Memorial photo and candles for Jan Kuciak and Martina Kusnirova are seen in Trnava, Slovakia, on 29th February, 2020. Kuciak, a Slovak investigative journalist, along with his girlfriend, was found shot dead on 25 February 2018 in their home in Slovakia

How Slovak politicians did not learn from the murder…

How Slovak politicians did not learn from the murder of a journalist

Recent legal reforms show promise, yet discrediting attacks on journalists continue

 

By IPI contributor Beata Balogová, editor-in-chief of SME

Igor Matovič, the current finance minister of Slovakia and former prime minister, sailed to power on the wave of public anger and disappointment that in 2018 followed the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová.

 

“Permanent attacks on journalists, defamations, suggesting that journalists are anti-Slovak prostitutes and enemies of the nation” – Matovič listed the sins of former prime minister Robert Fico against the press in an official press release on the day the public learned about the murders. He blamed Fico for “creating an atmosphere” that resulted in the killing of a journalist.

Robert Fico made journalists who uncovered corruption scandals of his governments targets through his permanent attacks. In less than a month after the murders, he had to resign on the heel of massive anti-corruption protests.

In the following parliamentary elections in 2019, Matovič, who throughout his political career used findings of top investigative journalists to build an image of himself of an anti-corruption activist, defeated Fico and became the next prime minister.

But how did it happen that almost five years later Matovič is not far behind Fico when it comes to verbal attacks against journalists? Most recently Matovič likened critical journalists to propagandists of Adolf Hitler and suggested that journalists can be bought for 500 euros to write favorable stories about their client. On a live radio show he also said he would gradually take down the corrupt journalists.

 

Promises and reality

The bouquet of political promises over the grave of Jan and Martina included stronger protection for journalists. This should have partially materialized in a constitutional law granting a special status for journalists along with an equal approach of state institutions to private and state-owned or public media. This law would also curb the possibility of state intervention (such as nationalization) against private media, for example.

The draft of this law is still parked at the ministry of culture, and it is unlikely that this government will find enough political will to pass such legislation.

The parliament, however, in June 2022 did adopt a long-due package of media laws to replace the legislation that had been ignoring the existence of digital media. The beginnings were promising, with the process appearing to reflect what one would find in a press-freedom-conscious country. The ministry of culture consulted on the draft with publishers of key media and experts so that it creates equal ground for different types of media (print, digital, broadcast).

The ambition is to bring more transparency to media ownership by creating a register for media. The state can remove any media from the register if it is financed by someone from the UN sanction list. Media companies must report their sponsors and all financial donations over 1,200 euros annually to the state. The legislation also introduces regulation for video-sharing platforms.

However, in parliament the law became a victim of political bargaining. In a last-minute move, part of the ruling coalition conditioned the adoption of the law packages on the insertion of a “right of reply” for public officials who feel that a media report affects their privacy, honour or dignity into the legislation. This applies also to opinions if these rise from false information.

It was either with a right to statement or no legislation passed at all. Journalists felt that the right of statement was an act of revenge from the ruling coalition in response to journalists’ critical approach to the government and the way they fulfilled their watchdog role during the pandemic.

 

Inspiration from Orbán

In September 2022, the Ordinary People, the party of Matovič, unexpectedly and without any previous discussion submitted to the parliament a proposal to impose a levy on the largest private broadcasters. The public broadcaster would not pay such a levy under this proposed legislation. If adopted, the levy would be a discriminatory measure that directly threatens independent media and allows the state to make interventions into their operation, media lawyers and press freedom advocates have warned.

Many see behind the move an inspiration from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been trying to suffocate the last television station that still broadcasts critical news, RTL Klub. Earlier this year Orbán announced the reintroduction of a tailor-made tax for broadcasters, like the one he had to kill four years ago after massive criticism from European institutions. Since the announcement, the government provided no further details, thus the broadcaster did not know what to expect. However, on October 19 the Orbán government said it will not collect the advertisement tax next year.

Matovič did not discuss this law with experts or the independent broadcasters.

 

Ján and Martina

It was clear from the day of the murder that some politicians would abuse the memory of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová, using them for their own benefit. Matovič would often refer to Jan Kuciak when lashing out at independent media for criticizing his political performance.

