR partners strongly condemn the proposals of the Georgian Dream (GD) ruling party to implement a series of legislative amendments that would impose additional restrictions and penalties on recipients of grants and foreign funding.

30.01.2026

If implemented, our organisations warn the amendments would strengthen an already restrictive web of legislation targeting financial support to media and civil society and could eliminate the ability of Georgian journalists and media outlets to receive any form of independent funding.

 

The proposed changes were announced on January 28 by Georgian Dream’s parliamentary majority leader and are set to be adopted on February 3. Under the fast-tracked proposals that were registered in the Parliament, violations of the new law would be punishable by a fine, 300 to 500 hours of community service, or imprisonment for a term of up to six years. 

 

The proposals would significantly broaden the scope of what is considered a “grant”, defining virtually any foreign-linked funding connected to public, political or policy-oriented activities as a grant. Media organisations and journalists who receive these grants or funding without prior government authorisation could face criminal penalties of up to six years’ imprisonment. 

 

Payments for journalism-related services, research or expertise by foreign actors could also be treated as illegal grants. Government approval would also be required for foreign organisations seeking to provide grants to their own local branches, for foreign-registered entities mostly engaged in activities related to Georgia, and for foreign actors hiring experts in Georgia. 

 

In addition, the criminal code would introduce an “aggravating circumstance” for “money laundering related to activities concerning Georgia’s internal political affairs,” punishable by a prison term of between 9 to 12 years.

 

The latest proposals add to an alarming list of restrictive pieces of legislation that undermine media freedom and civil society already passed in 2025.  According to Mapping Media Freedom monitoring, Georgia experienced a sharp rise in legal incidents, which accounted for 42.0% of all recorded cases. With 60 legal incidents documented in 2025, the number nearly doubled compared to 33 alerts in 2024.

 

Repressive legislation adopted by GD within the last two years included the foreign agents law, a Georgian version of FARA, amendments to Georgia’s Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression, as well as amendments to the laws on Grants and Broadcasting. Collectively, these legal measures not only threatened the survival of the media but also imposed restrictive censorship, pushing Georgian journalism to the brink of survival. 

 

MFRR partners have repeatedly warned that the already unprecedented clampdown on the country’s media would only intensify without sustained international pressure. Despite an increasingly hostile environment for free media, independent journalists remain in the country and refuse to be silenced or forced into exile. However, they urgently need international support. 

 

The proposed amendments are incompatible with Georgia’s international human rights obligations, including its commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights and its membership in the Council of Europe. They also conflict with Georgia’s obligations under the OSCE, which require the protection of freedom of expression and the ability of the media to operate independently.

 

We therefore welcome the invoking of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism to launch an expert mission on the deteriorating human rights situation in Georgia. 

 

Moving forward, our organisations urge the GD-led parliament to immediately scrap plans to adopt these restrictive amendments and repeal existing repressive legislation, including the foreign agents law, the Georgian version of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and the amendments to the laws on Grants and Broadcasting. Finally, we reiterate our call on the European Union and the international community to respond forcefully to the ruling party’s clampdown on media and civil society, including through additional targeted sanctions.

In 2025 and 2026, Mapping Media Freedom (MMF) database documented 149 alerts in Georgia which affected 268 journalists and media entities.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI) 
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Allgemein

Poland: Opinion on EMFA reform of Broadcasting Law

Poland: Opinion on EMFA reform of Broadcasting Law

The International Press Institute (IPI), the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) and Free Press Unlimited (FPU) provide the following contribution to the public consultation into the draft act to amend the Polish Broadcasting and Television Act. The draft Act published by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage represents a core element of the implementation of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).

28.01.2026

The International Press Institute (IPI), the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) and Free Press Unlimited (FPU) provide the following contribution to the public consultation into the draft act to amend the Polish Broadcasting and Television Act. The draft Act published by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage represents a core element of the implementation of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).

 

The submission is made as part of our four organisations work in the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide consortium that monitors threats against media freedom and advocates for measures to improve the freedom of the press in European Member States and Candidate Countries. This opinion submission was led by IPI and supported by ECPMF, EFJ and FPU.

 

MFRR partners held an international press freedom mission to Warsaw in 2024 to meet with the new government and call for democratic reform. The recommendations from that mission were published in the following report. This submission follows the engagement of the MFRR with Polish authorities during the visit, builds on individual reports of partner organisations and MFRR monitoring in 2025.

