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Serbia: Spyware attacks on BIRN journalists further deepen press…

Serbia: Spyware attacks on BIRN journalists further deepen press freedom crisis

The partner organisations of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) today raise further alarm about the deepening press freedom crisis in Serbia in the wake of revelations showing evidence of the abuse of advanced Pegasus spyware to target two journalists from leading investigative media platform BIRN.

28 March 2025

Our organisations warn that the ultimately failed attempt to use military-grade surveillance technology to spy on journalists from the award-winning Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) represents another milestone in the deteriorating situation in Serbia, which requires immediate and strong interventions from the European Union.

 

The confirmation of spyware use was published by Amnesty International on March 27 and documented how its forensic testing had shown how the two female journalists – one of whom was Jelena Veljković – had both received messages on February 14 containing fake links, which if clicked would have infected the phone with Pegasus, an advanced spyware tool sold by Israeli cybersurveillance firm NSO Group.

 

The messages were sent hours apart in the messaging platform Viber from the same number registered with the state operator Telekom Srbija, and included a link which led to a fake version of the Serbian news portal N1. According to BIRN, after the identical messages were flagged as potential phishing attacks, they were forwarded to Amnesty, which carried out the tests. The human rights group said that there was a high probability that one or more actors from the Serbian state apparatus, or agents acting on their behalf, were involved in the attack.

 

Our organisations strongly condemn the latest example of spyware use to target investigative journalists in Serbia, which is prohibited as a criminal offense under the country’s Criminal Code. These attacks pose a serious threat to journalistic privacy, source protection and media freedom. Alarmingly, these are the seventh and eighth confirmed cases of spyware use against journalists in Serbia, posing a pattern of illegal yet unsanctioned spyware abuse.

 

The MFRR responded to previous revelations in December 2024 which showed how products made by Israeli company Cellebrite were being used by Serbian authorities to extract data from the phones of journalists and activists. Following Amnesty’s report,  Cellebrite revoked its licence to the Serbian authorities. The revelations by Amnesty also documented how domestically-developed spyware, “NoviSpy”, had been developed to infect Android devices and capture confidential information and upload it to a government-controlled server.

 

The new revelations offer yet more damning evidence of the flagrant abuse of NSO’s technology by its clients. NSO claims its products are “sold exclusively to verified government users” such as state law enforcement and intelligence authorities, meaning its use in Serbia would be limited to state agencies.

 

Given the fresh abuses, our organisations firstly call on all Serbian intelligence authorities, police bodies, the Ministry of Interior, and the government to immediately provide transparent information about cyber-surveillance capabilities at their disposal and their use against journalists, as well as information about all ongoing contracts with private surveillance firms, any of which would violate the country’s laws.

 

Secondly, considering the growing body of evidence of Pegasus use by Serbian authorities, our groups demand that NSO Group launch an immediate internal review of any existing contracts with Serbian authorities, consider the repeated breaches of its terms of use, and swiftly revoke any existing contracts, as well as urgently review its safeguards procedures for abuse of its products by authoritarian states.

 

Thirdly, we urge the European Union to strongly condemn the targeting of journalists from BIRN Serbia, and to request urgent answers from Serbian government and law enforcement authorities about repeated abuses of spyware technology. More widely, the EU must take far stronger action to address spyware use against journalists and the rapidly deteriorating media freedom situation in Serbia, which has now reached its most worrying point in decades, in clear violation of fundamental democratic values required for EU accession.

 

Our organisations stand by BIRN Serbia, its journalists, and their important investigative work. We will continue to closely monitor, document and respond to all attacks on press freedom and journalists in Serbia, and will make spyware a central topic of investigation during the MFRR’s upcoming emergency visit to the country on April 7-9. During this trip we will gather information about other potentially unreported spyware attacks and work with partner organisations to investigate them.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Serbia: MFRR media freedom mission to visit Belgrade and…

Serbia: MFRR media freedom mission to visit Belgrade and Novi Sad

The partners organisation of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) will conduct a mission to Serbia between 7-9 April to meet with journalists, media stakeholders and law enforcement authorities amidst a rapidly worsening media freedom crisis.

28 March 2025

During the three-day visit, the delegation will travel to Belgrade and Novi Sad to meet with journalists, editors, media outlets, journalist associations and civil society groups to gather information about the serious spike in pressure on independent journalism and media freedom by state authorities and government officials.

 

The mission has sought meetings with officials from the State Prosecutor’s Office and the Serbian Police, as well as representatives from the European Union office in Belgrade (EU), the Council of Europe (COE), and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE).

 

The visit comes as independent media and those covering ongoing nationwide anti-corruption protests face an increasingly dangerous climate of attacks, harassment, death threats, smears from leading public officials, as well as legal threats, and ongoing regulatory and financial pressure.