When marking the anniversary of the murder in 2022, in a rather ambiguous statement, he said he wished that journalists become like Ján Kuciak. He publicly lashed out at Kuciak’s editor at Aktuality, Peter Bárdy, and said that he does not come anywhere close to Kuciak and only pretends to be his mentor. He called Bardy a shame.

Matovič had a chance to change the approach of politicians towards the media in Slovakia –  not only in the sense of improving the legal environment but also cleaning the atmosphere of hate and verbal attacks. Instead, he sees himself as a victim of the media and compared his situation to those of Holocaust victims. The fact that he is now finance minister, and therefore wields signficiant influence in government, represents a challenge to the independent media as well: having to ponder when to react and when to ignore his attacks against the press.

Orbán succeeded in building elected autocracy in Hungary because he completely captured the press and significantly complicated the functioning of the independent media. Therefore, people in Slovakia should be disturbed by similar tendencies, including politicians describing the press as an organized criminal group or enemies of the nation.

This article is part of IPI’s reporting series “Media freedom in Europe in the shadow of Covid”, which comprises news and analysis from IPI’s network of correspondents throughout the EU. Articles do not necessarily reflect the views of IPI. This reporting series is supported by funding from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and by the European Commisson (DG Connect) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response coalition.

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New Italian government under Georgia Meloni makes international observers and watchdogs question her position on freedom of the press.

Italy: Journalists brace for impact as Giorgia Meloni’s new…

Italy: Journalists brace for impact as Giorgia Meloni’s new government begins

Questions over how new administration will handle press freedom challenges

By IPI contributor Christian Elia

“On World Press Freedom Day my thanks go to the many journalists who fight for the truth. We will always be at their side against all forms of censorship and imposition of the single thought.” 

 

With these words Giorgia Meloni, leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, commented on the anniversary of 3 May earlier this year.

Now, after Meloni was sworn in as prime minister of a hard-right government on October 23, international observers are questioning the position of Meloni and the main supporters of her party on freedom of the press and pondering how the administration will address the many challenges facing the country’s journalists.

The coalition government, in addition to Fratelli d’Italia, includes the Lega, led by Matteo Salvini, and Forza Italia, led by Silvio Berlusconi – figures with a problematic track record on media freedom.

With major European Union initiatives to safeguard media independence and pluralism on the horizon, and major reform initiatives within the country stalled, questions also emerge over how the new administration will handle more systemic changes to the legislative and media landscapes.

 

European inspirations

Meloni’s first international outing after the elections, with a speech at the VOX party meeting in Spain, caused much concern in the media world.

In front of an audience that had heard messages from former U.S. President Donald Trump, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Meloni reiterated how Poland and Hungary are models of government for her, glossing over the fact that both governments are currently facing sanctions proceedings under Article 7 of the EU Treaty for breaches of fundamental values.

Meloni has not only defended Hungary and Poland when she was in opposition, but also reiterated this approach as soon as she won the elections. Press freedom in both countries remains under serious pressure. There are major questions about how far she will take inspiration in governing from these ideological allies, and how far she will support them in democratic forums.

In general, looking at Meloni’s rhetoric, it seems clear that she is now trying to present herself as a moderate leader. However, she remains president of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), a pan-European umbrella party that includes the ruling party in Poland as well as increasingly influential far-right parties in countries such as Spain and Sweden.

In the past, Meloni has also spread and supported conspiracy theories on her social media channels, such as ethnic replacement by migrants and disinformation about vaccines. Unlike other far-right leaders in Europe, however, she has not publicly made hostile comments against journalists or the press in general. Under increased scrutiny and critical reporting from the media, this may yet change.

Her government’s approach to EU efforts to strengthen media freedom and pluralism will be another key issue. To date, she has never taken a position on the European Commission’s Media Freedom Act (EMFA) or other press freedom legislation. Only her actions in government will clarify her positions in Italy and Europe on these issues.

Another major issue on the agenda regarding media will be reform of the country’s penal code regarding “defamation through the press”, which can currently be punished with prison sentences from six months to three years. In the past two years, the Constitutional Court has urged lawmakers to initiate a comprehensive reform of defamation provisions and ruled that incarceration in such cases is unconstitutional. Until now, however, parliament has dragged its feet. Observers are concerned the new government appears unlikely to push forward the reform process.