 

MFRR partners have been among the key international media freedom bodies advocating strongly for the European Media Freedom Act (EU Regulation 2024/1083) and our organisations have engaged with the European Commission in all stages of its design, creation and implementation. In line with this commitment, our organisations provide the following opinion on the draft amendment of the Broadcasting Act, which we hope will have a positive effect on creating additional safeguards for the protection of free and independent journalism in Poland.

 


Introduction

The draft act to amend the Broadcasting and Television Act overall represents a positive but incomplete initiative to reform Polish media legislation and create additional safeguards to protect free and independent media in Poland. In its current form it represents a rule of law-oriented effort to implement elements of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which entered into full force in August 2025. Our organisations commend the public consultation and the invitation to civil society and media organisations to participate. After this analysis, recommendations for changes to the draft amendment are outlined at the end of this submission.

 

Strengthening independence and the role of the National Broadcasting Council

A central pillar of the draft amendment involves the reformulation of the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) and measures to strengthen its independence. In a major change, the number of members on the KRRiT would be increased from five to nine, with four appointed by Sejm, two by the Senate and three by the President. One-third of the members will be replaced every two years.

 

KRRiT’s mandate would be expanded. Functions would include supporting self‑regulation in audience measurement and supporting the Media Ethics Council. It would also oversee and maintain a new database on media ownership and flows of state advertising to media. Under new EMFA rules, it would also be tasked with assessing media mergers and acquisitions through the lens of media pluralism and editorial independence (see below).

 

Under the draft legislation, the system for appointments to the expanded KRRiT would also be updated to strengthen selection criteria. Applicants would not be able to have been members of a political party in the past five years and must not have held party functions or have run on party lists in the last decade. Candidates would also require the written support of media or cultural NGOs. All appointment decisions must be preceded by public hearings with civil‑society participation. Decisions made by KRRiT’s chair would now need prior consent by the council.

 

Our organisations welcome the proposed reforms to KRRiT, which aligns with Article 7 of EMFA regarding the independence of national regulatory authorities. Under previous governments, KRRiT has undergone repeated cycles of politicisation, eroding its independence. The organisations notes the highly problematic actions of its former chair, who took disproportionate and unilateral actions against media reporting critical of the government. The requirement for decisions made by KRRiT’s chair to require consent from the council would strengthen democratic decision-making and are therefore particularly welcome.

 

We also welcome changes to criteria and civil society support for appointments, which would help improve the professionalism and independence of future candidates. An increased number of councillors on the KRRiT would also make any future political capture of the regulator more challenging, though not impossible. Overall, these changes would add safeguards but not firewalls, and the KRRiT should be closely monitored by civil society bodies.

 

Our organisations underscore that the independent functioning of KRRiT would be crucial to the success of the proposed reforms, including the strengthening of the independence of Poland’s public media. Considering the KRRiT’s members would be chosen by the Sejm, Senate and President, some level of political influence would remain. Some of the current KRRiT members exemplify these challenges.

 

The expansion of its mandate and centralisation of powers – spanning PSM performance and involvement of appointments, funding allocation, licensing regulation, and pluralism opinion – poses structural risks. Our organisations therefore urges a phased process of implementation to ensure KRRiT is reformed before its mandate is expanded. Options should be explored for a staggered implementation of the law to guarantee this.

 

Given the extension of the mandate of the KRRiT and the concentration of powers, we also urge the Ministry to assess whether the budget of the regulatory body is sufficient to adequately carry out its foreseen roles and responsibilities. However, additional funding, if required, should also be tied to reforms of KRRiT which increase its independence.

 

Regarding the proposed role of KRRiT in supporting the implementation of journalistic codes of ethics, our organisations stress that any increased involvement in ethics development by KRRiT should be either limited or scrapped. Media ethics should be the sole self-regulatory responsibility of media and journalists, not a politically-appointed regulator.

 

Dissolution of National Media Council

Under the draft amendment, the National Media Council (NMC) would be abolished. Article 1(18) of the draft bill repeals Articles 27–28a of the Broadcasting Act, which govern the NMC’s establishment, composition and powers. This would render the 2016 law establishing NMC obsolete. Upon dissolution, the NMC’s authority to appoint supervisory boards and management for public media (TVP, Polish Radio, PAP) would revert to the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT). The NMC was established in 2016 by the Law and Justice (PiS) party to oversee public media, with powers to appoint and dismiss their boards and supervisory boards, approve programme councils and ensure alignment with the “national interest” in public broadcasting.