 

Since the beginning of protests in November 2024 following the Novi Sad station tragedy, Mapping Media Freedom (MMF), the largest platform in Europe for documenting attacks on journalism and media, which is run by the MFRR, has recorded 66 violations of media freedom and different attacks on journalists.

 

The mission will be led by the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) and joined by representatives from ARTICLE 19 Europe, the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), Free Press Unlimited (FPU), the International Press Institute (IPI) and OBC Transeuropa (OBCT). It is being coordinated with support from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS).

 

The partner organisations of the MFRR last jointly visited Serbia in 2023 to attend events marking the anniversary of the murder of Serbian editor Slavko Curuvija in 1999. An MFRR fact-finding mission to Serbia was also carried out in 2021.

 

A mission report with key findings and recommendations will be published by MFRR partners following the visit and provided to EU authorities.

 

The delegation will also be holding press conferences with both Belgrade and Novi Sad. For more information, or to schedule interviews, please email mfrr@ecpmf.eu

 

Recent MFRR advocacy on Serbia:

Serbia: One year of unpunished attacks on journalist Dinko Gruhonjić

Serbia: Urgent call stop targeting and intimidating journalists

Serbia: Urgent need for a swift and thorough investigation into invasive surveillance of journalists and sources

Serbia: Media independence is an exception rather than the rule

Serbia: Independent journalism faces its biggest crisis in years

Srbija: Misija za slobodu medija MFRR u poseti Beogradu i Novom Sadu

 

Partnerske organizacije platforme Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) će sprovesti misiju u Srbiji između 7. i 9. aprila tokom koje će se sastati sa novinarima, medijskim interesnim grupama i organima za sprovođenje zakona usred sve veće krize slobode medija.

 

Tokom trodnevne posete delegacija će boraviti u Beogradu i Novom Sadu gde će se sastati sa novinarima, urednicima, medijskim kućama, novinarskim udruženjima i organizacijama civilnog društva kako bi prikupila informacije o ozbiljnom porastu pritisaka na nezavisno novinarstvo i slobodu medija od strane državnih organa i službenika.

 

Misija je takođe tražila sastanak sa zvaničnicima Republičkog javnog tužilaštva i policije, kao i sa predstavnicima kancelarije Evropske unije u Beogradu (EU) i Organizacije za bezbednost i saradnju (OEBS).

 

Poseta dolazi u trenutku kada se nezavisni mediji i oni koji izveštavaju o aktuelnim protestima protiv korupcije širom zemlje suočavaju sa sve opasnijom atmosferom napada, uznemiravanja, pretnji smrću, kleveta koje dolaze od visokih državnih funkcionera, kao i pravnih pretnji i kontinuiranih regulatornih i finansijskih pritisaka.

 

Od početka protesta u novembru 2024. nakon tragedije na stanici u Novom Sadu, Mapping Media Freedom (MMF), najveća platforma u Evropi za dokumentovanje napada na novinare i medije, koju vodi MFRR, zabeležila je 66 slučajeva kršenja slobode medija i raznih napada na novinare.

 

Misiju će predvoditi Evropska federacija novinara (EFJ), uz učešće predstavnika ARTICLE 19 Europe, Evropskog centra za slobodu štampe i medija (ECPMF), Free Press Unlimited (FPU), Međunarodnog instituta za štampu (IPI) i OBC Transeuropa (OBCT). Koordinira se uz podršku Nezavisnog udruženja novinara Srbije (NUNS).

 

Partnerske organizacije platforme MFRR poslednji put su zajedno posetile Srbiju 2023. godine kako bi prisustvovale događajima povodom obeležavanja godišnjice ubistva srpskog novinara Slavka Ćuruvije 1999. godine. Mreža MFRR je 2021. godine u Srbiji obavila misiju za procenu stanja slobode medija.

 

Nakon posete partneri MFRR-a objaviće izveštaj sa najvažnijim zaključcima i preporukama, koji će potom biti dostavljen zvaničnicima Evropske unije.

 

Delegacija će takođe održati konferencije za štampu u Beogradu i Novom Sadu. Za više informacija i zakazivanje intervjua pišite na e-mail adresu mfrr@ecpmf.eu

 

Nedavne akcije MFRR-a vezane za Srbiju:

Serbia: One year of unpunished attacks on journalist Dinko Gruhonjić

Serbia: Urgent call stop targeting and intimidating journalists

Serbia: Urgent need for a switf and thorough investigation into invasive surveillance of journalists and sources

Serbia: Media independence is an exception rather than the rule

Serbia: Independent journalism faces its biggest crisis in years

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Serbia: One year of unpunished attacks on journalist Dinko…

Serbia: One year of unpunished attacks on journalist Dinko Gruhonjić, the culture of impunity must end

The members of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) consortium and partner organisations of the Council of Europe’s Safety of Journalists Platform are deeply concerned about the ongoing year-long persecution campaign against journalist Dinko Gruhonjić, programme Director of the Independent Association of Journalists of Vojvodina (NDNV) and Associate Professor at the Department of Media Studies at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad.