 

Party problems

Meloni, while always defending her staunchest supporters, has been very careful not to attack freedom of the press directly, taking a cautious stance on the issue of journalists’ work, but not failing to emphasise that in her opinion there is a widespread desire to damage Fratelli d’Italia politically.

What is certain, however, is the attitude of many supporters of her party towards the press. Recent incidents of physical or verbal aggression against journalists can be traced back to extreme right-wing militants, however not directly linked to the Fratelli d’Italia party

The most notorious cases are those of journalist Federico Gervasoni, of the daily newspaper La Stampa, who was threatened with death on social networks for having carried out an investigation into the neo-fascist organisation Avanguardia Nazionale, where some current members of Fratelli d’Italia have operated in the past.

Then there is the case of the journalist Federico Marconi and the photographer Paolo Marchetti, of the weekly magazine L’Espresso, who were physically assaulted for filming during the commemoration by a group of neo-fascists of three right-wing militants murdered in the 1970s. For this attack, exponents of Forza Nuova, an organisation that supported Meloni for a period, were prosecuted by the Italian justice system, but has now distanced itself from her.

The latest episode is the persistent threats against Repubblica journalist Paolo Berizzi, known for his investigations into Italian neo-fascism.

Leading journalist unions and organisations – Ordine dei Giornalisti and the Federazione Nazionale della Stampa Italiana – have called for intervention by the political class in these cases.

Meloni and the party leaders immediately distanced themselves publicly and expressed solidarity with the affected journalists, but never definitively ended relations with the most radical part of her supporters.

 

Journalists’ safety

In recent years the Italian state has become a model with regard to the protection of journalists threatened by the mafia. Roberto Saviano is the best-known symbol of many journalists who have enjoyed not only physical protection,  but also the support of civil society through awareness-raising campaigns.

Another major source of physical attacks and threats over the past 10 years, according to the Italian Order of Journalists, has been politically motivated attacks on the press from groups associated with the far and extreme right.

In order to guarantee the work of journalists and freedom of the press, press freedom groups have stressed that it is necessary for these attacks to not only be punished by the judiciary, but also to be recognised as systematic attacks, so that the Ministry of the Interior and the police, who must protect journalists during these public events and in general, are constantly vigilant.

Whether the new occupants of the Ministry of Interior will continue the important work laid down by previous administrations will be vital for the safety of journalists in Italy moving forward.

 

Media ownership

With respect to the concentration of media ownership, currently Meloni’s leadership team in Fratelli d’Italia does not represent any particular editorial interests.

However, the former deputy Guido Crosetto, an executive of the company Federazione Aziende Italiane per l’Aerospazio, la Difesa e la Sicurezza (AIAD), linked to Confindustria (the trade representation of Italian industrialists), is the one Meloni will be counting on to obtain the support of industrial groups with interests in the media, which until now have never explicitly supported Meloni in her political rise. Crosetto was appointed Minister of Defence in the Meloni government.

Ever since Silvio Berlusconi entered politics in the 1990s, the problem of media freedom arose because the leader of Forza Italia could count on control of important Italian media. Since then, many things have changed and Berlusconi has reduced his role in media, selling the newspaper Il Giornale and negotiating the sale of the Mediaset TV networks.

Today, in the absence yet of a definitive law on the control of the media by politicians, which even the Democratic Party has never achieved, Guido Crosetto seems to be the mediator between the industrial groups and the media they control.

Until now, Giorgia Meloni, as former leader of the opposition and as party leader, has never expressed any particular indications with respect to a whole series of Italian and international regulations on the subject of freedom of the press. Generally, Meloni has preferred communication linked to social networks over mainstream media.

As the new government takes the reins, many of these questions will become apparent. Until then, journalists are preparing for a bumpy ride.

This article is part of IPI’s reporting series “Media freedom in Europe in the shadow of Covid”, which comprises news and analysis from IPI’s network of correspondents throughout the EU. Articles do not necessarily reflect the views of IPI. This reporting series is supported by funding from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and by the European Commisson (DG Connect) as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response coalition.

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