 

Partner organisations of the MFRR have strongly criticised the function and independence of the National Media Council. Its establishment in 2016 bypassed the existing constitutional body, KRRiT, to establish a separate public media regulator dominated, by design, by political allies and MPs. Through the NMC, PiS wielded significant power in deciding the composition of the country’s public media, handing the party considerable influence over shaping programming and editorial policy. Although the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruled in December 2016 that the circumvention of the KRRiT’s mandate was unconstitutional, the government used a legal ambiguity to block any reform.

 

Our organisations therefore support the abolition of the National Media Council, which represents a core element in the previous government’s system of capture of the country’s public media. The dismantling of the NMC will return Poland’s media regulatory landscape to constitutional order and eliminate a key lever of government interference over public media, now and in the future. If implemented, the transfer of its powers back to a reformed KRRiT could support the depoliticisation of TVP and would hopefully speed up the end of the current state of liquidation.

 

It should again be stressed that reform of KRRiT to increase its independence and professionalism is vital to securing overall improvement to media regulation. The transfer of the NMC’s regulatory powers to the KRRiT must be preceded by the strengthening of the regulator’s functional independence. Centralising such regulatory powers in the KRRiT without first guaranteeing its independence poses serious risks. Our organisations again stresses the need for a phased process of implementation to ensure KRRiT is reformed before its mandate is expanded. Options should be explored for a staggered implementation to guarantee this.

 

Public media – funding cuts and transfer to tax‑based model

Under the draft amendment, the funding model for public media in Poland would shift from a primarily licence-fee subscription model to an integrated tax‑based model. The current subscription fee would be replaced in 2027 with an audiovisual payment embedded into annual personal income tax declarations. These changes would guarantee at least 2.5 billion PLN (€590 million) per year for 2027–2036. The annual budget would be set by the Finance Minister, allowing significant discretionary power, but would be approved by parliament.

 

Our organisations recognise the ineffectiveness of the current licence fee system. However, our organisations note with concern that, according to estimates, this proposed annual budget would be more than 30% lower than 2024 projections and represents only 0.06% of GDP. According to the European Broadcasting Union, this would rank Poland 26 out of 27 EU countries for public media funding, well below the EU average of 0.12% of GDP.

 

Article 5 of EMFA requires Poland to ensure public service media have editorial independence, transparent governance and stable and adequate funding. While the proposed reform would foresee ‘stable’ funding until 2036 on paper, the cut of 30% undermines alignment with EMFA rules on ‘adequate’ PSM funding. The foreseen cut would add financial strain to an already lost list of challenges facing the broadcasters, which remain under liquidation.

 

We therefore urge the government to rethink the proposed tax‑based model to ensure changes from 2027 would not result in significant budget cuts. We urge the Ministry of Culture and National heritage to guarantee funding of at least 0.12% of GDP, ensuring Poland remains within the EU average. A failure of the government to provide adequate and sustainable funding would undermine the ability of Poland’s public media to continue their process of reform.

 

The MFRR partners also warn that replacing the licence fee with budgetary subsidies, set by the Finance Minister, would make public media vulnerable to government decisions. Even if the funding requires parliamentary approval, this could potentially contradict EMFA Article 5 on independence. Annual budget cycles, while legally guaranteeing a minimum budget, could leave funding vulnerable to destabilising annual fluctuations. Additional safeguards should be implemented to ensure the annual allocation by the Minister is handled in a transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory and merit-based manner, with strong parliamentary oversight. Ultimately, the abolition of the subscription fee should only be undertaken if funding is guaranteed in a model which is truly stable, without major cuts, and independent of government.

 

Public service media – appointments and governing procedures

Public service media governance would also be redesigned. Telewizja Polska, Polish Radio, and the 17 regional broadcasters, would be brought together under a unified governance model. As outlined above, the National Media Council would be eliminated and its powers would return to the KRRiT. Supervisory boards and programme councils would be reduced to nine members and partly filled through competitions organised by KRRiT, based on civil society and staff nominations, with published rankings and reasoning for transparent choices made. Editors‑in‑chief would be appointed from shortlists prepared by the TVP and PR programme councils, following consultations with editorial teams and trade unions. The overall position of manager of the PSM would be held in a single role.