14.03.2025

Fifteen attacks against Dinko Gruhonjić have been documented on the MFRR platform since 14 March 2024, when a manipulated video was released falsely portraying him as a political opponent. The majority of these attacks (80%) were threatening and intimidating, including an unprecedented level of death threats sent online and written on his house. Smear campaigns by media tabloids were further amplified by public figures with close ties to the government. The video has been used numerous times to discredit the journalist’s work, including by former Prime Minister Vučević, who stepped down. Gruhonjić has experienced a hostile climate at the Novi Sad University, where his students have also been threatened. In addition, Gruhonjić faced two criminal complaints for ‘hate speech’, along with NDNV President Ana Lalić Hegediš, who was sent death threats as well.

“For 15 days, I became the ‘main story’ on regime-controlled media, effectively the subject of a ‘manhunt’. For the first time in my 35 years of living in Novi Sad, strangers confronted and insulted me on the street, and I faced direct physical threats. Despite this, the Serbian police have provided no protection,” said Dinko Gruhonjić for the 2024 Europe Press Freedom Report of the Council of Europe’s Safety of Journalists Platform.

One year later, alarmingly, none of the threats reported to the Special Prosecutor’s Office for High-Tech Crimes (VTK) has been prosecuted, and the threats persist.

As a prime example, on 16 February 2025, Gruhonjić received seven frightening Facebook messages in a single day from different accounts. They include threats of sexual violence, as well as death threats, warning the journalist that his throat will soon be “cut” and his “bones will be broken”. Two of the messages also threatened to “destroy” the lives of Gruhonjić’s family members. The Safe Journalists Network (SJN), which has been closely following Gruhonjić’s case, reported similar threats the day before on its website. The offices of the NDNV have also been broken into recently, with no action taken by the authorities despite footage of the perpetrators.

Amidst increasing threats against journalists for reporting on student protests and political instability following the fatal collapse of the Novi Sad railway roof, pressures against Gruhonjić and his son, who is based in Croatia, have intensified. In this context, Gruhonjić saw no other choice but to seek protection for his son from the Croatian authorities.

The culture of impunity, deeply entrenched in Serbia, has made journalists distrust law enforcement authorities. Such an environment discourages reporting and goes a long way to legitimise such ad hominem attacks without fear of accountability. We will continue to closely monitor the situation in the country and provide support to journalists in need, as well as call for accountability from the authorities.

The undersigned organisations reiterate their full support for journalist Dinko Gruhonjić and once again urge the authorities, who are aware of all the threats and the identities of many of the perpetrators, to thoroughly investigate all threats and ensure justice without delay.

Signed by:

  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • Index on Censorship
  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
  • PEN International
  • International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

Serbian penal code Library

Serbia: MFRR and SJN urgently call to stop targeting…

Serbia: MFRR and SJN urgently call to stop targeting and intimidating journalists

MFRR partners share a statement condemning the threats and attacks against journalists and media workers when covering demonstrations and protests in Germany, France, Slovenia, Greece, Spain, Poland and Italy. The MFRR calls for increased protection for media freedom across Europe from protestors, unknown 3rd parties and police officers to ensure they are free to continue their work informing the public.

In the aftermath of the deadly collapse of the roof of the Novi Sad railway station on 1 November 2024, journalists have come under unacceptable pressure while covering the tragic story and the subsequent protests. The majority of incidents logged on the Mapping Media Freedom platform are instances of verbal abuse and physical assault against journalists and media workers. Of the 22 incidents documented between November 2024 and February 2025, five attacks were initiated by state officials, including Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his ruling SNS party.

 

Some of the most serious attacks include a death threat sent to Ana Lalić Hegediš, the Executive Director of the Independent Journalists Association of Vojvodina (NDNV), on her Facebook page in November 2024. On 17 January 2025,  NDNV, whose premises had recently been broken into, reported that police had forcibly removed five journalists from the Novi Sad City Hall to prevent them from documenting an opposition-led protest from inside the building. 

 

On 15 February 2025, Ksenija Pavkov, N1 journalist, received death threats and abuse while reporting about an SNS rally in Sremska Mitrovica. On 24 February 2025, private security at the Novi Sad City Assembly – acting on the orders of Assembly President Dina Vučinić – searched journalists, restricted their movement, and locked them in a press room until the end of the conference.

 

Our organisations further note with alarm raids by Serbian police against non-governmental organisations (NGOs) critical of the government conducted on 25 February 2025. The government has portrayed what is happening in the country as a “coloured revolution”, with NGOs allegedly being paid by foreign states to destabilise the country. 