 

Our organisations is broadly in favour of the new system for management appointments, which represents a significant improvement on the current system. The proposed changes would increase transparency in the appointment procedure and increase democratic decision-making. We particularly welcome the switch to the appointment of the editor-in-chiefs by the programme council, instead of the NMC, or KRRiT, and new rules to ensure that appointees to these management positions do have demonstrable political connections. If properly implemented and overseen by an independent KRRiT, the proposed changes should help depoliticise the broadcasters and considerably limit the political influence over both future programming and editorial decision-making. Moving forward, we urge the current unstable state of liquidation at public media to be ended in the soonest possible timeframe.

 

While successive governments in Poland failed to create conditions for independent public media, the politicisation of TVP under the previous government caused significant harm. Considerable work remains to be done to limit political influence, professionalise and modernise the broadcasters for the digital age, and rebuild badly damaged public trust. The change in management appointment system will not be enough on its own to undo this damage and will take commitment and time. We again stress that the success of the reform of the public media will be closely tied to the reform of KRRiT. The concentration of appointment procedures for public media in the hands of a single regulatory body poses risks if the independence of the KRRiT is not first guaranteed.

 

Media ownership transparency and state advertising transparency

The draft amendment foresees the establishment of a new system for tracking transparency of media ownership structures and state advertising in media. This database would be overseen by KRRiT. Regarding advertising transparency, it would ensure all allocation of public money to media in the form of state advertising is conducted in a transparent, impartial, inclusive and proportionate and non-discriminatory manner, backed by audits and sanctions. All public entities would be obliged to supply information to KRRiT on their criteria for advertising. In addition, the KRRIT would also maintain an up-to-date database on ownership structures of media entities. The regulator would also be obliged to issue advisory opinions in media‑merger cases and to monitor the market for pluralism and editorial independence.

 

Our organisations support the proposed reforms, which would implement Article 25 of EMFA. As our organisations have identified, under the previous PiS-led government state advertising by public bodies was distorted into a form of reward system for positive coverage, with independent media critical of the government deliberately cut off from these funds. This weaponisation of state advertising to punish watchdog journalism is a central element of media capture. Proposed measures to increase transparency over these financial flows should assist in creating much needed accountability and equity. Future attempts by administrations or regional or local governments to politicise the funding would be visible and far easier to identify and rectify. However, the success of the system in practice would require monitoring to assess the impact of its implementation.

 

To ensure strong oversight of transparent media ownership, the draft amendment should be strengthened to oblige KRRiT to examine all forms of beneficial and indirect ownership structures, with powers to investigate and request information on all non-transparent ownership. Tied to this, further assessment should examine whether the KRRiT has sufficient powers to sanction media outlets for clear breaches of transparency rules or for failing to provide information on ownership structures, while ensuring that any such powers are open to judicial review.

 

Our organisations welcomes the proposed introduction of new obligations for the assessment of media mergers, alongside UOKiK, Poland’s anti-monopoly and consumer rights watchdog. This aligns with Article 22 of the EMFA, which obliges all Member States to provide an assessment of the impact of key media market concentrations on media pluralism and editorial independence. Under the previous government, in 2020 the regional media network Polska Press was controversially acquired by the state-controlled oil company PKN Orlen, despite major concern over the shift in editorial policy to one more favourable to the government. In a legal challenge by the Ombudsman backed by the MFRR, the court rejected the obligation to consider the impact of media pluralism in the local media market when assessing the acquisition. As a result, the merger was approved and the takeover was completed. In the following months, MFRR organisations documented the editorial purge by the newly appointed management in the vast majority of media outlets acquired by Orlen. Had there been clear obligations for an impact assessment at the time, the takeover of Polska Press could have potentially been avoided. We hope that if implemented, the media pluralism test could avoid a repeat of this situation.

 

Our organisations would expect the reformed KRRiT to work with the European Board for Media Services, a new EU body comprising representatives from national media regulators, to carefully assess the impact of any future media mergers of acquisitions at either local and national level on media pluralism and editorial independence and refrain from approving deals if serious concerns emerge. An obligation should be added to require that KRRiT must automatically request an expert opinion from the European Board in all cases flagged by the Polish Ombudsman (Commissioner for Human Rights).