 

The Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA), which runs the fact-checking website Istinomer, an important source of verified information for Serbian citizens, was among the organisations raided without a warrant. These raids, based on unverified claims by individuals within the U.S government about alleged misuse of USAID funds, mark a new level of intimidation on those reporting the truth, with media outlets and media NGOs potentially next.

 

Such acts are a clear violation of press freedom and freedom of expression. They reflect an institutionalised landscape in which violence against journalists and activists is tolerated and encouraged by official rhetoric constantly portraying the press and NGOs as enemies of the state.

 

The MFRR and SJN call on the authorities to refrain from targeting the media and NGOs and to stop inciting hostility to prevent the safety of journalists from further deteriorating. The undersigned organisations also call for thorough and independent investigations into any violence against members of the press, including those allegedly perpetrated by police and private security agencies.

 

At a crucial time, when truth and accurate reporting are more vital than ever, the MFRR and the Safe Journalists Network will continue to closely monitor the developments in Serbia and stand in full solidarity with Serbian civil society and journalists targeted for reporting the truth.

Signed by:

Media Freedom Rapid Response

  • European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe 
  • Free Press Unlimited
  • International Press Institute (IPI)

 

SafeJournalists Network

  • Association of Journalists of Kosovo
  • Association of Macedonian Journalists
  • Association of BH journalists
  • Croatian Journalists’ Association
  • Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia
  • Media Union of Montenegro

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries.

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Serbia: Urgent need for a swift and thorough investigation…

Serbia: Urgent need for a swift and thorough investigation into invasive surveillance of journalists and sources

The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) partners and the SafeJournalists Network (SJN) are expressing serious concern over the revelations in Amnesty International’s forensic analysis, exposing the invasive use of spyware and other digital tools by Serbian intelligence services and police to hack journalists’ phones as part of a covert surveillance campaign. These concerning revelations come amidst escalating threats against journalists in Serbia.

In the report “A Digital Prison”: Surveillance and the Suppression of Civil Society in Serbia” published on 16 December 2024, Amnesty International revealed that mobile forensic products made by the Israeli company Cellebrite were being used by the Serbian authorities to extract data from the phones of journalists and activists, while new Serbian spyware, “NoviSpy”, had been developed to infect devices and capture confidential information, including contact lists, which were then uploaded to a government-controlled server.

 

According to Amnesty International, Cellebrite technology, widely used by police and intelligence agencies worldwide to unlock devices and search for evidence, was given to Serbia in 2019 as part of an aid package to help the country meet EU integration requirements. Amnesty International asked for comments from the Serbian government ahead of the publication but has not received a response.

 

Among the dozens of testimonies, collected with BIRN’s contribution, from activists and journalists whose phones were hacked during detentions and interrogations by Serbian police is the case of Slaviša Milanov, a journalist for FAR portal. On 21 February 2024, Milanov was traveling to the city of Pirot when he was arrested and taken to a police station, on the pretext of conducting a breathalyser test. Upon entering the police station, Milanov was ordered to leave his phone and personal belongings at the police reception. After his drug test came back negative, plainclothes police officers sent him to a second police station, where he was questioned on suspicion of transporting wanted persons across the Bulgarian border, which Milanov denied. The journalist was then questioned over his work.

 

“After his release, Slaviša noticed that his phone, which he had left at the police station reception during his interrogation, appeared to have been tampered with, and his phone data was turned off. He requested Amnesty International’s Security Lab to conduct a forensic analysis of his phone (…). The analysis revealed that Cellebrite’s UFED product was used to secretly unlock Slaviša’s phone during his detention,” declared Amnesty, before adding that additional forensic evidence confirmed NoviSpy was also used by the Serbian authorities to infect Milanov’s phone.

 

We urge the Serbian authorities to conduct a thorough, impartial, and independent investigation into the alleged use of spyware against journalists, which is prohibited as a criminal offense under the Serbian Criminal Code. The MFRR consortium also calls on the government to strengthen protections for journalists’ freedom of expression, privacy, and sources, as guaranteed under international human rights law. Transparency and oversight of the secret services are essential to prevent further violations of journalists’ rights.

 

Under the 2023 EU Recommendation on the investigation of the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware, the use of spyware by law enforcement should only be authorised in exceptional cases, for a predefined purpose, and for a limited time. Journalists’ data should be protected from surveillance unless there is evidence of criminal activity.

 

In addition, the MFRR partners echo Amnesty’s call to EU key institutions to prioritise the development of an EU framework addressing threats to fundamental rights posed by spyware applicable also to the candidate countries. This must include rigorous accountability mechanisms for state surveillance practices in line with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) as well as an EU-wide ban on the production, export, sale, import, acquisition, transfer, servicing, and use of spyware, which disproportionately interferes with those rights.

 

No “digital prison” must be created and allowed to operate freely as a tool to repress and silence journalists and civil society representatives for their work of public interest.