 

Ban on media publications by local public authorities

An earlier version of the draft amendment included plans for new rules to limit local governments’ ability to publish their own press titles. This provision would have helped limit the ability of local governments to sponsor press titles which promote the local authorities in question, especially ahead of elections. We note that the current draft amendment shared for public consultation has removed these rules. We further note the critical response to this change by the Chamber of Press Publishers, the Association of Local Newspapers and the Association of Local Media, which rightly argue that legislation is needed to strengthen local journalism in Poland.

 

The MFRR partners recognise the detrimental impact that the unfair use of state funds by local governments to publish political content has had on local media and the local advertising market. We stress that while this proposed reform is not foreseen within the scope of the EMFA, the reform of the Broadcasting Act can and should go beyond EMFA. As such, our organisations call for the reinstatement of the proposed rules on local government media publication, as initially outlined, while ensuring local authorities can continue to publish crucial information bulletins for citizens. We further stress the need for an additional government package of financial support for local media.

 

Conclusion

As outlined, the draft act to amend the Broadcasting and Television Act overall represents a welcome initiative to reform Polish media legislation, implement key elements of EMFA, and create additional safeguards to protect free and independent media in Poland. It would enhance transparency, good governance and pluralism safeguards. However, there remains space for improvement to create safer guardrails for the independence of the regulatory body KRRiT and help support the sustained reform and depoliticisation of public media.

 

The draft law is undermined by the proposed changes to the system of funding for the public media, which would result in a substantial loss of revenue and could result in unstable annual fluctuations in budgeting. Drastic cuts to the funding for public media must be addressed and additional safeguards must be implemented to ensure the independence of the reformed KRRiT is undertaken before its mandate is significantly extended.

 

If ultimately implemented, and improved with the following recommendations, we believe these reforms would partially undo damage done to Poland’s landscape for media freedom under previous governments, especially that led by PiS, and construct much needed defences against future capture of the media ecosystem.

 

The bill therefore represents a measured and democratic attempt to depoliticise the public broadcasting and media freedom landscape in a proportionate and non-discriminatory manner. Our organisations also assessed that the draft amendment does not include significant additions beyond the scope of the European Media Freedom Act.

 

Until these reforms are fulfilled, Poland will remain frozen in a state of media freedom limbo: trapped with many of the previous damaging changes but unable to reverse them or safeguard against future threats.

 

While other EU countries have already implemented the European Media Freedom Act, Poland lags behind. Our organisations are aware that ultimately the passing of the draft bill into law will depend on its approval by President Nawrocki and are committed to advocating for the passing of the legislative reform despite these limitations.

 

To further improve the quality of the draft amendment, the undersigned partner organisations of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) outline the following recommendations.

 

Recommendations:

– Implement a phased implementation approach to ensure that reform of KRRiT is completed or significantly advanced before its mandate is expanded, to ensure independent media regulation

– To add additional safeguards, detach KRRiT’s assessment powers -such as public service mission performance – from sanctioning and regulatory functions, such as funding allocation and appointment procedures.

– Clarify the methodologies and decision making powers governing KRRiT’s expanded powers, ensuring they are transparent and have the backing of media and civil society groups

– Oblige KRRiT to examine all forms of beneficial and indirect ownership structures, with powers to investigate and request information on all non-transparent media ownership, with transparent criteria and justifications provided for assessments and disclosure powers

– Further assessment to examine whether the KRRiT has sufficient powers to sanction media outlets for clear breaches of transparency rules or for failing to provide information on ownership structures. Provide clarity on the sanctions possible for non compliance with disclosure.

– Assess whether the budget of KRRiT is sufficient to adequately carry out its foreseen expanded roles and responsibilities. Additional funding, if required, should also be tied to reforms of the regulatory body which increase its independence

– Any increased involvement of KRRiT in supporting or promoting journalistic ethics should be either significantly limited or scrapped, as media ethics should be the sole self-regulatory responsibility of media and journalists

– Guarantee a system funding of at least 0.12% of GDP for public media, ensuring Poland remains within the EU funding average

– Examine the possibility of multi-year planning for public media budgets to avoid short-term yearly planning schedules and increase predictability

– Ensure the system for allocation of media budgets provided by the Finance Ministry by KRRiT are clearly grounded in law under a transparent methodology