Signed by:

Media Freedom Rapid Response 

  • The European Federation of Journalists (EFJ)
  • European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • ARTICLE 19 Europe

SafeJournalists Network 

  • Association of Journalists of Kosovo
  • Association of Journalists of Macedonia
  • Association BH Journalists
  • Croatian Journalists’ Association
  • Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia
  • Trade Union of Media of Montenegro

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

The team of journalists at KRIK. Credit: Oliver Bunic (NIN) Library

Self-defence against SLAPPs in Serbia

Self-defence against SLAPPs in Serbia

In Serbia, the investigative newspaper KRIK is the target of frequent legal harassment. To counteract it, the editorial team has developed strategies based on civil society solidarity, public denunciation and monitoring of trials

 

By Massimo Moratti
Originally published by OBCT. Also available in ITA.

In Serbia, SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) against independent journalists are causing increasing concerns.

 

What caused a stir was the start of the trial against the investigative journalism portal KRIK     by a judge of the Belgrade Court of Appeal, Dušanka Đorđević, who filed both a civil and criminal case against the journalists, demanding, among other things, a ten-month prison sentence and the imposition of an accessory penalty, a two-year ban from practicing the profession.

 

The charge? Publishing data on the judges’ assets, which were already public. The data in question are part of KRIK’s online database “Prosudi ko sudi” (which can be translated as “examine those who judge”), which discloses to the public the properties and financial status of judges presiding over highly sensitive cases, such as the murders of Prime Minister Đinđić and journalist Ćuruvija, or cases against prominent politicians and possible connections with the criminal world.

 

KRIK and SLAPPs

This is not the first harassing action targeting KRIK. In fact, the portal has collected 16 of them, most of which are civil cases, but there are also criminal or commercial cases.

 

Over time, KRIK journalists have become accustomed to it. They know that when they write about certain topics or mention certain people, they soon find themselves facing new legal harassment. Nonetheless, journalists seem to have found a way to coexist with SLAPPs and above all a way to combat and discourage them.

 

Distrust in the authorities

Many SLAPPs come from individuals close to the majority party or from members of the government majority. For this reason, despite the fact that the lack of media freedom is a sore point for Serbia and one of the obstacles to accession to the European Union, as found in the most recent EU Progress Report    , KRIK journalists do not believe that there is good will on the part of the Serbian authorities to contain the phenomenon.

 

Even if the government decides to adopt measures that reflect the content of the recent anti-SLAPP directive, as recommended on several occasions, “it is more than legitimate to suspect that such measures would in fact distort the content of the directive and turn it into another tool to muzzle the media,” as Bojana Jovanović, deputy editor-in-chief of KRIK, tells us.

 

Unfortunately, based on their experience, KRIK editors are doubtful about official initiatives and believe that, at best, they are merely formal efforts without any genuine will to solve the problem.

 

Per questo motivo, è molto meglio organizzarsi da soli e porre in atto strategie, tra organizzazioni della società civile, volte a sostenersi a vicenda e a contenere l’impatto delle SLAPP.

 

The strength of civil society

For this reason, it is much betterf or civil society organisations to self-organise and implement strategies aimed at supporting each other and containing the impact of SLAPPs.

 

KRIK’s experience is also useful for other organisations that are facing legal harassment and need to prevent those forms of intimidation that progressively lead to self-censorship and loss of quality of investigative journalism.

 

KRIK’s strategies are essentially based on solidarity among civil society organisations and on the public denunciation of SLAPPs. They clearly cannot replace the necessary legal assistance or material and psychological support among journalist organisations, but rather complement and strengthen them. These strategies consist of simple measures.

 

First, when KRIK journalists are informed that legal action has been initiated against them, they report the fact without trying to hide it, but publicly inform partners and donors that yet another SLAPP has been initiated.

 

In this way, the perpetrators of the harassment are exposed to the public and KRIK readers have the opportunity to show support and solidarity. This sends a clear signal that KRIK is not alone in facing legal harassment, but enjoys the support of other parts of civil society, international organisations and even diplomatic representations that care most about media freedom in Serbia.

 

As the case progresses and approaches the actual trial, it is very useful for the fairness and transparency of the proceedings to have independent observers following the case in court. They can be members of other professional organisations, civil society organisations, members of diplomatic representations and international organisations, both governmental and non-governmental.

 

Practice suggests that when there are observers present in the courtroom, tensions are reduced and the proceedings tend to follow the normal procedure, resulting in fairer treatment for defendants.

 

In order to better deal with SLAPPs, KRIK has joined forces with other organisations in the sector such as the Slavko Čuruvija Foundation and BIRN (the Balkan Investigative Journalism Network).

 

When one of these organisations is the target of a SLAPP, the others report the case through their channels and bring it to the attention of their readers.

 

The three organisations have decided to extend this media coverage also to local initiatives that find themselves facing similar situations.

 

Outside Belgrade, in fact, there are many journalists who are targeted by SLAPPs and their economic situation makes them even more vulnerable than the media in the capital, as the disproportion of forces is even greater. For this reason, when they learn of harassment against smaller outlets, in agreement with the interested parties, they report the news at the national level to discourage those who started the SLAPPs.

 

Finally, demonstrating that you are not intimidated by lawsuits and that you continue to do your job is another way to discourage SLAPPs. Showing that they do not have the desired effect and that journalists continue to write anyway removes the incentives to start new lawsuits.

 

Greater awareness of SLAPPs

In conclusion, it is also important to remember that, as Bojana argues, “now there is greater awareness of SLAPPs and not only those who work in the sector, but also the general public is learning to recognise them as another gag on the independent press”.

 

In the past, this was not the case; it was believed that these were limited cases and that the plaintiffs could have legitimate motivations, which could be proven in court. Now, however, we know that these lawsuits only intend to intimidate journalists and block their activity and are therefore rightly perceived in this light.

 

In this sense, it is important to continue to educate the public and spread awareness about this form of legal harassment.

The team of journalists at KRIK. Credit: Oliver Bunic (NIN) Library

Serbian judge’s lawsuits set to chill press freedom

Serbian judge’s lawsuits set to chill press freedom 

The Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) expresses grave concern regarding the legal threats facing the Serbian investigative news organization KRIK and its journalists. These abusive legal actions include demands for imprisonment and bans from journalism. We stand with the journalists on trial, and urge Serbia to implement anti-SLAPP safeguards to protect independent media.

KRIK is currently facing 16 Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), vexatious legal actions intended to intimidate the defendants rather than seek justice. Two of these, whose trial began recently, were initiated by Appellate Court Judge Dušanka Đorđević and her husband Aleksandar, a lawyer engaged by the Ministry of Finance. 

 

The couple accuses KRIK’s Stevan Dojčinović and Bojana Pavlović of data protection violations, after the journalists published details about Judge Đorđević’s assets and career in an award winning database aiming to increase transparency in the judiciary. According to KRIK, all the data was lawfully obtained from publicly accessible sources.

 

The plaintiffs seek penalties of €6,500 in damages, 10-month prison sentences, and 2-year bans on journalism for the accused journalists. Any conviction would set a dangerous precedent and severely undermine press freedom. 

 

The lawsuits exhibit all the characteristics of SLAPPs, as they seem to aim to intimidate the journalists rather than addressing legitimate legal concerns.

The MFRR consortium believes that the case is part of a broader campaign to silence KRIK for its investigative journalism. The outcome will be a test for the Serbian judiciary’s independence and commitment to the rule of law. It will also be a test of the judiciary’s ability to provide a fair trial and to ensure that the presiding judges are not unduly influenced by their colleagues bringing the case. 

 

A guilty verdict will have a terrible chilling effect on the media and potentially spell the end of investigative public interest journalism in the country. 

 

We stand in solidarity with KRIK and its journalists. The MFRR believes that this case presents all the features of a SLAPP and the relevant EU provisions, including early dismissal, should be taken into account by the judiciary. Furthermore, our consortium calls on the Serbian authorities to refer to the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on countering the use of SLAPPs, aligning domestic safeguards to prevent similar cases in the future with international human rights standards.

 

The MFRR will continue to monitor the case closely, to advocate for the public’s right to hold power accountable and against the erosion of independent journalism.

Signed by:

  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)
  • Free Press Unlimited (FPU)

This statement was coordinated by the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR), a Europe-wide mechanism which tracks, monitors and responds to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States, Candidate Countries and Ukraine.

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Event

Media Freedom in the Western Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities…

Media Freedom in the Western Balkans:

Challenges and Opportunities in the Framework of EU Enlargement 

07 October, 11:00 CET.

Free and independent media play a key role in ensuring citizens’ right to information on issues of public interest and in holding power into account. A sound media system is thus a pillar of democracy and the rule of law. 

 

Over the past years, the Media Freedom Rapid Response has noted a gradual deterioration of media freedom standards across EU member states and candidate countries. Common issues of concern include the increased interference of political powers in the governance of public service media, the lack of transparency in media ownership, precarious working conditions, and growing intimidation and threats against journalists and media professionals. 

 

These concerns have prompted EU institutions to take action and introduce new legislative tools to address such trends, such as the anti-SLAPP directive and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). While aiming to harmonize media freedom standards across member states, these newly adopted norms will have an impact on candidate countries, as they move forward in the alignment with the EU acquis as part of the accession process. 

 

This webinar will present the updated results of two Shadow Reports on Media Freedom in Albania and Serbia prepared in collaboration with the Centre Science and Innovation for Development (SCiDEV) and the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia. It will explore media freedom-related challenges and developments in the two candidate countries taking into consideration the ongoing negotiations to join the EU and the annual progress reports that the European Commission is expected to publish later in the autumn. 