– Add additional safeguards to ensure the annual allocation of funding by the Finance Minister is handled in a transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory and merit-based manner

– Clarify the relationship between KRRiT and UOKiK regarding media merger assessments and the powers of both bodies, under the new system, to block or challenge media mergers identified as posing a threat to media pluralism or editorial independence

–  Reinstate the originally proposed rules on banning local government media publication, while ensuring local authorities can continue to publish crucial information bulletins

–  Complement the amendment of the Broadcasting Act with additional measures to support local and regional media, to bolster local democracy reporting

–   Take steps to push forward reforms to the public media governance with urgency, ensuring the end of the current state of liquidation and a return to stability for public media employees

 

The undersigned organisations remain open to further communication and dialogue with the Polish government and President in the ongoing creation and debate on the implementation of this bill and wider EMFA reforms, as well as with the journalistic and civil society community.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Albania flag Library

Amendments to Albania’s Criminal Code must be strengthened to…

Amendments to Albania’s Criminal Code must be strengthened to ensure full decriminalisation of defamation

The undersigned organisations of the SafeJournalists Network, partners of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), Reporters Without Borders (RSF) today stress that recent amendments to Albania’s Criminal Code, though positive, must be strengthened to ensure full decriminalisation of defamation.

27.01.2026

Our organisations welcome the amendments to Albania’s Criminal Code approved on 21 January 2026 by the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and Public Administration, which if passed into law would represent important steps forward in improving the climate for media freedom, journalists’ safety and freedom of expression.

 

These amendments reflect a clear political intent to move away from the criminalisation of defamation as part of the European accession process, acknowledging that public-interest reporting carried out in good faith should not be subject to criminal punishment. We also specifically welcome the strengthening of criminal protection against violence and serious threats targeting journalists because of their professional duties, notably through amendments of the Articles 237 and 238 of the Criminal Code, which address long-standing concerns related to journalists’ safety and the state’s positive obligations under European human rights law.

 

At the same time, European standards make clear that partial or status-based approaches to decriminalisation of defamation are insufficient to protect freedom of expression effectively. As long as defamation remains a criminal offence, it produces chilling effects on journalists, civil society actors, activists, whistleblowers, and other public watchdogs. For this reason, full decriminalisation of defamation and insult remains the only acceptable outcome to  ensure durable alignment with European standards and to safeguard public-interest expression in Albania.

 

Against this background, we note that the newly adopted amendments do not yet achieve this objective. The current text introduces a limited, status-based exemption from criminal liability, applicable only to journalists described as “registered and recognised” and only in relation to defamation, while insult remains a criminal offence. This approach raises concerns regarding legal certainty, equal protection of freedom of expression, and the continued chilling effect of criminal law on public debate.

 

In particular, limiting protection to a narrowly defined professional category risks excluding other public-interest speakers, including civil society organisations, activists, researchers, whistleblowers, and citizens, who play a vital role in democratic discourse. Moreover, references to “registered and recognised” journalists are problematic in a context where Albania has no formal system for journalist registration and where such mechanisms would be incompatible with European standards on media freedom and independence.

 

We also note that retaining parallel criminal offences, such as insult, undermines the effectiveness of partial reforms by allowing critical expression to be prosecuted under alternative provisions, thereby maintaining the pressure of criminal law on speech.

 

In light of the above, we encourage the Albanian authorities to build on the positive steps already taken and to pursue full decriminalisation of defamation and insult, in line with European and international standards, and ensure that protection of expression is function-based and linked to public interest and good faith, rather than to professional or status-based criteria.

 

Such an approach would consolidate the progress made so far and ensure that Albania’s legal framework genuinely protects freedom of expression as a cornerstone of democratic society and the rule of law.

 

We reiterate our commitment to supporting Albanian institutions in improving legislation concerning media freedom and freedom of expression. We support the joint declaration of Albanian civil society organisations and their continued engagement to improve the legal framework for freedom of expression.

Signed by:

Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) Partners 

  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • International Press Institute (IPI)

 

Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

 

SafeJournalists Network 

 

  • Association of BH journalists
  • Association of Journalists of Kosovo
  • Association of Macedonian Journalists
  • Croatian Journalists’ Association
  • Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia
  • Trade Union of Media of Montenegro

Reporting Diversity Network

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.