Moderator

Serena Epis

OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

Opening Remarks

Cristina Caputo

Adriatic and Balkan Unit, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

Maja Smrkolj

Political Desk Serbia DG NEAR, European Commission 

Speakers

Tamara Filipović

Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (IJAS)

Blerjana Bino

Centre Science and Innovation for Development (SCiDEV)

Final Remarks

Massimo Moratti

OBC Transeuropa (OBCT)

Digital security Library

Digital security in Serbia: Another challenge to media freedom

Digital security in Serbia: Another challenge to media freedom

Media outlets in the country are increasingly exposed to cyber attacks, online threats and manipulations. We talked about digital security and its impact on independent journalism in Serbia with Bojan Perkov, digital policy coordinator at SHARE Foundation.

 

Interview originally published by OBCT. Available in Italian here.

SHARE Foundation  is a Belgrade-based NGO that works on privacy protection, security and freedom of expression. The activities of the organisation include training, support and awareness raising on digital security for journalists, activists, civil society and human rights defenders. These are organised around four pillars: freedom of expression online, data protection, digital security, and free access to knowledge. The NGO has also developed the SHARE CERT  , the first special CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) in Serbia for online media and civil society, offering incident response, training and mentorship to journalists and media organisations that incur in digital issues.

 

What are the main trends that you notice regarding digital security challenges in Serbia?

We recently published our yearly monitoring report in which we track violations in three main areas: cyber attacks, privacy and data protection issues, as well as frauds, threats and manipulations. In 2023, we recorded many threats and manipulations. During the election campaign, for example, opposition politicians faced significant digital threats, including a smear campaign involving an intimate video aired on national TV, which forced a politician to withdraw from the race.

 

Are media outlets and journalists major targets of digital rights violations?

Yes, they are frequently targeted, especially when they expose government wrongdoing. This makes them inconvenient for the authorities. Civil society organizations like CRTA also face attacks from high-ranking officials.

 

Who are the most common offenders and forms of online attacks?

Public officials and politicians are the major offenders. However, we also see attacks from citizens, especially on social media. While these citizen attacks are numerous, those from politicians have more severe consequences. As for the kind of attacks, we mostly observe smear campaigns, accusations, and insults, often through social media and pro-government media outlets. Private actors often use SLAPPs, strategic lawsuits against journalists who write about their activities. Investigative outlets like KRIK, for example, face numerous lawsuits and digital threats from powerful actors.

 

How do these digital security challenges impact journalism?

Journalists continue their work professionally despite threats. However, these attacks amplify public hatred towards them, creating a hostile environment.

 

Is there an awareness of the seriousness of digital threats among journalists and civil society organizations?

Awareness varies. Organizations that have experienced attacks are more vigilant, while others may not realize the severity of these threats.

 

How prepared are media outlets to face digital threats?

There is a gap among media outlets. Smaller local media often lack resources and digital security awareness. Investigative journalists, however, are well-prepared, receiving training and support, especially from international organizations like OCCRP. They often meet confidential sources in person and use encrypted apps like Signal. They implement proper digital security measures tailored to their threat models.

 

How do you assess Serbia’s legal framework regulating the digital environment, especially regarding media freedom?

It can be improved. Most laws are influenced by European integration. For instance, our law on personal data protection is modelled after GDPR but, it combines it with the law enforcement directive, making it complex. We also have the law on information security, primarily focused on critical infrastructure. Efforts to update it were stalled by political events.

 

Do you see a gap between the law and the practice?

Yes, implementation often lags due to a lack of political will. Independent institutions try their best, but the broader system is not supportive.

 

Is there a network or coalition advocating for digital security in the country? Do you have transnational links with counterparts in the EU and other regions?

We are part of the national CERT network and cooperate with other special CERTs. We represent civil society and media in these forums.

The SHARE Foundation is also a member of European Digital Rights (EDRi) and other networks, such as CiviCERT. We receive significant support from these coalitions, which is empowering and essential for our advocacy efforts. We also co-founded the Southeast European Digital Rights Network, involving diverse organizations from across the region.

This publication is the result of activities carried out within the Media Freedom Rapid Response and within ATLIB – Transnational Advocacy for Freedom of Information in the Western Balkans, a project co-funded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. All opinions expressed represent the views of their author and not those of the co-funding institutions.

Library

Serbia: Media independence is an exception rather than the…

Serbia: Media independence is an exception rather than the rule

Increasing political and financial pressure threatens the independence and editorial autonomy of many media outlets in Serbia. We interviewed Irina Milutinović, Senior Research Associate at the Institute of European Studies in Belgrade and co-author of the Country Report on Serbia of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2023.

 

Interview conducted by OBCT and originally published here

According to the Serbia Media Pluralism Monitor 2023, editorial independence is one of the areas in which Serbia registers high risks. What are the main threats to editorial autonomy in the country? 

Journalists suffer various forms of pressure, mostly of a political and financial nature. Independent editors in Serbia are an exception, rather than the rule. They are usually appointed by their media owners, who choose from among their loyal so that they can control journalists’ work from the inside through soft censorship.

 

Some significant forms of pressure come from SLAPPs as well as from smear campaigns, often initiated by state authorities and public officials and mostly targeting investigative and critical journalists as enemies of the country.

 

Political pressure is also applied through financial blackmail: state advertising and direct state subsidies are often allocated through politically biased and non-transparent mechanisms. Pro-government media are the biggest beneficiaries of this type of support, including tabloid media, although they often disregard the journalistic ethical code.

 

Finally, most TV and radio stations, as well as print media outlets, belong to companies that are under direct or indirect control of subjects close to the ruling party.

 

What impact do these challenges have on journalists and the quality of their work? 

First, I want to point out that the Serbian media market is highly concentrated and polarised, which means that pro-government media are larger, more numerous, and more influential, while more critical ones have smaller coverage and proportionally weaker public influence. Pro-government media tend to instrumentalise issues of public interest to foster a we vs them dialectic, where “us” are usually described as patriots, while “them” as traitors.

 

Another important feature of the media landscape is poor content pluralism, as most outlets tend to adopt and support the government’s political agenda without any critical approach. So critical voices remain marginalised and lose their capacity to contribute to democratic processes: there is zero debate and no bottom-up transfer of their proposals on government’s decisions.

 

Does this situation impact citizens’ trust in the sector? 

In general, citizens show low levels of trust in the media. Media literacy in Serbia is not good. Most citizens who live in marginalised communities are under a very strong influence of pro-government media. The public service broadcaster RTS has the biggest influence and is perceived as the most trustworthy media in the country.

 

What we notice is an increase in the number of people getting news online. In this regard, it is important to note that the digital space in Serbia is characterised by aggressive communication, threats, and insults, and the number of online attacks on journalists has increased, especially through social networks.

 

In recent years new Internet portals were opened without being properly registered: most of them do not publish an impressum so we don’t know who finances and owns them. A big problem is that these portals act as main spreaders of disinformation and fake news.

 

On the other hand, some digital media have become the real drivers of alternative voices. These portals usually deal with investigative and analytical journalism, offer diversified views, and give space to voices and topics that we cannot find in the mainstream media, such as corruption and criminal affairs, local community problems, human rights, ecology, etc. They are less exposed to political interference, so they have a bigger potential to function as platforms for democratic debate.

 

As part of the EU integration process, Serbia has to align with the EU set of norms, including those on media freedom. How would you assess the country’s legal framework regarding the media sector?

In October of last year, the National Assembly of Serbia introduced two new media laws: the Law on Public Information and Media and the Law on Electronic Media, whose provisions aim at implementing the objectives of the Media Strategy adopted in 2020.

 

Some positive developments must be noted. For example, the Law on Public Information and Media regulates in more detail the process of media co-financing and state aid. When it comes to the Law on Electronic Media, it introduces some provisions that potentially strengthen the independence of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) and others that prescribe a more transparent process for the allocation of public funds.

 

However, not all the provisions of the new laws are harmonised with the Media Strategy and the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive.

 

Regarding editorial independence, for example, what is particularly worrisome is the return of the state to media ownership. According to the Law on Public Information and Media, state-owned companies can fund or own media outlets, a practice that is prohibited by the Media Strategy itself, which on the contrary recognises that the removal of every form of state participation in media ownership is a key factor for the improvement of media freedom in the country.

 

Do you think that the process of EU integration has an impact on the protection of press and media freedom in the country?

It is hard to say. It is true that the government occasionally undertakes some regulatory reforms as part of the EU accession process. But in practice, the adopted regulations are gradually ignored, so the ruling party manages to find ways to maintain and even increase their control over almost the entire media landscape.

 

Overall, I think the situation today is no better than, for example, ten years ago when the negotiation process formally began. I think the EU should honestly recognise that the Serbian government has reached the limits of its willingness to move Serbia forward along the path to EU membership.

 

Even if we don’t take into account Kosovo or the issue of sanctions on Russia, the rule of law and media freedom in Serbia are considered problematic areas that have blocked the opening of new negotiating clusters.

 

The institutional set-up has been further captured by the main governing party and the President himself. In this situation, the recognition that the current model is unsustainable if Serbia wants to move closer to EU membership seems to be the first step.

 

With this in mind, the EU should develop stronger relations with the main opposition parties in Serbia, sending a signal to Serbian citizens that there are other important political actors and partners in Serbia and that the ruling elite cannot claim that it is keeping Serbia on the EU membership path.

This interview was published by OBCT as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) and within ATLIB – Transnational Advocacy for Freedom of Information in the Western Balkans, a project co-funded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. All opinions expressed represent the views of their author and not those of the co-funding institutions.